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Abstract
Outsourcing—the practice of contracting out certain stages of production to ex-
ternal suppliers—is an increasingly important feature of the globalized economy.
This dissertation studies outsourcing relationships in the automotive industry to
refine understanding of the theory of the firm. It is composed of three essays,
each covering a different question on the structure of outsourcing relationships.
The first essay investigates the determinants of supplier choice, where three di-
mensions of buyer-supplier proximity are empirically evaluated: geographical,
cultural and relational proximity. The second essay investigates the choice of
relationship governance, by estimating how the complexity and codifiability of
transactions, and the capability of suppliers can influence the way that firms con-
duct their outsourcing relationships. And the third essay investigates technology
adoption in outsourcing, by modeling and testing the link between innovation
and the choice to maintain a long-term relationship.

Chapter 1
General introduction
1.1 Global trends and the role of outsourcing
Two significant trends have shaped the global economic landscape over recent
years:
1. Rise in international trade, and
2. Rise in production fragmentation.
The amount of trade that crosses international borders has risen to unprece-
dented high levels. Total merchandise trade (that is, the volume of imports plus
exports of goods) already stands at around 50% of world GDP ([34] World Bank,
2015), and the bulk of it is trade between outsourcing firms. Across a sample
of 20 countries, 50% to 90% of the value of exports comes from goods that use
inputs sourced from foreign suppliers ([15] Johnson, 2014). Also the number of
countries that participate in international trade has gone up. In 1970, 41 coun-
tries had a volume of trade above 50% of GDP, and in 2010, this number was
already 124 ([34] World Bank, 2015). It implies that firms not only go farther
away to obtain their supplies, but they are also sourcing from many more differ-
ent supply markets. This ability to tap into new supply chains reflects a second
trend.
Over recent years, firms have become more and more specialized in their
core activities. To illustrate, in a sample of 42 countries, the ratio of value
added to exports went down by 10 percentage points between 1970 and 2009 ([14]
Johnson and Noguera, 2012). It implies that firms need to rely on an ever broader
supply base for the delivery of intermediary value, and this can have significant
effects on the composition of markets. In the automotive industry for example,
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suppliers already take up crucial stages of production, including the design and
sub-assembly of high-tech components ([30] Van Biesebroeck, 2010), and almost
80% of total employment in this industry is already located at suppliers ([17]
Klier and Rubinstein, 2008).
Both trends of raising international trade and production fragmentation are
central stage in the globalization phenomenon, which puts outsourcing on an
ever more important role. Despite of these trends, however, much of economic
activity continues to take place within country borders, and even within firm
boundaries. It calls for a careful analysis, grounded on new theoretical insights
and empirical evidence. This dissertation studies outsourcing relationships to
refine understanding of the theory of the firm on three fronts: who firms choose
to trade with, what affects the way that firms trade, and what do they trade.
To tackle these questions, my analysis draws from two general literatures: trade
and governance.
1.2 Insights from the trade literature
The trade literature studies why certain firms often go great lengths to obtain
and deliver their inputs, and why other firms do not. Classic economists as early
as [34] Smith (1776) have argued that firms in different countries will trade with
each other because it allows them to specialize in what they are most productive
at. Specialization can thus create gains of trade, as it enables firms to reach
out for the unique capabilities of distant suppliers ([26] Ricardo (1817) first elab-
orated this in his model of comparative advantage), or their access to unique
resources ([13] Heckscher (1919) and [23] Ohlin (1933) elaborated this in their
factor proportions model).
But trade does not depend on the characteristics of firms alone, also the
composition of markets can influence which firms supply whom. [35] Stigler’s
(1951) original insight established a relationship between the size of the market
and outsourcing. When the market is large enough, outsourcing becomes more
likely as firms are able to spin off stages of production that benefit from increasing
returns to scale. This is reminiscent of a new strand of theory that explains why
firms trade even when there are no apparent gains from comparative advantage.
In the so-called new trade theory, firms offshore production stages because they
may be more efficiently produced abroad, at centralized locations of suppliers.
[18] Krugman (1980) has demonstrated that firms will engage in this form of
trade in order to exploit the economies of scale of entering larger international
1.2 Insights from the trade literature 3
markets. However, while sourcing farther away to tap into larger supply markets
can be important, so are also the costs of overcoming long distances.
A well-established empirical fact in the trade literature is that the amount
of trade is positively related to the size of the trading economies, and negatively
related to distance. As distance costs fall with improvements in shipment tech-
nologies and logistics, more distant firms are able to join the global production
chain, and this can contribute to a larger supply market and a further increase
in trade. This empirical result, known as the gravity equation, has been widely
used as a generalized framework for estimating the effects of distance on trade.
But its aggregate nature presents many caveats. By treating trading firms as rep-
resentative of a country or region, it misses out one of their most distinguishing
characteristics: that they are a very small and unique bunch. Firms that trade
internationally are found to be generally large ([5] Bernard, Jensen, Redding and
Schott, 2007) and highly productive ([20] Melitz, 2003), and they also tend to be
very well managed ([7] Bloom and Van Reenen, 2010).
Studies in international business look in detail at the strategies of large multi-
national firms, many of which are significant players in the automotive industry.
This strand of the literature has developed useful variables to understand where
and with whom firms trade. To source and supply internationally, firms are found
to minimize the costs associated with distance over several relevant dimensions.
These include not just the costs of covering geographical distances, but most
importantly, the costs of dealing with different business cultures ([44] Kogut and
Singh, 1988). Results show, quite consistently, that firms will trade in countries
which are culturally proximate to them, in terms of economic, financial and in-
stitutional proximity, including language and demographics ([7] Berry, Guillén
and Zhou, 2010).
Another important insight relates to the concept of a knowledge economy.
Through outsourcing, firms are able to exploit the advantages of the specialized
knowledge that external suppliers accumulate, including the knowledge about the
suppliers’ own trading partners. Building a unique network of suppliers can thus
become a source of comparative advantage on its own ([9] Dyer, 1996). But to
produce and transmit knowledge, which is tacit in nature, communication is very
important and firms need to rely more strongly on face-to-face interactions within
their network. As distance becomes a very constraining factor in the propagation
of knowledge, a new role for proximity emerges. Studies in regional economics
point to the particular role of agglomeration forces in supporting knowledge flows
between firms ([19] Maskell, 2001; [29] Storper and Venables, 2004). The emer-
gence of supplier parks, often located abroad to support the foreign activities of
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multinational firms, reflects this growing significance of clustering in outsourcing
([64] Reichhart and Holweg, 2008).
1.3 Insights from the governance literature
As more and more firms resort to external suppliers for the delivery of interme-
diary inputs, not just the quantity of buyer-supplier trade goes up, but also the
variety of products and services supplied increases. The governance literature
studies why (and how) firms choose to outsource certain stages of production.
[9] Coase’s (1937) original insight on this question was that to source some-
thing from an external supplier is to engage in a potentially costly transaction.
Difficulty to discover the right suppliers or even to set the right prices can make
trading on markets costly. Particularly when haggling over price and quality
issues with a supplier is likely, the costs of outsourcing can become so high that
firms choose to in-source instead, and use the power structures within a vertically
integrated firm. [77] Williamson (1979) argued that such costly trade disputes
will arise when suppliers are required to make investments that are highly specific
to the outsourcing firm.
Vertical integration can make the resolution of conflicts quicker and less costly,
but it can also pose several problems in terms of incentives, that sometimes only
independent ownership can overcome. This trade-off was first modeled by [14]
Grossman and Hart (1986), who showed, in what is known as the property rights
theory, that firms will choose to outsource whenever sourcing from independent
suppliers is more productive than integrating production.
As suppliers accumulate specialized knowledge, they also become increasingly
productive, which makes predicting the choice of governance more difficult. Many
outsourcing relationships that involve highly specialized and capable suppliers
contain aspects of both market transactions and hierarchical governance. For
instance, [27] Mol (2005) finds that specialized R&D investments, traditionally
seen as a core business of the integrated firm, can be increasingly observed in
outsourcing. Applied studies in the governance literature have found broadly
two ways to answer this apparent contradiction.
One strand of the literature focuses on the aggregate factors that influence the
degree of contractibility, and that are exogenous to firms. Following this view,
outsourcing is facilitated by things such as the ability to secure intellectual prop-
erty and to recourse to well-functioning institutions. Other factors include close
business ties and the existence of firm networks to support outsourcing trans-
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actions. [29] Powell (1990) documents several industries in which networks play
the important role of inter-firm governance, and [4] Asanuma (1989) investigates
the traditional network structure of supply relationships among Japanese firms.
The second strand of the literature looks at the internal incentives that long-
term outsourcing relationships can provide. Because the prospects of continued
business can help incentivize suppliers, long-term outsourcing contracts can be-
come a viable alternative to in-house production ([5] Baker, Gibbons and Mur-
phy, 2005). By designing a sustainable long-term contract, firms can combine
the benefits of independent ownership with the benefits of close cooperation.
Complementarity between different mechanisms of governance is also key in the
study of global value chains. [10] Gereffi, Gibbons and Murphy (2005) devel-
oped a theoretical framework to study the optimal choice of governance, where
the complexity and codifiability of transactions, as well as the capabilities of
suppliers are used as complementary predictors.
1.4 Evidence from the automotive industry
The automotive industry is an interesting place to study outsourcing. The tight
interaction between suppliers and assemblers, and the importance of specific in-
vestments and location has made this industry an important place where eco-
nomic theories are proposed and tested. In the most cited application of the
theory of the firm, [30] Monteverde and Teece (1982) point to the role of supplier
switching costs to explain the degree of vertical integration of car manufactur-
ers. Later, [12] Head, Ries and Spencer (2004) study the formation of vertical
networks in the automotive industry using the property rights theory, and more
recently, [17] Klier and Rubinstein (2008) document the spatial dimension that
these networks take, highlighting the importance of clustering in the proximity
of assembly and supplier plants. Last but not least, the best-selling book of [78]
Womack, Jones and Roos (1991) makes a comprehensive survey of the Japanese
automotive business model, and the prominent role that it places on outsourcing.
Several factors can explain why this industry has been so fruitful for re-
search. First, the automotive industry is very complex: it is both competitive
and differentiated, it adds high amounts of value, and it is very downstream
([2] Antràs, Chor, Fally and Hillberry, 2012), which opens up scope for virtu-
ally endless economic studies. Second, the industry is both well-established and
dynamic, meaning that firm behavior can be easily modeled with standard eco-
nomic tools, while there is enough change taking place so that new hypotheses
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can be tested. And third, the industry is global as well as local. It implies that,
while global trends strongly influence the behavior of firms, agglomeration and
dispersion forces at the smaller scale can play an equally important part, allowing
for insights regarding the local environment and policy.
This dissertation uses a collection of new data sets to characterize outsourc-
ing relationships in the automotive industry. The main database comes from a
consultant to the industry, SupplierBusiness, who compiled detailed information
about as many as 74,000 different outsourcing contracts between all major car
assembly firms and their suppliers of car parts. Given that sourcing contracts are
generally treated with utmost confidentiality, observing such rich information is
truly unique. For nearly 600 distinct vehicle models, I observe which suppliers
hold contract to supply which of the different parts or components in the data.
The car models included in this database are produced between 1984 and 2024,
mostly in North America and Europe (with an additional 9% of contracts in
Asia), and I observe an average of approximately 120 contracts per model. To
answer the different research questions of my dissertation, I merged this database
with several different data sources, explained in detail in the following chapters.
1.5 Overview of the chapters
This dissertation is a compilation of three essays, each covering a different re-
search question on the broader topic on how are buyer-supplier relationships
structured:
1. What are the determinants of supplier choice?
2. What predicts the form of relationship governance?
3. And how can outsourcing relationships foster innovation?
To answer these questions, the overall methodological approach used in the fol-
lowing three chapters is to model firm choices at the level of transactions. Chap-
ters 2 and 3, co-authored with Johannes Van Biesebroeck, are empirical contri-
butions to the first two questions, while Chapter 4 is my single-authored effort on
the third question, and it includes both theoretical and empirical contributions.
Chapter 2 is a careful empirical study of the determinants of supplier choice.
It is well known from theory that individual firm characteristics are key in the
choice of suppliers ([76] Wernerfelt, 1984). With the advantage of our unique
data, we are able to investigate the magnitude and importance of a range of
bilateral determinants while controlling for everything that is special at the indi-
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vidual firm level. It allows us to gain new insights into the outsourcing strategies
of firms. We find that proximity between a buyer and a supplier constitutes a
form of comparative advantage that was previously confounded with variables
reflecting the success of already successful firms. In particular, we estimate that
sourcing success is highest in relationships that strategically combine geographi-
cal, cultural and relational proximity. We find that a proximity strategy is very
effective, but that some dimensions of proximity (such as geographical proxim-
ity) do not always confer independent benefits, while others work best when
comparative advantage (in relational proximity) already exists.
While Chapter 2 examines existing buyer-supplier relationships, Chapter 3
investigates the circumstances under which such relationships are set up in the
first place. This is a question that hinges on the theory of the firm, that is, on
how to govern transactions. Firms face several options when it comes to choosing
the optimal form of governance, and this often goes beyond the simple choice to
make or buy. We elaborate a set of conditional statements by discerning three
complementary predictions in the theory of the firm, namely on the impact of
transaction costs, the returns on supplier investments, and the degree of contract
completeness. This approach allows us to view outsourcing governance as a more
nuanced concept. Next we use the framework of [10] Gereffi, Humphrey and
Sturgeon (2005) to derive a set of empirical predictions that we can test with our
data of outsourcing relationships. We find that three aspects of the technological
content of relationships are important to predict the choice of value chain gov-
ernance: the complexity and codifiability of transactions, and the technological
capabilities of suppliers.
While Chapter 3 establishes a link between technology and relationships, in
Chapter 4 I explicitly analyze the decision to invest in new technologies. Innova-
tion inherently suffer from low contractibility, which has foremost to do with the
fact that development, production and marketing of new technologies are pro-
cesses riddled with uncertainty. When the returns on investment are uncertain,
firms cannot fully rely on written contracts to enforce the division of surplus, an
issue that leads to the classic problem of under-investment. A relational contract
can help overcome this problem by working out a range of informal agreements
that are self-enforceable. I combine the incomplete contracting framework of
[1] Acemoglu, Antras and Helpman (2007) with the basic features of relational
contracting in [5] Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002), to derive an equilibrium
relationship between two firm choices that I endogenize: the choice to innovate
and the choice of governance. My theoretical model delivers a testable empirical
relationship in terms of variables that I can directly observe in my data of out-
8 General introduction
sourcing contracts. The empirical contribution is to then test this relationship,
that the likelihood of contract renewal is positively related to the supply of more
innovative technologies, and I find strong support in my data.
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Chapter 2
Proximity in supplier choice
2.1 Introduction
Sourcing strategies have changed fundamentally over the last decades. The pro-
duction process of most goods has become increasingly fragmented in terms of
ownership and global in reach and scope. The trade-in-tasks framework pio-
neered by [14] Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) models this growing trend
towards global sourcing of individual stages of production. Evidence collected by
[36] Johnson and Noguera (2012) shows a steadily falling share of value added in
total trade flows. For many technologically advanced products, globalization of
production has coincided with the emergence of lean and modular process tech-
nologies ([25] Kotabe, Parente, and Murray, 2007; [74] Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck
and Gereffi, 2008). This involves a more prominent role for external suppliers,
who increasingly contribute to design and engineering. Suppliers are given more
manufacturing and sub-assembly tasks and need to coordinate their production
schedules with their clients.
In the North American and European automotive industries, outsourcing ac-
celerated in the 1980s with the diffusion of Toyota’s lean manufacturing tech-
niques ([78] Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990). Collaboration with outside sup-
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pliers increased both in development and production, which raised their relative
importance.1 In 2007, almost four fifths of the industry’s employment in the
United States was at supplier plants ([43] Klier and Rubinstein, 2008). In Eu-
rope, several changes in the economic environment contributed to a reshaping of
historical sourcing patterns. These include the integration of Central and Eastern
European countries in the European Union, the establishment of local assembly
plants by Asian firms, and a wave of mergers and acquisitions by the largest
carmakers and suppliers. It makes the automotive industry a promising place to
study how firms have adjusted to the aggregate trends mentioned above.
We estimate a model of supplier selection to learn how carmakers currently
value proximity to suppliers. The work builds on the literature that measures
the importance of bilateral distance in foreign market penetration (e.g. [7] Berry,
Guillén and Zhou, 2010), but we take the choice of supplier as the outcome of
interest.2 Our contribution is to apply a multi-dimensional concept of proxim-
ity. We analyze three dimensions—geographical, cultural and relational proxim-
ity—which are found to exhibit overlapping effects. Studying the importance of
one proximity dimension without looking at the other two will lead to ambiguous
conclusions and we illustrate several such instances. An additional contribution
is to focus on several aspects of proximity that are under a supplier’s control.
The estimates reveal which proximity strategies are most effective for a supplier
to boost its attractiveness as outsourcing partner.
Given the growing role of suppliers in the industry, it is natural to expect past
relationships to confer current benefits. It is extremely rare, however, to observe
systematic information on historical sourcing patterns. We use a novel measure
of relational distance between suppliers and carmakers to show that proximity in
this dimension is an important predictor of future contracts. One possible mech-
anism is the facilitation of knowledge exchange and the reduction of risk through
trust ([22] Dyer and Chu, 2000). Beyond the direct effect of relational proxim-
ity on sourcing, it is important to control for it when studying the importance
of other determinants of supplier selection, such as geographical and cultural
distance. [10] Bönte (2008), for example, suggests a two-way interdependence
between geographical proximity and trust in recurring relations.
The nature of automobile production has always required some geographical
proximity and its importance is confirmed in our results. Transportation and lo-
gistics costs are naturally important for a final product that consists of thousands
of parts. The growing role of suppliers in design and subassembly of components
requires frequent interactions between suppliers and carmakers ([25] Kotabe et
al., 2007) and even among suppliers. Locating in a supplier park around an as-
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sembly plant is a popular strategy with multiple benefits ([27] Frigant and Lung,
2002). In terms of sourcing success, however, we find that suppliers derive no
independent benefits from co-locating with potential clients. It tends to reflect
past relationships rather than predict future ones, as in the case of suppliers that
follow their existing clients when they expand abroad ([54] Martin, Mitchell, and
Swaminathan, 1999). We also find that the benefits of locating in the proximity
of complementary suppliers needs to be balanced by the business-stealing effects
of suppliers that produce close substitutes.
Globalization and FDI have reshaped the organization of the European au-
tomotive industry and increased competition among parts suppliers. Market
integration across the continent and the establishment of local assembly plants
by foreign firms intensified contacts between firms with different cultural back-
grounds. A preference for culturally close business partners has been a prevalent
feature of the automotive industry, especially for Asian firms ([4] Asanuma, 1989),
driven among other things by a different perception of trust ([68] Sako and Helper,
1998). Our estimates confirm that a shared nationality still provides suppliers
with a strong benefit in sourcing relations. Relational proximity, as measured by
the four dimensions in [19] Hofstede (1980), is effective in overcoming cultural
distance, but while it reduces the disadvantage of a different nationality, it does
not eliminate it. Having an administrative presence in the assembly country, on
the other hand, helps to overcome most of the remaining cultural gap.
We use a unique data source of individual outsourcing transactions that covers
a large fraction of the European automotive industry. We assembled information
on 19,323 contracts, each identifying the assembler of a particular car model, the
component that is outsourced, and a list of potential suppliers for that specific
component. The data set has a wide geographical reach, comprising 122 assembly
plants and 1,530 supplier plants in 30 countries. In addition to the production
locations, we collected information on the headquarter locations of all firms,
assemblers and suppliers, as well as administrative branch offices of suppliers.
Detailed ownership information links up all the elements in the data set.
Our model captures the extremely rich set of observed interactions in the
sample. Multi-product carmakers own assembly plants in several countries and
make repeated selections among a group of multinational component suppliers
that operate production facilities in several countries and compete in several
component markets. Studies of the geographical embeddedness of multinational
firms have often lacked the analysis of strategic interactions among firms and
between firms and locations ([8] Beugelsdijk, McCann and Mudambi, 2010). Fol-
lowing the tradition in the economic geography literature, we construct a model
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of heterogeneous firms to measure interactions in space. We introduce additional
explanatory factors drawing on insights from the international business litera-
ture. In particular, we highlight the simultaneous influence of spatial transaction
costs and relationship assets in the strategic choices of firms. An advantage of
the complex organizational structure of multinationals is that it allows us cap-
ture proximity effects along multiple dimensions and at multiple levels of detail:
geographical proximity at the production or plant level, cultural proximity at the
decision-making or headquarters level, and relational proximity at the transac-
tion or contract level. It improves the identification of causal effects ([16] Corrado
and Fingleton, 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss
why the automotive industry is a good place to study the impact of proximity on
outsourcing relationships and why the 1993-2012 period in Europe is a good time
and place to estimate our supplier choice model. This is followed, in Section 3,
by the development of three testable hypotheses regarding proximity strategies.
We provide information on the data set in Section 4 and discuss the empirical
methodology and construction of bilateral proximity measures in Section 5. Es-
timation results follow in Section 6, and Section 7 concludes with a discussion of
implications and limitations.
2.2 Outsourcing in the European automotive in-
dustry
Since the mid-1980s and throughout the 1990s, the automotive industry has
undergone a fundamental restructuring in the way component production is or-
ganized. Traditional integrated production systems have given way to more dy-
namic disintegrated supply chains ([18] Helper, 1991). Lead by Japanese car
assemblers, so-called lean production systems are now implemented by car as-
semblers everywhere. Changes were first aimed at reducing in-process inventory
costs with the development of just-in-time and just-in-sequence supply chain
management systems. At the same time, production of more parts and of more
sophisticated components was outsourced. Both trends greatly increased the
need to coordinate with suppliers, not only in terms of logistics, but also in man-
agement and administration. Relationships with external suppliers, who took
on more responsibility in the design and engineering process ([78] Womack et
al., 1990) deepened and expanded as supply networks evolved into sophisticated
configurations. Choosing and maintaining the right supply base has become an
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important part of carmakers’ strategy ([21] Dyer, 1996) and proximity plays a
crucial role in this.
The European automotive industry is particularly well suited to identify the
effects of various dimensions of proximity on supply relations. It is one of the
world’s most competitive automotive markets with approximately 40 original
equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and a large supply base ([52] MacNeill and
Chanaron, 2005).3 Car assemblers produce multiple vehicles in assembly plants
that are distributed across different countries. Production facilities of suppliers
are also scattered across the continent to serve their various clients. In each
component market it operates, a supplier will faces a different set of competitors
which themselves vary in geographic and product scope. In this global industry,
only a subset of the firms have regional headquarters in Europe and some suppli-
ers have established local administrative branches to improve interactions with
their clients.
Since the mid-1990s, the European automotive industry has undergone several
changes that make the observed supply contracts to a large extent the result of
actual choices and not merely legacy contracts with suppliers that were selected
a long time ago ([51] Lung, 2006). Three main trends deserve discussion.
First, the integration of new member states into the European Union (EU)
coincided with rapid growth in their living standards and car sales. Local pro-
duction was attractive for foreign multinationals to take advantage of lower labor
costs and the new plants could be used as export platform for the Western Euro-
pean market. This process started with Southern countries, Spain, Portugal, and
Turkey, and accelerated when former communist countries in Central and East-
ern Europe joined the EU, most notably Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania,
and Poland. Initially, new assembly plants were largely supplied from the OEMs’
existing supply bases. As local component sectors developed, sourcing patterns
on the entire continent adjusted to incorporate the best emerging suppliers ([9]
Bilbao-Ubillos and Camino-Beldarrain, 2008).
Second, following the 1992 EU single market program to integrate national
economies more closely and the conclusion of the Uruguay round of multilateral
trade negotiations in 1994, Asian firms established several new assembly plants
in Europe. As a group, they operated only four assembly plants at the start of
the sample period in 1993, but added ten new plants in subsequent years. This
mirrored their earlier entry in the North American market. As they developed a
local supply base, they had to decide for each component whether to rely on local
firms or to pressure their existing suppliers to follow them to Europe. Increased
price competition and falling trade barriers also induced car assemblers to in-
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crease component imports from emerging automotive sectors in large developing
countries ([73] Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2011).
Third, several multinational carmakers had to integrate newly acquired OEMs
in their European production network. Ford established its Premier Automotive
Group which included the formerly independent European firms Volvo, Jaguar,
Aston Martin, and Land Rover. General Motors added Saab to its Opel/Vauxhall
lineup and integrated the European operations of Daewoo with Chevrolet’s. Volk-
swagen even combined eight OEMs in a single group. The integration of SEAT
(from Spain) and Skoda (from the Czech Republic) enlarged its geographic scope,
while the addition of four luxury and sport brands (Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborgh-
ini and Porsche) extended its presence beyond the mass-market segments. With
each acquisition, an owner has to decide to what extent to integrate the supply
chain of a newly acquired firm into its existing operations. To limit the number
of distinct suppliers a firm needs to collaborate with, acquisitions tend to be
accompanied by a rationalization of supplier relationships.
Each of these three trends prompted adjustments in European supply chains
that affected all of the large component suppliers in our sample. We thus ar-
gue that modeling the configuration of observed outsourcing relationships as the
outcome of a static supplier choice model is a reasonable approximation for the
specific region and time period.
2.3 Proximity strategies in outsourcing relations
2.3.1 The importance of supplier proximity
A large number of studies investigate the make-or-buy decision of firms. The
transaction cost economics literature in particular has generated many insights
into factors that influence outsourcing or in-house production of parts and compo-
nents, see [30] Monteverde and Teece (1982) for an application to the automotive
industry. When firms outsource production activities, they are certainly not in-
different which supplier to transact with. This selection depends on more than
just prices and we investigate what suppliers can do to boost their attractiveness.
Car assemblers can choose from a competitive supply base with firms offering
a broad range of components and support services. Important sources of com-
petitive advantage include resource endowments and efficiency ([76] Wernerfelt,
1984) and the capability to meet standards of quality and reliability ([15] Christo-
pher, 2005). Throughout the analysis we control for these sources of competitive
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advantage that are constant across all a supplier’s relationships. Similarly, we
include country dummies to absorb factors that make some locations more attrac-
tive than others. [11] Brakman, Garretsen, and van Marrewijk (2009) compare
the relative importance of locations and linkages, while we merely acknowledging
that fixed locational assets are important. Instead, we focus on the importance
of another type of strategy that is novel in the study of outsourcing relations:
the proximity between buyer and supplier.
Geographical, cultural and relational proximity can be considered as three
separate strategic choices and their impact on supplier selection have each been
studied separately. For example, [64] Reichhart and Holweg (2008) discuss the
important advantages that suppliers derive from locating in close proximity to
their clients and even other suppliers. [68] Sako and Helper (1998) argue that
assembler’s preference for suppliers from the same country stems from the greater
facility of establishing trust between culturally close firms. [21] Dyer (1996)
illustrates the importance of relationships as firms that invest in building up
specialized supply networks outperform competitors.
The relationship between geographic or cultural proximity and repeated in-
teractions is likely to involve two-way causation which requires caution in inter-
preting empirical results ([5] Bathelt and Glückler, 2003). In the absence of in-
stitutional or relational ties between firms initially, close proximity can be highly
conducive to make a relationship work and provide a supplier with a competitive
advantage. Such relationships that originate from convenience can lead to long-
term collaboration, as former suppliers accumulate relationship-specific capital
that transforms them to partners with unique advantages ([77] Williamson, 1979).
Physical proximity also helps mitigate lacking cultural or historical ties through
its influence on the perceived psychic distance between firms ([30] Håkanson and
Ambos, 2010).
The influence of the different factors is likely to overlap as proximity exhibits
multi-level, multi-dimensional effects. Cultural distance is more important at
the decision-making level, but it tends to co-vary with geography which is more
important at the production level. Relational proximity is likely to be most im-
portant at the contract level, but as it ties firms together over time, it leads to
persistent effects of cultural and geographical advantages even after the underly-
ing reasons for their importance might have disappeared. As a result, empirical
evidence that measures the importance of one dimension but does not hold the
other two dimensions constant will suffer from omitted variable bias.
The literature on foreign market penetration already emphasizes the multi-
dimensional nature of proximity. The independent impact of several proximity
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dimensions on firm performance has received particular attention in the analysis
of foreign consumer markets ([28] Ghemawat, 2001) and FDI ([7] Berry et al.,
2010). Only by investigating the conditional importance of each dimension is it
possible to identify the true importance of the underlying, independent forces.
Otherwise, overlapping effects between different dimensions will lead to an up-
ward bias and mitigating effects to a downward bias. Given the existing evidence
obtained analyzing each dimension separately, the a priori expectation is for pos-
itive, independent effects for each of the three proximity dimensions.
Hypothesis 2.1. Geographical, cultural, and relational proximity each confer
independent benefits that raise the attractiveness of a supplier as outsourcing
partner, even after controlling for the other proximity dimensions.
2.3.2 The independent role of geographical proximity
The most straightforward reason why geographical proximity to a client is ben-
eficial is that physical distance raises many transaction costs, such as trans-
portation, logistics, and the costs or difficulties to meet delivery schedules ([20]
Duranton and Puga, 2004; [15] Christopher, 2005). These costs are particularly
important for components with a low value-to-weight ratio or for customized sub-
assemblies that need to arrive at the assembly plant in a correct sequence ([78]
Womack et al., 1990). It is also easier for firms to search for suitable business
partners among firms that are located nearby ([75] Tabuchi, 1998). Given that
all transaction costs raise the cost of the end product and are borne directly or
indirectly by the outsourcing firm, they will influence its choice of supplier.
These effects are unlikely to be monotonic. Transportation costs are often
concave with distance as the mode of transportation is adjusted for faraway
shipments. In contrast, timely and frequent delivery schedules can becomes in-
creasingly difficult to meet from distant locations. Another source of disconti-
nuity are the costs associated with border crossings ([24] Feenstra, 2002). They
include logistical costs, inspections, and probability of delays, but also paperwork
and regulatory compliance costs, which especially for foreign multinationals can
be difficult to cope with.
Proximity also facilitates personal interaction and face-to-face communication
which is required to inspect and monitor product quality, exchange tacit knowl-
edge, and collaborate on problem solving. Specifically for the automotive indus-
try, [21] Dyer (1996) has shown that immediate physical proximity, as in the case
of co-located supplier parks, leads to greater trust between contracting parties,
among other benefits. [22] Dyer and Chu (2000) argue that face-to-face commu-
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nication is an important determinant of trust and [10] Bönte (2008) finds direct
evidence that physical proximity can induce inter-firm trust. While some of the
communications-related benefits of clustering might have diminished in impor-
tance, the geographical organization of an increasingly complex, knowledge-based
economy is still strongly affected by clusters ([63] Porter, 2000).
Co-location of suppliers with assembly plants has emerged in the automotive
industry to reap the efficiency and specialization benefits of outsourcing while
still allowing close collaboration ([47] Larsson, 2002; [67] Sako, 2005). There are
several confounding factors, however, that might explain the sourcing success of
co-located suppliers, even in the absence of independent co-location benefits.
First, because supplier parks host several suppliers benefits could be due to
improved interactions with the client or to an advantage of clustering with other
suppliers. Both forces can confer different and independent benefits in a decen-
tralized network structure, while in a centralized network structure clustering can
reinforce the benefit of co-location ([50] Lorenzen and Mudambi, 2012). Knowl-
edge spillovers ([53] Malmberg and Maskell, 2002) or productivity spillovers ([49]
López and Suedekum, 2009) have been shown to be important in manufacturing
in general. Benefits specifically mentioned for automotive suppliers include syn-
ergies that facilitate design work, e.g. efficient exchange of information, access
to high quality components, sharing of infrastructure, and facilitating technol-
ogy adoption ([67] Sako, 2005; [64] Reichhart and Holweg, 2008). Many of these
benefits could derive as much from proximity to other suppliers than to the client.
Second, it is important to recognize the simultaneous influence of agglomer-
ation and dispersion forces in clusters ([62] Ottaviano and Puga, 1998). As a
predictor of outsourcing relations, the benefits of locating in a cluster need to
be placed against the possible disadvantage of losing sales when locating close to
competitors. This mirrors the business stealing effect that complicates the iden-
tification of productivity spillovers from FDI ([1] Altomonte and Pennings, 2009)
or the difference between spillovers from horizontally and vertically related firms
([49] López and Suedekum, 2009). Which type of outputs other suppliers produce
in a cluster, in particular complementary or substitute parts, will influence the
net benefits of a cluster.
Third, spatial clusters can also be viewed simply as a form of revealed prefer-
ence for the properties of a location ([23] Ellison and Glaeser, 1998; [11] Brakman
et al., 2009). Even in the absence of spillovers, a cluster variable will help control
for unobservable attributes of a location that positively affect all firms located
there and help isolate any independent benefits of co-location.
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Fourth, when carmakers establish assembly plants in foreign markets, they
often convince several of their existing suppliers to follow them ([54] Martin et al.
1999). Those suppliers will initially be located nearby, not because of independent
co-location benefits, but because they have not yet established other commercial
ties in the new market. A related form of reverse causality is possible for leader
firms, the first firm to establish an automotive assembly plant in a particular
region. The first mover advantage allows a leader firm to establish a supply
network that will serve its own needs best ([13] Cantwell and Mudambi, 2011).
This will not only provide a transportation cost advantage, but allows the firm to
site its most trusted suppliers nearby and source knowledge-intensive parts from
a local network. In contrast, laggard firm have to take the configuration of the
supply chain in a region as given. It forces them to rely to a greater extent on
their parent network, which by construction is located at greater distance.
In general, past or current sourcing contracts are likely to play a role when a
supplier expands into a new location ([66] Rosenbaum, 2012). Specialized firm-
specific supply chain strategies can lead to co-location as a side effect, if they are
part of a long-term strategy ([21] Dyer, 1996; [25] Kotabe et al., 2007). One thus
needs to control for relational proximity before one can ascribe an independent
causal effect of co-location on sourcing. Close proximity might result from the
establishment of a relationship rather than causing it.
Hypothesis 2.2. Geographical proximity to a client makes a supplier more at-
tractive as outsourcing partner, but complete co-location does not provide inde-
pendent benefits.
Hypothesis 2.3. Geographical proximity to other suppliers confers benefits that
make a supplier more attractive to clients, but the net advantage is diminished
by the more intense competition in a cluster.
2.3.3 The independent role of cultural proximity
Some aspects of the proximity of two transacting parties transcend the location
of production plants and are better captured at the firm level. One important
dimension is the culture of firms. It includes practices and doctrines, social and
economic goals, language, customs, the mentality that dominates among em-
ployees, and even the internal institutional environment and mode of interaction
with the outside world. Benefits of a shared culture include direct savings in
accounting and transaction costs and indirect benefits of aligning objectives and
business practices. Because of the different aspects it embodies, from locally
rooted cultural values to the psychic distance between firms’ management, cul-
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tural proximity has generally been measured on multiple dimensions using survey
data (e.g. [19] Hofstede, 1980; [30] Håkanson and Ambos, 2010).
Cultural distance is often included in the analysis with a transaction costs ar-
gument ([69] Shenkar, 2001). Conducting business with culturally close partners
lowers uncertainty and hence it lowers the likelihood that agreements need to be
revisited. By influencing the ease and incentive of acquiring and sharing tacit
knowledge, it also raises asset specificity and helps sustain contracts. A shared
culture facilitates collaboration and trust ([68] Sako and Helper, 1998) and the
establishment of a relational contract between two firms which is especially im-
portant when performance is multidimensional ([5] Baker, Gibbons and Murphy,
2002). Culturally close suppliers require less monitoring, control, and transfers
of competencies and skills. Many of these factors are particularly important in
the automotive sector.
Following [44] Kogut and Singh (1988), many studies in the international busi-
ness literature have looked at the impact of cultural distance on multinationals’
market entry or FDI decisions. We similarly expect cultural relatedness between
firms to facilitate the governance and implementation of outsourcing contracts
and to be a positive predictor of observed relationships. A shared nationality,
as measured by the location of the firms’ headquarters has already been shown
to facilitate sourcing in the automotive sector ([4] Asanuma, 1989). We consider
two strategies for suppliers to boost their attractiveness to carmakers with whom
they do not share a nationality.
First, suppliers can target clients that are culturally close. In the FDI litera-
ture it has already been shown that multinationals have more success in markets
that are similar on several dimensions to their home market ([7] Berry et al.,
2010). There is reason to believe, however, that such proximity might not be as
beneficial in the current context. Suppliers do not need to interact with a large
number of consumers or local firms. They only need to connect and collaborate
with one particular client firm, which itself is invariably a multinational enter-
prise that operates in many countries around the world ([73] Sturgeon and Van
Biesebroeck, 2011).
A second strategy for suppliers is to bridge the cultural gap rather than avoid
it. They can establish an administrative branch in the neighborhood of the
assembly plant to facilitate the resolution of design, production, and logistical
problems which inevitably arise over the course of a supply contract. Before a
relationship is initiated, supplier-carmaker interaction can be at the headquarter
level, between the purchasing and sales departments, or between design and engi-
neering divisions. Successfully fulfilling the contract, however, requires intensive
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collaboration with employees of the client at the assembly plant, which often is
in a different country from the client’s headquarter. [7] Berry et al. (2010) and
[28] Ghemawat (2001) include administrative distance as important elements of
proximity in their framework.
Hypothesis 2.4. Cultural proximity provides an independent benefit to a sup-
plier that even a close relational proximity cannot fully overcome.
Hypothesis 2.5. Establishing an administrative presence in the country where
a client operates is an effective strategy to bridge a cultural distance.
2.4 Data
The information on outsourcing relations comes from SupplierBusiness, a con-
sulting firm in the automotive industry. Each observation in the data set identi-
fies a model-component-supplier triplet that represents an outsourcing contract
between a car assembler and an external component supplier. The contract iden-
tifies the particular car or light truck model where the specified component will
be installed. In total, we work with a sample of 235 models assembled in Europe
between 1993 and 2012. We observe an average of 75 contracts per model, out
of a total of 330 different components. The sample includes the 112 largest sup-
plier firms active in Europe, which produce on average 31 different components
and supply on average seven models with each component. We have compiled
information on all manufacturing locations, administrative branches and head-
quarters of suppliers at the city level. We also observe the assembly plants for
all models and the carmakers’ (regional) headquarters. We know for each model
when production starts and when it is planned to end.
We now discuss each of the three elements in a contract triplet: models,
components, and suppliers. Each car or light truck model carries the brand
name of one of 40 OEMs, which in turn are owned by global parent firms. For
example, Volkswagen AG is the largest group in our sample and is represented by
five OEMs: Audi, Bentley, SEAT, Skoda and VW. We observe 42 distinct models
for this firm and know in which of the 21 European assembly plants operated
by Volkswagen AG each is assembled.4 Information on headquarter locations of
all OEMs comes from the Automotive News online data center. Table 2.1 lists
the car firms in the sample, sorted by their total number of European assembly
plants, along with the number of OEMs and distinct models. The last column
shows the average number of unique components by model for which we observe
the outsourcing contract.
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Table 2.1: Car assembly firms in Europe
Number of
Assembly
plants OEMs Models
Unique
components
per model a
VW 21 5 42 98
Ford 17 6 35 85
Fiat 15 5 34 60
Renault-Nissan 14 3 25 83
GM 12 3 17 76
PSA 10 2 25 90
Daimler 8 4 19 89
BMW 7 3 12 105
Toyota 7 1 8 67
Porsche 3 1 7 85
Chrysler 2 2 2 64
Suzuki 2 1 3 29
Honda 1 1 2 80
MG Rover 1 1 2 51
Tata 1 1 1 82
Hyundai 1 1 1 52
Total 122 40 235 330
Average 8 3 15 75
Note: aAverage rounded to nearest integer.
Components are classified into 330 unique categories, each belonging to one
of the six major areas of a car: chassis, powertrain, exterior, interior, electronics,
and miscellaneous. The categories take into account not only the generic com-
ponent description, but also their general functionally and the area of the car
where they are installed. We observe, for example, more than 600 contracts for
bearings or bushes, but we create separate categories when they are installed in
doors, wheels or engines, and whether they belong to the powertrain, chassis, or
exterior areas.
Information on suppliers comes mostly from the Amadeus database compiled
by Bureau van Dijk. It combines and harmonizes company accounts from all
sectors of the economy and all European countries.5 The supplier names on
contracts are matched to firm names in several data fields of Amadeus. We
learn the location of (regional) headquarters, of administrative branches listed
in company reports, and of all production subsidiaries in 4-digit NACE codes
associated with parts manufacturing for the automotive industry. Table 2.2 lists
the largest supplier firms in our sample, which number 112 in total. The Schaeffler
Group, for example, operates the most production facilities in Europe, 49, while
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the average is 14. It manufactures 54 distinct components and holds a supply
contract for almost all of the car models in our data set (232). Unfortunately we
do not observe which component is produced in which plant. To construct the
distance between a model’s assembly plant and the potential suppliers, we use
the supplier’s closest manufacturing facility.6
Table 2.2: Top supplier firms in Europe
Number of
Production
plants
Unique
components
Models per
component a
Schaeffler 49 54 4
Continental 48 173 1
Bosch 47 96 2
Magneti Marelli 33 66 4
Total 32 86 3
Magna 29 107 2
TRW 26 109 2
Denso 22 67 3
Delphi 21 118 2
Valeo 21 94 2
ThyssenKrupp 21 87 3
Federal-Mogul 18 61 4
Visteon 13 75 3
Dana 13 64 4
Cooper Standard 6 74 3
(112 firms total) . . . . . . . . .
Total 1,530 330 1
Average 14 31 7
Note: aAverage rounded to nearest integer.
The sample contains a total of 122 assembly and 1,530 supplier plants. Table
2.3 summarizes their geographical distribution across Europe. Germany hosts the
most assembly plants, one in five, followed by the United Kingdom and France.
Fewer than one third of all assembly plants are located in the home country
of the parent firm, mostly in the three countries with strong surviving OEMs:
Germany, France, and Italy. Several plants are located in the country where the
original OEM hails from, even though they are now owned by a foreign parent
firm: United Kingdom, Sweden, the Czech Republic, and Romania.
The geographical distribution of supplier plants follows a similar pattern, but
they are more dispersed and more likely to be foreign owned. While 21.6% of all
European supplier plants are located in Germany, only slightly more than one
third of them are owned by a German firm. The fraction of domestic ownership
is even lower in all other countries. Outside Germany, only one supplier plant
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Table 2.3: Geographical distribution of assembly plants, supplier plants and
branches
OEM assembly plants Suppliers
% by country All
Domestic
OEM
Domestic
parent firm
All
plants
Plants in
home
country
Foreign ad-
ministrative
branches
Germany 20.5 15.6 13.9 21.6 8.9 16.3
United Kingdom 15.6 8.2 0.8 12.8 0.6 11.3
France 12.3 9.0 9.0 11.3 2.5 9.7
Italy 9.8 7.4 7.4 7.8 1.0 2.3
Spain 9.0 0.8 9.0 0.3 10.5
Turkey 4.9 1.8
Czech Republic 3.3 1.6 5.5 0.8
Belgium 3.3 4.1 3.5
Hungary 3.3 2.8
Poland 3.3 4.3 3.9
Portugal 3.3 2.0 0.1 1.2
Sweden 2.5 2.5 1.8 0.6 3.9
Romania 1.6 1.6 1.7
Other 7.3 13.7 0.6 36.6
Total (%) 100.0 46.7 31.1 100.0 14.6 100.0
Total (No.) 122 57 38 1,530 224 257
Notes: Empty cells are zero entries. Other countries include Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark,
Finland, Greece, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Morocco, Norway, Russia,
Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Tunisia and Ukraine.
in twenty is located in its home country. To strengthen their corporate presence
abroad, many suppliers have established administrative branches. Germany, the
United Kingdom, and Spain are the most popular locations, but they are also
prominent in countries with less developed local automotive sectors (the category
Other).
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict graphically the locations of, respectively, all assem-
bly and supplier plants in the sample. They illustrate the extent of agglomera-
tion. In Figure 2.2 we also indicate the presence of supplier clusters, which are
described in the variables section. Comparing the two figures already hints at a
close connection between the geographical distribution of assembly and supplier
plants.
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Figure 2.1: Assembly plants
2.5 Empirical method
2.5.1 Model
We estimate a supplier choice model where the dependent variable, a 0/1 dummy
for sourcing success, has a supplier market share interpretation. The estimating
equation describes the last stage in the carmaker’s decision. A supply contract
will specify a price, minimum quality, and delivery schedule. In addition, there
is a more subtle, informal relational agreement ([5] Baker et al., 2002), as the
supplier is expected to collaborate with the client on design, innovation, and
solve possible problems. The firm that is most likely to meet both the formal
and relational terms, from the point of view of the carmaker, will be awarded
the contract. We model this as an assembler choosing a supplier to maximize
a latent expected profit function which is described by a reduced form equation
that includes a rich set of proximity variables and controls.
Several choices have already been made prior to this. Suppliers have chosen
the locations of production and administrative support offices as well as their
product portfolio.7 Carmakers have decided where to assemble each model and
which components to outsource.8 Their final decision is to select the preferred
external supplier from the choice set, which we model using a conditional logit.
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Figure 2.2: Supplier plants and clusters
The elasticities implied by the estimated coefficients are then used to make in-
ferences about supplier strategy. Understanding what clients value is important
for suppliers who wish to design a successful strategy.9
The explanatory variables of interest are the different dimensions of geograph-
ical, cultural, and relational proximity. Using fixed effects, we flexibly control for
important mitigating factors, such as differences in supplier resources and ca-
pabilities, and constant locational advantages. These are important sources of
comparative advantage that help a supplier on each contract. The conditioning
in the model implicitly incorporates an intercept for each outsourcing contract, a
model-component pair, thus holding the advantages of component-specific assets
constant in the analysis. Details on the structural form of our model are the
Appendix.
To estimate the conditional logit model, we need to define the choice sets of
potential contracts from which a car assembler chooses one or more suppliers.10
For each model-component contract, the choice set includes the supplier that
is observed holding the contract, as well as all suppliers holding a contract to
supply any of the 235 models in the data set with the exact same component.
For each outsourcing contract there were on average 14 competing suppliers.
The proximity variables of interest still vary across potential suppliers even after
conditioning on each contract or choice set and including supplier fixed effects.
28 Proximity in supplier choice
Figure 2.3 shows an excerpt of the data set to illustrate the key elements of
the model. The first column enumerates the different choice sets, unique model-
component pairs for which we observe a list of potential suppliers and over which
the conditioning takes place (blue shaded box). Each potential supplier for a
contract enters as a separate observation. The dummy variable in the fifth column
indicates whether a contract was signed or not—it is the outcome variable in the
supplier choice model (green dashed box). The last columns contain two examples
of variables constructed to capture some dimension of bilateral proximity between
a car assembler and potential supplier, the first at the plant and the second at the
firm level (red dotted box). The full set of these proximity variables is described
in the next section.
Figure 2.3: Structure of the data set
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Figure 2: Structure of the data set 
Contract 
ID 
OEM/Model Component Potential 
Supplier 
Contract 
signed? 
OEM/Model – Supplier 
Proximity Variables 
NO 
BORDER 
SAME 
NATIONAL. 
Etc. 
1 Ford Focus Battery Continental 0 1 1 ··· 
1 Ford Focus Battery Delphi 0 1 0 ··· 
1 Ford Focus Battery Johnson Cont. 1 1 0 ··· 
2 Ford Focus Tires Bridgestone 1 0 0 ··· 
2 Ford Focus Tires Continental 0 1 1 ··· 
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· 
13 Audi A4 A/C pump Behr 0 1 1 ··· 
13 Audi A4 A/C pump Delphi 0 1 0 ··· 
13 Audi A4 A/C pump Denso 1 1 0 ··· 
13 Audi A4 A/C pump Valeo 0 0 0 ··· 
13 Audi A4 A/C pump Visteon 0 0 0 ··· 
14 Audi A4 Tires Bridgestone 1 1 0 ··· 
14 Audi A4 Tires Continental 0 1 1 ··· 
··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· ··· 
Notes: The sample contains a total of 269,608 observations (potential contracts), 19,323 unique outsourcing 
relations, 235 unique car models, 330 unique components, and 112 unique suppliers. Illustrative examples. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Unit of Analysis: 
OEM/Model – Component 
Dependent variable: 
Actual contract: YES/NO ? 
Key explanatory variables: 
OEM/Model – Supplier proximity 
We implement two estimators. First, we estimate the conditional logit model
using maximum likelihood. It assumes that the error term that affects the com-
petitive position of suppliers is identically and independently distributed across
observations. This assumption is relaxed using a second, generalized method
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of moments (GMM) estimator. The GMM estimator allows for a flexible, un-
observable spatial pattern in the correlation across residuals. It allows us to
separate the causal effect of the structural proximity variables from remaining
spatial feedback mechanisms. [56] McMillen (2012) argues that this is a good
way to detect model misspecification. [16] Corrado and Fingleton (2012) further
highlight the importance of a hierarchical modeling of the spatial structure to
improve the identification of causal effects. The inclusion of firm- and plant-level
interaction variables in our estimating equation helps in this regard. In addition,
the spatial filter applied to the model allows for spatial effects at even the most
detailed (contract) level.
We build on the work of [38] Kelejian and Prucha (1998) who propose the
use of instrumental variables to recover a spatial autoregressive structure of first
order. It involves first estimating the benchmark model (the conditional logit
model in our case) and then using the fitted values to approximate the spatial
term. Our implementation follows most closely the approximate GMM estimator
of [41] Klier and McMillen (2008a), as the size of our dataset does not permit an
exact solution.11 We adapted their estimator for the spatial logit model to the
probability function of the conditional logit. It introduces an autoregressive term
that captures the effect of a full-blown spatial structure. A statistical test on this
term demonstrates that no residual spatial structure can be detected beyond the
effects of our benchmark proximity variables.
In our application, a potentially more important source of correlation between
the error terms of different observations stems from the existence of past rela-
tionships. A benefit of the GMM approach is that it can be generalized to other
dimensions than geographical distance. In particular, we can model the error
terms as having an autoregressive dependency on the intensity of past collabora-
tion. The autoregressive term that we introduce in the preferred specification is
defined as the average probability of sourcing success in any previous relationship
between the current OEM and potential supplier.12 It can be interpreted as the
‘relational proximity’ between the parties entering a particular contract. Details
on the implementation are in the Appendix.
2.5.2 Variables
We characterize the proximity between car assemblers and potential suppliers
using several bilateral distance and cluster variables defined for production plants,
and three firm-level measures of culture. Variable definitions are summarized in
Table 2.4. KM DISTANCE is calculated in a straight line between every assembly
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plant and the closest manufacturing plant of each potential supplier. Table 2.5
provides the sample average, standard deviation and correlations for the main
variables. The mean distance is 367 kilometers, with a standard deviation of 667
km. It is highly skewed to the right as it takes on only positive values.
Table 2.4: Summary of the variables
Variable Type Description
KM DISTANCE Continuous Assembly plant–supplier plant straight line
distance, in kilometers.
PROXIMITY 700KM Binary Closest supplier plant is within 700km of
assembly plant.
PROXIMITY 10KM Binary Closest supplier plant is within 10km of assembly
plant.
NO BORDER Binary Supplier has a plant in country of assembly.
SUPPLIER
CLUSTER
COMPLEMENTS
Binary Supplier plant is located within 10km of at least
two other suppliers of different components (to
different car assemblers).
SUPPLIER
CLUSTER
SUBSTITUTES
Binary Supplier plant is located within 10km of at least
two other suppliers of the same type of
component (to different car assemblers).
SAME
NATIONALITY
Binary Supplier and OEM headquarters are in the same
country.
HOFSTEDE
MAHALANOBIS
Continuous Mahalanobis distance over 4 dimensions of
cultural proximity (Hofstede, 1980),
standardized.
ADMINISTRATIVE
BRANCH
Binary Supplier has an administrative branch the
country of assembly.
CHOICE Binary Dependent variable, supplier chosen to sign
outsourcing contract or not.
From the distance variable, we generate two intuitive dummies that are mo-
tivated by the literature on the automotive industry. PROXIMITY 700KM
and PROXIMITY 10KM indicate whether a supplier has a manufacturing plant
within 700 or 10 kilometers of the assembly plant where the component must be
delivered. The first is a proxy for a single day’s driving distance ([43] Klier and
Rubinstein, 2008); the second captures co-location of suppliers with the assembly
plant in a supplier park, see [64] Reichhart and Holweg (2008) for definitions and
a typology. The large difference in cutoffs is to clearly distinguish between two
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underlying reasons for proximity: logistics costs versus the benefits of face-to-
face interactions. The vast majority of potential suppliers locate within 700 km
(86%); relatively few locate within 10 km (4.3%), but they still account for more
than 11,000 observations. The NO BORDER variable indicates whether a sup-
plier has a production plant in the country where the assembly plant is located.
This is the case in just over half of the potential contracts (56%). These three
variables allow for nonlinear effects of geographical proximity to the client.
Two variables capture the separate effects of locating in the proximity of hor-
izontally related firms, i.e. other automotive component suppliers. SUPPLIER
CLUSTER COMPLEMENTS indicates whether a plant is near at least two other
suppliers that produce different components for different clients. The cutoff dis-
tance for a cluster is 10 km, consistent with the co-location variable. SUPPLIER
CLUSTER SUBSTITUTES is constructed similarly, but counting only other sup-
pliers that produce the same type of component.13 On average, 45% of supplier
plants are located within either kind of cluster, with complements the majority
type (32%). Note the strong correlation between PROX 10KM and SUP CLUS
COMP which is the result of supplier parks co-locating with an assembly plant.
The inclusion of different cluster variables, in addition to the bilateral distance
variables, allows us to capture a much more nuanced picture of the benefits of
clustering. Recent research finds that multinationals exploit the advantages of
each link in their larger geographical network ([35] Jenkins and Tallman, 2010).
We also use three firm-level measures of proximity to capture factors that
go beyond logistics and production spillovers. SAME NATIONALITY indicates
whether the headquarters of the OEM and the supplier are in the same country.
We use the nationality of the OEM rather than the parent firm because sourcing
and supply chain decisions are to a large extend made independently by the
OEM in charge of vehicle design. It means, for example, that Opel/Vauxhall,
although owned by the U.S. firm General Motors, is classified as headquartered
in Rüsselsheim, Germany. 15% of all potential suppliers share nationality with
the OEM.
For OEM-supplier pairs with headquarters in different countries, we include
a control for cultural proximity at the country level. HOFSTEDE MAHA-
LANOBIS calculates the Mahalanobis distance over [19] Hofstede’s (1980) four
cultural dimensions: uncertainty avoidance, power distance, masculinity, and in-
dividualism.14 Following the critique of [69] Shenkar (2001), recent research by
[37] Kandogan (2012) suggests that this aggregation improves on the metric by
[44] Kogut and Singh (1988). It takes into account the correlation pattern in the
four dimensions. The variable is expressed in standard deviations relative to the
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sample mean and equals zero when OEM and supplier share nationality.
The third measure of cultural proximity is ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH,
which equals one if a supplier has an administrative branch or support office in
the country where the model is assembled. They are only observed in foreign
countries, i.e. outside of the country where a supplier’s headquarters are located.
One quarter of the potential contracts in the sample benefit from a branch.
The last row of Table 2.5 shows the summary statistics for the dependent
variable, CHOICE, an indicator whether a contract has been signed or not. Its
construction has already been discussed in the methodology section. On average,
about one in ten (9.1%) potential outsourcing contracts is actually signed.
2.6 Results and discussion
2.6.1 Main results
Table 2.6 contains the implied semi-elasticities for the supplier choice model
estimated using maximum likelihood. They indicate the effect of each proximity
variable on the probability that an outsourcing contract is formed in percentage
points.15 In each specification, geographical proximity is a strong predictor of
sourcing success. For example, specification (1) implies that locating 100km
closer to an assembly plant is boosts the probability that a supplier is awarded
the contract by 2.7%.16 Specification (2) suggests that locating within a day’s
driving distance boosts the probability of sourcing success by 23%. The signs
and magnitudes of these results are consistent with earlier studies.
In line with the first hypothesis, we find that different proximity dimensions
have overlapping effects. When variables are added in subsequent specifications,
the point estimates change, generally in intuitive ways. For example, adding con-
trols for supplier clusters reduces the estimated benefit of co-location with the
assembly plant. In their absence, the coefficient on the PROX 10KM variable
misleadingly reflected some of the positive spillovers from locating near com-
plementary suppliers. When we introduce controls for cultural proximity, in
specification (4), the estimated effect of co-location is reduced further.
The first column of Table 2.7 repeats the last specification of Table 2.6, but
uses the approximate GMM estimator. The relative ranking of elasticities is
virtually identical for both methods.17 With this new estimator we can allow
for unobserved spatial correlation in the residuals, which introduces a spatial
autoregressive term in the equation. Its predictive effect on supplier selection is
34 Proximity in supplier choice
Table 2.6: Benchmark results: effect of proximity on the supplier choice proba-
bility
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DISTANCE (in 100km) -0.0272
(10.16)
PROXIMITY 700KM 0.227 0.230 0.232
(6.436) (6.457) (6.455)
PROXIMITY 10KM 0.351 0.294 0.166
(10.10) (8.467) (4.966)
NO BORDER 0.194 0.153 0.0469
(9.058) (7.208) (2.278)
SUPPLIER CLUSTER COMPLEMENTS 0.231 0.195
(13.33) (11.32)
SUPPLIER CLUSTER SUBSTITUTES -0.637 -0.639
(30.98) (31.09)
SAME NATIONALITY 0.567
(12.42)
HOFSTEDE MAHALANOBIS -0.123
(7.454)
ADMINISTRATIVE BRANCH 0.201
(6.673)
Pseudo-R2 (fit) 0.0969 0.0983 0.114 0.126
Notes: 269,608 observations. The reported coefficients give the relative change in
conditional logit probability with respect to a discrete change in the explanatory
variable, evaluated at the sample average. Z-statistics (absolute value) in parenthesis.
Supplier and country fixed effects included throughout. Contract-specific fixed effects
absorbed through conditioning.
negligible and statistically insignificant, while the point estimates on the observed
proximity variables barely change. It implies that they exhaustively characterize
the effects of geographical proximity on supplier choice.
As discussed earlier, we extended the spatial econometrics approach to control
for correlation along a second dimension, namely the intensity of past collabo-
rations between a supplier and OEM. This explicitly controls for the emergence
of relationship-specific capital that can increase the likelihood of subsequent re-
lationships for firms that have collaborated previously ([77] Williamson, 1979).
It also controls for unobservable factors that make a particular supplier-OEM
match especially productive.18
The estimates of our preferred specification, in column (4) of Table 2.7, pro-
vide strong support for the first hypothesis. Each of the three proximity dimen-
sions has a strong, independent effect on sourcing outcomes. Locating within a
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Table 2.7: Estimation of supplier choice probability controlling for residual cor-
relation in geographic or relational space
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PROXIMITY 700KM 0.336 0.360 0.278 0.351
(5.300) (4.031) (5.685) (4.244)
PROXIMITY 10KM 0.123 0.111 0.089 0.064
(3.475) (2.347) (2.120) (1.432)
NO BORDER 0.100 0.099 0.0725 0.110
(3.300) (3.263) (2.266) (2.828)
SUPPLIER CLUSTER COMPLEMENTS 0.238 0.217 0.173 0.193
(12.08) (3.814) (5.767) (6.206)
SUPPLIER CLUSTER SUBSTITUTES -1.576 -1.600 -1.120 -1.390
(23.81) (17.88) (5.833) (10.15)
SAME NATIONALITY 0.698 0.695 0.402 0.385
(10.77) (10.63) (4.492) (2.637)
HOFSTEDE MAHALANOBIS -0.131 -0.132 -0.0850 -0.0751
(4.043) (4.049) (2.681) (1.481)
ADMIN BRANCH 0.373 0.378 0.193 0.303
(8.074) (7.958) (3.410) (4.817)
SPATIAL AUTOREGRESSIVE TERM: 0.000313
(correlation of residuals in geographic space) (0.394)
RELATIONAL AUTOREGRESSIVE TERM: 0.313 0.560
(correlation of residuals in relational space) (2.319) (2.557)
Contract-specific fixed effects (conditioning) Yes Yes No Yes
Observations 269,608 269,608 186,506 184,930
Notes: The reported coefficients are approximate marginal effects on the conditional logit
probability. T-statistics (absolute value) in parenthesis. Supplier and country fixed effects
included throughout. Estimation with two-step GMM based on [41] Klier and McMillen
(2008a). P-value of Sargan test: 0.667 (1), 0.637 (2), 0.932 (3) and 0.617 (4). Further details
on the estimation method in the Appendix.
day’s driving distance (geography) and having headquarters in the same country
(culture) are the two strongest predictors. Relational proximity, the last variable
in the table, is also estimated to raise the likelihood of further sourcing success,
even conditional on geographical and cultural proximity. The absolute magni-
tude of this last effect averages 7% over the full sample, but it can be as high
as 54% for some contracts. The average importance of past relationships is ap-
proximately sufficient to overcome the disadvantage faced by a supplier with a
different nationality but with a local administrative branch, or the disadvantage
faced by a supplier located across a border.
The changes in coefficients when relational proximity is included underscore
the importance of estimating all effects simultaneously. Because relational prox-
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imity is correlated with geographical and cultural proximity, the enduring effect of
past relationships on current sourcing outcomes needs to be explicitly controlled
for before one can assign a causal effect to those other factors. For example,
[46] Kumaraswamy, Mudambi, Saranga and Tripathy (2012) describe how lo-
cal suppliers can leverage relationships with downstream multinationals to learn
and catch-up with the technological frontier. Relationships provide access to ad-
vanced knowledge and access to the industry’s global value chain, which strength-
ens a supplier’s attractiveness to future clients. [61] Nobeoka, Dyer and Madhok
(2002) provide examples of suppliers that enlarge their client base with the ex-
plicit purpose of enhancing their technology learning. Co-locating production
facilities or employees can play a crucial role in this strategy. Follow-sourcing,
where suppliers follow existing clients overseas, is common in the automotive
industry ([54] Martin et al. 1999; [73] Sturgeon and Van Biesebroeck, 2011).
The next two hypotheses concern the precise nature of the geographical and
cultural effects. Suppliers that locate closer to a potential client gain benefits, but
only up to a point. In particular, the positive effects of co-location on the sourcing
probability should not be interpreted as an independent effect. It disappears
almost completely when cultural and relational controls are included, which is
something that previous studies have not done. Omitted variable bias is likely
to be important in many settings as co-location will be correlated with a wide
range of strategies. In contrast, the positive effect of locating within a day’s drive
remains remarkably stable when controls are added. The border effect declines in
absolute importance once cultural proximity is controlled for, but it does retain
a significant and independent effect throughout.
Once we distinguish between two types of supplier clusters, Hypothesis 2.3
also receives strong support. Proximity to firms producing parts with a different
function in the final product—firms that are complementary in terms of technol-
ogy and client-base—has a positive effect on sourcing outcomes, consistent with
positive spillovers. Including this control diminishes the independent effect of
co-locating with a client. Proximity to firms that produce substitute parts have
a remarkably strong negative effect as business-stealing outweighs any possible
spillovers. These two opposing effects of other suppliers can only be identified
if the two dimensions of clusters are investigated separately, and if the effect of
clustering near the client is simultaneously controlled for. Including only a single
cluster variable, as is the case in most previous work, leads to much more muted
average effects.
While locating ‘close enough’ is what mattered in the geographical dimension,
being extremely close provides an additional advantage in the cultural dimension.
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Even though the SAME NATIONALITY variable is strongly correlated with re-
lational proximity, and reduces in magnitude in the final specification, its inde-
pendent effect on sourcing is still the largest of any included variable. The vast
majority of contracts is between two multinationals operating outside their home
country. Only 5% of the observed relational ties are strong enough to generate a
benefit of equal value as a shared culture.
A potential supplier with a nationality that differs from the client, but that
is culturally similar ([19] Hofstede, 1980) also has a higher probability of being
awarded a contract. This mirrors the findings in [39] Kirkman, Lowe, and Gib-
son (2006) who perform a meta-analysis evaluating the importance of this culture
measure in a variety of settings. They find robust effects at the individual, or-
ganization, and country-levels of analysis, although culture explains only a small
fraction of variation in most cases. In the Appendix, we show that the results are
similar for an alternative measure based on the psychic distance approach of [30]
Håkanson and Ambos (2010). The evidence in our application, however, does
not support the interpretation that cultural distance has an independent effect
on sourcing. The effect is halved in magnitude and becomes statistically in-
significant when relational proximity is controlled for. Like co-location, it mostly
reflects a lingering effect of past relationships. It confirms the causal illusion that
[69] Shenkar (2001) warned for: a positive effect of low cultural distance should
be considered an outcome of past relationships rather than a factor predicting
them.
To understand the importance of proximity, it is also important to account for
actions that firms can take to mitigate adverse effects. Given the importance of
headquarter location, it is no surprise that suppliers with different nationalities
often set up administrative branches in countries where they wish to supply
assembly plants. The coefficient estimate on the ADMIN BRANCH variable
suggests that such a strategy can almost entirely overcome the disadvantage of
a different nationality. We have performed a similar analysis for administrative
branches in the country where a potential client has its headquarters instead, but
there the effect was much weaker. Consistent with Hypothesis 2.5 we find that
support offices help, but they need rather be located close to a client’s place of
production, not its purchasing department.
In the Appendix we illustrate that these findings are robust to modifying
the following three implicit assumptions of the model. First, given the appar-
ent importance of proximity one might worry that suppliers choose locations or
establish additional production facilities to increase the probability of being se-
lected. Second, the definition of the set of unique components has implications
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for the substitutability of alternative suppliers and their presence in different
choice sets. Third, the conditional logit model makes the independence of irrele-
vant alternatives assumption. By construction, the relative odds of choosing one
supplier over another are invariant to the other suppliers in the choice set.
2.6.2 Heterogeneous effects
We have seen that suppliers can adjust some of their proximity dimensions to
make themselves more attractive outsourcing partners. The importance of some
dimensions is likely to vary both across components and across potential clients.
We now explore this heterogeneity.
[21] Dyer (1996) has argued that inter-firm specialization is a source of com-
petitive advantage. Many types of specific assets can lead to quasi-rents and
enhance firm performance ([71] Schoemaker and Amit, 1994). In our application,
it is vital to distinguish between assets that are specialized to the component or
to the local economic environment, and assets that originate from interactions
between firms. The latter form the core of our proximity analysis, while the
former are absorbed by model-component fixed effects through conditioning.19
Omitting these fixed effects is informative about any possible contract-specific
heterogeneity in the importance of proximity dimensions.
One of the most important changes in column (3) of Table 2.7, relative to
the preferred specification in column (4), is the reduced importance of the two
geographical proximity variables: PROX 700KM and NO BORDER. For some
components, alternative assets or capabilities are even more important than prox-
imity and all potential suppliers tend to be located at a distance. A low wage
cost or the availability of cheap energy are examples. If we pool observations
from different contracts together as in column (3), the fact that some distant
suppliers are successful leads to noticeably lower estimates on the geographic
distance variables. Within a value chain, different types of linkages due to dif-
ferent technology or resource requirements have different proximity requirements
that facilitate logistics and the transfer of knowledge ([25] Fifarek and Veloso,
2010).
A similar mechanism reduces the coefficient estimate on relational proximity
in column (3). For some basic parts with little quality variation, carmakers base
their choice mainly on price and transportation costs. Other benefits such as
the existence of unique assets pertinent to the component can be a good substi-
tute for relational proximity. Sourcing will then shift towards the lowest bidder
more frequently. As carmakers disregard past relationships, no close relationships
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emerge, which reflects in a lower estimate on the relational proximity variable.20
In both cases, failing to compare only within the relevant set of suppliers in-
appropriately treats too many firms as potential choices and biases the results. It
confirms the experimental results in [12] Buckley, Devinney and Louviere (2007).
They study FDI location choices and show that it is crucial to consider the full
set of available options to improve comparability in a world with heterogeneous
preferences and boundedly rational managers. In our analysis, we find that to
the extent that some proximity dimensions are of lesser importance in certain
contracts and can be overcome by the benefits of specialized assets for the com-
ponent, the estimated importance of those dimensions is biased downward if the
supplier choice is not modeled over the relevant set of potential suppliers.
Different activities in global supply chains can contribute vastly different val-
ues to a vehicle, see for example [60] Mudambi (2008) for knowledge-intensive
products. We investigate how this influences the importance of proximity for
supplier choice by introducing different coefficients by component type in the
model. In column (9) of Table 2.8 we illustrate results for electronics compo-
nents. Locating within a one day’s drive and in the same country are the only
factors that are (much) more important than in the benchmark specification.
In contrast, a shared nationality or administrative branches are less important.
This conforms well with the characterization of the modern electronics industry
in [36] Sturgeon (2002). Product design as well as manufacturing are technolog-
ically intensive and firms locate close to knowledge centers with highly skilled
workers. Crucially, the codifiability of performance requirements and interfaces
makes it easy to exchange knowledge over large distances and between firms with
different cultures. Even though scale economies are large and one plant will serve
many clients, the need for customization of automotive parts and integration in
sub-assemblies makes it undesirable to locate production facilities too far away.
The optimal proximity strategy of suppliers clearly depends on the product lines
they are active in.
Proximity effects might also vary by ownership if supply chain strategy dif-
fers for firms from different countries. [7] Beugelsdijk (2007) has argued that
it is important to allow for heterogeneity in firm strategy to reliably isolate the
importance of (external) geography factors. The results in Table 2.8 allow for a
more flexible model of the decision making process by interacting the proximity
variables with the region of origin of OEMs or suppliers.
The first three columns of Table 2.8 differentiate the elasticities by OEM,
distinguishing between firms headquartered in Europe, North America and Asia.
Given that the vast majority of potential contracts in the sample are with Euro-
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pean OEMs, those elasticities are very similar to the benchmark results of Table
2.6. For North American OEMs, proximity within a day’s drive is particularly
important, but a shared nationality not. Both effects are exactly opposite for
Asian OEMs, which are nearly 2.5 times more likely to award a contract to an
Asian supplier. Their preference for co-located suppliers might again reflect en-
dogenously chosen supplier locations. They also have the strongest preference
for suppliers located within the same country, which could indicate that com-
munication problems or foreign regulatory environments pose greater difficulties
for them. The presence of an administrative branch only appears to be a factor
when competing for the business of European OEMs, which is intuitive as it is
their home market.
Differential cultural antecedents of supplier switching probability in turn in-
fluence where suppliers locate. Given that it is costly to reverse location decisions,
suppliers will only choose to maximize the benefits of co-location if they antici-
pate long-lasting relationships. The importance of trust in supplier relationships
of Japanese carmakers ([22] Dyer and Chu, 2000; [68] Sako and Helper, 1998)
is more likely to induce some reverse causality and raise the coefficient estimate
on the PROX 10KM variable. One should be cautious not to interpret the full
effect as an independent benefit of co-location. In contrast, the ‘close but adver-
sarial’ model of supplier relations practiced by American firms ([59] Mudambi
and Helper, 1998) should lead to lower estimated benefits of co-location, which
is what we find. It does not necessarily imply that American carmakers place
a lower independent value on co-location. It could simply be that suppliers are
less likely to choose locations that maximize those benefits. This behavioral ad-
justment is consistent with the absence of any co-location effect for American
suppliers in column (5).
The results distinguishing by supplier type, in columns (4) to (6), confirm
that sharing a nationality with the OEM is very helpful for Asian, but not for
North American suppliers. The much higher estimate for the co-location variable
for Asian suppliers in column (6), compared to the estimate for Asian OEMs in
column (3), suggests that co-location helps them even with OEMs of different
nationality. Foreign administrative branches are especially effective for Asian
suppliers, but even for North American suppliers they are the single most im-
portant proximity factor. Interestingly, when European suppliers set up branch
offices in other European countries, this is perceived negatively by car assemblers
and it lowers their probability of success. The importance of co-location or locat-
ing in the same country follows the same pattern as by OEM: it is vital for Asian
suppliers, unimportant for American suppliers, and intermediate for Europeans.
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The importance of production facilities within one day’s driving distance seems
to originate mainly from contracts awarded to European suppliers.
We can also interact the proximity variables with a key feature of assembly
plant location, whether it is in the home country of the parent firm or abroad.
In the home country, the firm is more likely to be a leader, which is expected
to facilitate establishment of tight connections with local suppliers and a local
network of knowledge transfer. The distinction between leader and laggard firms
manifest itself in two ways. On the one hand, geographical proximity to a client,
especially co-location and lack of borders, is more important at home, in column
(7), compared to abroad, in column (8). This is consistent with leader firms
shaping local supply chains for own benefit. On the other hand, the advantage
of co-location among suppliers is higher abroad than at home. The ‘physical
attraction’ experienced by insiders that makes it difficult for outsiders to enter a
network ([13] Cantwell and Mudambi, 2011) is less of a barrier in supplier parks
abroad. As the carmaker has less control over the local supply chain, it relies
more on its own, more distant network, but also on the suppliers’ network. The
importance of culture also varies by location. Shared nationality and the efforts
to bridge such gap (e.g. FDI, supplier foreign branches) are more important in
the home country of the client, while cultural proximity plays a stronger role
abroad.
2.7 Implications, limitations and conclusions
Our analysis has highlighted the need to use a multi-dimensional concept of
proximity when studying the determinants of outsourcing relationships. Car-
makers value supplier proximity in geographical, cultural and relational space,
but these different dimensions have overlapping effects. One should be cautious
to attribute a causal effect to one dimension if the other dimensions cannot be
controlled for, something often lacking in previous research. While the indepen-
dent beneficial effect of having a production facility within a single day’s drive of
a client or within the same country is highly robust, this is not always the case.
In particular, the observed relationship between sourcing success and co-location
of suppliers and clients stems entirely from indirect effects of other variables.
A shared nationality, the enduring influence of past relationships, and clusters
of complementary parts suppliers each do have independent effects on sourcing
outcomes. Co-location, on the other hand, is merely correlated with those under-
lying causes and should not be considered as providing an independent benefit
in sourcing relations.
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The findings also have practical relevance because many aspects of proxim-
ity are under a supplier’s control. The estimated effects are informative about
the relative effectiveness of different location strategies. We have found that a
shared nationality has the single most important independent impact on sourc-
ing success and suppliers can clearly not influence this. However, cultivating a
close relationship with a carmaker substantially diminishes the disadvantage of
a different nationality. This is particularly true working with Asian clients. The
relationship-specific skills highlighted in [4] Asanuma (1989) can to some extent
be acquired. Establishing an administrative presence near an OEM’s produc-
tion site facilitates closer interactions and helps suppliers overcome most of the
remaining cultural distance. American and Asian have used this strategy with
great success to win contracts from European firms.
The results imply more generally that suppliers can pursue proximity strate-
gies to tailor their attractiveness to different clients. These go beyond the culti-
vation of unique capabilities that can be deployed across all outsourcing relation-
ships ([76] Wernerfelt, 1984). An effective strategy needs to be tailored to the
particular preferences of potential clients. Carmakers value specialized supply
networks ([21] Dyer, 1996) and elements of proximity can play a valuable role
in this. Suppliers need to realize, though, that not all choices have a direct and
independent influence on competitive advantage. Relational proximity, in par-
ticular, confers positive, but only limited independent benefits. It can however
leverage existing sources of comparative advantage that a supplier has in other
dimensions.
The opening of new assembly plants in Eastern Europe induced carmakers
to establish local supply networks. Past relations and cultural proximity was
of crucial importance for suppliers entering these new locations, especially for
system integrators ([9] Bilbao-Ubillos and Camino-Beldarrain, 2008). Without
relational proximity, establishing a presence in a co-located supplier park would
save on transportation costs, but only confer small additional benefits through
proximity to suppliers producing complementary parts. Cost savings from pro-
ducing locally alone might not be enough to attract contracts from clients of a
different nationality, lacking cultural proximity. Since OEM headquarters are
firmly rooted in Western Europe, the periphery of the industry remains depen-
dent on the core ([19] Domanski and Lung, 2009). Suppliers that want to expand
into emerging automotive industries need relational capital to leverage existing
sources of comparative advantage and they should not neglect FDI in support
offices to help overcome administrative distance.
The recent history of the North American automotive industry provides a
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dynamic illustration of the above effects. It was traditionally clustered around
Detroit and the importance of geographical proximity seemed indisputable. The
advent of modular production with a greater role for suppliers increased the
relative importance of cultural and relational proximity, but given that most
major suppliers were already headquartered in the Midwest, this organizational
change initially had little impact on the industry’s geography ([41] Klier and
Rubinstein, 2008). Since the 1980s, Asian and European carmakers established
assembly plants in the South to avoid import quotas and take advantages of right-
to-work laws. Initially, many suppliers supplied the new plants from more distant
locations, the Midwest or even Japan. Culturally close suppliers were among the
first to locate in the South ([34] Smith and Florida, 1994). As the industry grew
in the South, the most successful American suppliers built up relational capital
and eventually moved production facilities there as well.
Our analysis also has implications for the ongoing debate on the role of dis-
tance in a globalized economy. In their bestsellers, both [14] Cairncross (2001)
and [26] Friedman (2005) argue that although geographical and cultural proxim-
ity used to be important predictors of commercial relationships and trade flows,
they are not so anymore. Reviewing the statistical evidence more systematically,
[18] Disdier and Head (2008) find a ‘puzzling persistence’ for the importance of
distance in gravity equations, even in recent years and even for services trade.
Our results suggest that the importance of past relationships for sourcing deci-
sions can lead to enduring effects of proximity even if its independent benefit has
diminished sharply. Compositional effects can also hide the reduced importance
of distance for some products. Some highly complex products will always need
proximity to facilitate collaboration ([48] Leamer and Storper, 2001). For more
basic products, however, our results are consistent with the availability of key
assets or low production costs to trump the importance of proximity.
Our study has some limitations. First, our analysis implicitly separates the
carmaker choices and the supplier strategies. Some decisions are likely to be
taken jointly by both parties to a transaction. For example, the diminished role
for co-location once relational proximity is taken into account could be explained
by simultaneous decision-making. Addressing this issue ideally requires a fully
dynamic model, which is beyond the scope of this study.
Second, we only evaluate the importance of proximity on the probability that
a supplier can attract a new outsourcing contract, which can be interpreted as the
impact on suppliers’ market share. While this dependent variable is a necessary
condition for success, it does not capture all performance dimensions of interest,
such as profitability, quality or the level of innovation. A more comprehensive
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analysis that includes alternative performance indicators and measures the com-
plementarity between them is warranted. It would be interesting to revisit in our
context [7] Beugelsdijk (2007)’s finding of the secondary role of environmental
variables in firms’ innovation performance
Third, our sample only includes the largest suppliers. An important benefit is
that these firms tend to a lot more clients (automotive assembly plants) than pro-
duction locations. It limits reverse causality from sourcing contracts to locations
as they can only co-locate with one of their many clients. It is possible, however,
that proximity influences sourcing success of smaller firms in a systematically
different way, for example because of the tiered organization of the supply chain
in the automotive sector ([78] Womack et al., 1990). We plan to investigate this
issue in future research with access to better data.
Appendix
Robustness analysis
Measurements of geographic distance
We have conducted a series of robustness checks and report the relevant results in
Table 2.9. For all different specifications, a linear distance variable was included
throughout. This tends to reduces the point estimates on the PROX700KM and
NO BORDER variables, but leaves all qualitative findings unchanged—see for
example specification (1).
We have also performed the regressions including an additional discrete dis-
tance effect, at 100km, which allows for multiple deliveries per day, or defined
the cutoffs based on frequency distributions of distance rather than absolute dis-
tances. In all cases, the benefits of geographical proximity gradually decay as we
move away from the assembly plant, at least if we do not control for relational
proximity.
Alternative cluster variables
Next, we consider alternative measures of supplier clusters. In specification (2)
we require a minimum of five (instead of three) plants to qualify as a cluster;
in specification (3) we enlarge the radius around supplier plants that defines a
cluster to 30km (from 10km). Both changes raise the number of firms in an
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average cluster, but in (2) the total number of clusters is reduced, while it is
raised in (3). In both cases, the elasticities associated with any type of cluster
increase, but the changes are very small. Using a more narrow definition of
clusters leads to slightly lower elasticity estimates.
Definitions of cultural distance
We have also estimated the benchmark model using an alternative definition of
bilateral headquarters’ distance, grounded on the psychic distance approach. We
used the variable constructed by [30] Håkanson and Ambos, defined as the “sum
of factors (cultural or language differences, geographical distance, etc.) that
affect the flow and interpretation of information to and from a foreign country”
(2010: 201). For better comparison, the variable is standardized relative to the
sample mean. In specification (4) we see that this alternative variable produces
similar results, but it captures less variation in our sample. Interestingly, it
seems to capture more of the cultural aspects embedded in the border effect,
but it performs worse at measuring very close cultures as in the case of shared
nationality.
Correlation between contracts
The assumption that the residuals are uncorrelated might be violated if some im-
portant connection between observations is not modeled. The tests in Table 2.7
investigate this for two possible types of dependency, namely spatial correlation
and historical linkages. Another potential violation of the independence assump-
tion might occur if the supplier choice for one component depends on outcomes of
contracts for other components of the same vehicle. We can accommodate such
effects by using a clustered variance-covariance matrix that allows the covariance
terms to differ from zero within each set of contracts for the same car model.
The estimates in specification (5) of Table 2.9 have indeed larger errors, but it
does not affect the interpretation of the results.
Endogeneity of location
One potential endogeneity problem is that suppliers could change the location of
their plants to influence the outcome of contracting decisions. It would invalidate
our treatment of the observed locations as pre-determined supplier characteris-
tics. Our analysis already mitigates this issue in two ways. First, by including
contract-level fixed effects we only compare across suppliers for a given model-
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component pair which holds constant anything unusual about the contract, such
as a remote assembly plant location, or a component with strong co-location re-
quirements. Second, given that the sample includes for all suppliers many more
contracts than production locations, they can locate their plants only near a few
assembly plants.
Nonetheless, we can verify the sensitivity of the results by re-estimating the
model excluding components that are more likely to suffer from this endogeneity
problem. Components that are bulky, that generate high coordination costs, or
that require a lot of face-to-face interactions are candidates. In specifications (6)
and (7), we re-estimate the benchmark specification, but exclude engineering-
intensive or design-intensive components. Taking an extreme position, we elimi-
nate half of the observations in the first regression and almost 40% in the second.
The results change only slightly except for the PROX 10KM variable. It con-
firms our finding from Table 2.7 that endogenous locations cannot be dismissed
entirely as an explanation for the effect of co-location.
Construction of choice sets
From the start, we had to define unique components to construct a set of poten-
tial suppliers for each observed contract. All results so far are based on a detailed
classification system that separates components according to their generic name,
functionality, and area of application in the car. An alternative approach is to
group components according to their generic name alone. This broader definition
groups components in the same category irrespective of their function or appli-
cation in the vehicle. The implication is that choice sets include more potential
suppliers for the same component. Competing suppliers will be less alike and
contract-level fixed effects will absorb a smaller fraction of the variation. Results
in column (8) of Table 2.9 illustrate that using generic component names does
not materially change the estimates.
The independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption
A well-known restriction of the conditional logit model is that it implies indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). By construction, the relative probability
of selecting one supplier instead of another is independent of the presence or
characteristics of further potential suppliers. Especially when the model needs
to describe the choices of a heterogeneous group of decision makers over vary-
ing choice sets, this assumption might be overly restrictive. The inclusion of
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supplier-fixed effects alleviates this concern somewhat.
A statistical test for the validity of the IIA assumption is readily available
([31] Hausman and McFadden, 1984). One needs to estimate the model excluding
suppliers one by one from all choice sets, and then test for significant differences
in the coefficient estimates. While excluding the majority of suppliers did not
pose a problem, for a few of the largest suppliers in the sample and a few non-
European firms the predictions in the benchmark model changed slightly but in a
statistically significant way. Our specifications with interaction terms, however,
provided more robust results.
Supplier choice model
For each set of potential contracts r = 1, 2, ..., n (defined in the methodology
Section), car assemblers choose which suppliers s = 1, 2, ..., n they want to sign a
contract with. We assume that the final choice of suppliers maximizes the profits
of car assemblers. Denoting Sr the set of options available in the supplier selection
process, the optimization problem is to choose which of the potential suppliers
to award the outsourcing contract and which to decline it, so that expected
profits are highest, given the quantities q specified in the contract. Hence, the
underlying profit maximization problem of firm r is extended to incorporate
supplier choice: maxq,s∈S π = p (q) q − C (z (q) , w (z (q) , s)), with p and w for
output and input prices, and q and z for output and input quantities. C (·)
is the cost function. In our econometric model, profits are given as a linear
function of contract-specific characteristics αr, which include the characteristics
of car assemblers and assembly locations, a set of characteristics of suppliers
and supplier locations β′xrs, and a nuisance term εrs that captures unobserved
factors plus measurement errors, assumed to be independently and identically
distributed with a type-I generalized extreme value distribution:
max
Sr
π (Sr|q) : πrs = αr + β′xrs + εrs ∀s ∈ Sr.
[29] McFadden (1974) shows how the maximization of a random utility func-
tion can be linked to the conditional logit model. [79] Woodward (1992) applies
an equivalent profit maximization problem to the location choice of Japanese
manufacturing start-ups in the United States. Similarly, we study the geography
of the European automotive industry with a model that implies an underlying
profit maximization for car assemblers choosing amongst different component
suppliers. The joint probability function that corresponds to such choices is
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given by:
Pr [Y1 = y1, ..., YN = yN |m1, ...,mn] =
exp
(
N∑
i=1
nr∑
s=1
yrs
(
αr + β′xrs
))
n∑
r=1
∑
Mr
exp
(
n∑
r=1
nr∑
s=1
yrs
(
αr + β′xrs
)) .
Yi = yi, i{rs} = 1, 2, ..., N are the observed dichotomous yes-or-no choices of
supplier, and mr is the number of successful suppliers in each set of potential
outsourcing contracts, over which the conditioning takes place. The two outer
summations in the denominator are over the setsMr of all possible combinations
of 0 and 1to {yr1, ..., yrnr}for all r = 1, 2, ..., n, such that mr =
∑nr
s=1 yrs. Notice
that the contract specific scalar αr, as any other constant term in the model,
cancels out after conditioning since it can be factorized away on both numerator
and denominator. This implies that we cannot retrieve its estimates. In contrast,
the parameter vector β can be easily estimated, as shown in [57] Mehta and Patel
(1995).
Our basic model specification includes K distinct measures of proximity and
their average effects β′ = (β1, ..., βK), k = 1, 2, ...,K, in addition to supplier fixed
effects β9s and country fixed effects for the locations of supplier plants β10c:
β′xrs = β1PROX700rs + β32PROX10rs + β3NO BORDERrs +
β4CLUS COMPrs + β5CLUS SUBSrs + β6NATIONrs +
β7HOFSTEDErs + β8BRANCHrs +
∑
s
β9s +
∑
c
β10c.
We report the mean of elasticity for each dichotomous proximity variable. More
specifically, we calculate the transformed point estimates g (βk), where g (·) is a
transformation that retrieves the change ∆yi/yi in the fitted outcome variable
that is due to a change from 0 to 1 in a given variable xki. We make the standard
assumption of one positive outcome within each set of potential contracts, which
is reasonable given that over 80% of the contracts in our sample are for single
sourcing.
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Two-Step GMM conditional logit estimator
We can test whether we have omitted an extensive spatial correlation structure
by checking if ρ = 0 in the following spatial autoregressive AR(1) model:
Y = ρWY+Xβ + ε
= (I− ρW)−1Xβ + (I− ρW)−1ε.
In the second equation line, the inverse matrix has a full-blown MA(∞) repre-
sentation that pre-multiplies both the error term and the explanatory variables:
(I− ρW)−1 = I+ ρW+ ρ2WW′ + ...
We construct a spatial weight matrix using the inverse distance between the
locations of suppliers, for each observation in the sample d−1ij , as shown below:
W =

0 d−112 . . . d−11n
d−121 0
... . . .
d−1n1 0
 .
If ρ significantly different than zero, the errors are not uncorrelated as assumed,
and our βs will be inconsistently estimated due to omitted variables. While the
first issue can be handled with bootstrap estimation, the problem of structural
bias requires further treatment.
The variables WX are easily obtained from the sample, but WY is not
available, as Y is a latent variable. [38] Kelejian and Prucha (1998) propose
replacing WY by an instrumented variable. [41] Klier and McMillen (2008a)
demonstrate how a related two-step GMM estimator can be obtained for use with
large samples, in order to avoid the need to work with very large matrices (for us
this means inverting a square 269,608 matrix, which exceeds our computational
resources). In their method, the objective function of the standard 2SLS-GMM
estimator is replaced by a one shot guess of the orthogonality condition—a linear
approximation at the point where ρ = 0.
The motivation is that the solution for the model Y = (I− ρW)−1Xβ +
(I− ρW)−1ε is relatively close to the point Y = Xβˆ0 + εˆ0. In the full spatial
model, a generalized method of moments estimator would require to minimize
the condition that the regressors (I− ρW)−1Xβ are orthogonal to the error term
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(I− ρW)−1ε. In the linearized model, instead of using the full expression for the
error term, it is approximated by applying a Taylor series expansion of first degree
around εˆ0:
(I− ρW)−1ε ≈ εˆ0 + Γˆ0
(
θ − θˆ0
)
Define v ≡ εˆ0 + Γˆ0
(
θ − θˆ0
)
. Now the GMM method is to minimize the
condition that a set of instruments Z is orthogonal to v, with respect to θ:
v′ZMZ′v.
We use M = (Z′Z)−1, which amounts to the two-stage least squares estimator.
εˆ0 and θˆ0 can be easily obtained from the initial conditional logit regression. Γˆ0
is, by definition, the gradient of the error term of the full model with respect to
the parameters of interest, an endogenous term if not treated. Measured at the
starting point it becomes:
Γˆ0 =
∂
∂θ
(I− ρW)−1ε
∣∣∣∣
θ=θˆ0
.
Furthermore, the residuals in the full model u = (I− ρW)−1ε can be retrieved
by u = CHOICE − P, where CHOICE is the observed binary choice variable.
Thus the above reduces to:
Γˆ0 = − ∂
∂θ
Pθ=θˆ0 .
P is the conditional logit probability, again with the assumption of one positive
outcome within each strata, written as, for each observation i:
Pi =
exp
(
β′x⋆⋆i
)∑nr exp (β′x⋆⋆i ) ,
where X⋆⋆ = (I− ρW)−1X⋆ and x⋆i = σ−1i xi, xi = (Xi)′.
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After some algebra, the gradient terms become:
Γβki = Pi
[
x⋆⋆ki −
∑nr x⋆⋆ki exp (β′x⋆⋆i )∑nr exp (β′x⋆⋆i )
]
Γρi = Pi
[(
β′x⋆⋆⋆i − σ−2i β′x⋆⋆i diag (Λ)i
)
−
∑nr (β′x⋆⋆⋆i − σ−2i β′x⋆⋆i diag (Λ)i) exp (β′x⋆⋆i )∑nr exp (β′x⋆⋆i )
]
,
,
whereX⋆⋆⋆ = (I− ρW)−1WX⋆⋆ andΛ = (I− ρW)−1W(I− ρW)−1(I− ρW)−1.
Assuming at the starting point that ρ = 0, we do not have to bother about all
the heteroskedastic terms, and the above gradients become much simpler, with
Λ equal zero on the diagonal and x⋆⋆i = xi:
Γˆβ0ki = Pˆi
[
xki −
∑nr xki exp (β′xi)∑nr exp (β′xi)
]
β=βˆ0
Γˆρ0i = Pˆi
[
β′hi −
∑nr (β′hi) exp (β′xi)∑nr exp (β′xi)
]
β=βˆ0
,
,
where H =WX, hi = (Hi)′. Now we have all the pieces needed to construct
the variable v and run the 2SLS with instruments Z. In the first stage, we
regress the endogenous gradient terms on all our exogenous variables plus a set
of instrumental variables. In the second stage, the endogenous variables are
replaced by the predicted values from the first stage.
[41] Klier and McMillen (2008a) provide Monte Carlo results to show that
this procedure (a logit variant) can deliver good results for parameter values
ρ < 0.5. We estimate a ρ coefficient that is close to zero, positive and statistically
insignificant. The instruments we used are all variables from the standard model,
some of the WX variables that vary sufficiently in space, and the plain latitude
and longitude coordinates. The validity of instruments is typically tested using
over-identifying restriction in the GMM condition, a procedure called Sargan
test. In the notes to Table 2.7 we list the p-values of this test, which does not
reject the validity of our instruments.
The regression with the relational correlation variable uses essentially the
same procedure, but instead of space, time is the dimension in the autoregressive
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matrix, called the lagging vector L now:
L =

L11
...
L1n
 .
Because the time dimension of our sample does not exhibit sharply defined inter-
vals, and because we want to estimate the broader effect of past collaboration,
time is collapsed over all previous relationships between a certain OEM and a
supplier into a single lagged period.
The estimates of the two-step GMM have the direct interpretation as marginal
effects. However, the comparison with the results from the conditional logit model
is not direct. The two-step GMM is an approximation method and produces well
performing point estimates only if the sample is large enough, which is the case
in our study. Nonetheless, the relative magnitude of the point estimates is very
much comparable, as discussed in the results section.
Notes
1[17] Corswant and Fredriksson (2002) and [21] Humphrey (2003) provide a detailed overview
of the most important sourcing trends in the industry. The increased role of suppliers and the
globalization of their activities are center stage.
2Our estimating equation can also be interpreted as a characterization of suppliers’ market
share in terms of proximity measures. The coefficient estimates are determined as the choice of
suppliers by carmakers, and are, in turn, informative on the effectiveness of different supplier
strategies.
3OEMs are the organizational units of the car assemblers which design, produce, and market
various car models under one brand (a single car assembler typically owns several OEMs). Since
supply chains tend to evolve slowly over time and unique componentry is one way to differentiate
brands, we consider the locations of the assembly plants as well as the (regional) headquarters
of the OEMs in the analysis. A few models are assembled in more than one location, in which
case we use the smallest average distance from these assembly plants to the suppliers’ plants.
4A few models are assembled in more than one location, in which case we use the smallest
average distance from these assembly plants to the suppliers’ plants.
5Subject to a minimum size threshold, it provides comprehensive coverage of all firms that
submit annual accounts to the national authorities. The threshold differs by country, but all
firms that we are interested in easily exceed the minimum size threshold.
6One way to justify this approach is that plants can relatively easily produce several com-
ponent and suppliers minimize transportation costs by allocating production to the closest
location. The least demanding assumption that still allows consistent estimation is that the
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choice of specialization of suppliers’ plants is uncorrelated.
7[66] Rosenbaum (2012) incorporates the initial location choice of suppliers in a two-step
estimation procedure, but still treats the product scope decision as predetermined, as we do.
8The make-or-buy decision is often modeled in a transactions cost framework, see for example
[30] Monteverde and Teece (1982). In the international trade literature the property rights
theory is commonly used, see [2] Antràs (2012) for a review and supporting evidence from
trade in automotive products.
9A few studies have looked at the importance of distance in location decisions in the automo-
tive industry. [34] Smith and Florida (1994) explain the number of Japanese automotive-related
manufacturing plants in US counties using the distance to the nearest Japanese assembly plants
as explanatory variable. [40] Klier (2005) uses the distance of each county to the city of Detroit
as an explanatory variable for supplier employment. [42] Klier and McMillen (2008b) model
the location choice of automotive suppliers using a choice model with random alternatives and
find that both the distance to Detroit and to the nearest assembly plant are important predic-
tors. These studies use more aggregate models that cannot distinguish between the different
dimensions we consider.
10In rare occasions, car assemblers decide to multiple-source a component, splitting one
contract between two or more suppliers. This is allowed in the conditional logit model, but
complicates the interpretation of the coefficients, see [65] Richardson (1993) for a discussion.
11An additional benefit of this approach is that it makes it possible to use the same outcome
variable as in the maximum likelihood estimation. We had to adapt the estimator to the
probability function of the conditional logit and provide details in the Appendix.
12Rather than having a weighting matrix that contains the inverse of geographical distances,
we use the inverse of the average probabilities of selection in any of the earlier situations where
an OEM could have selected a certain supplier. The statistical implementation is the same as
in spatial case.
13The results proved highly robust to alternative definitions; robustness checks are in the
Appendix.
14The data was compiled by Prof. Boyd in “Hofstede’s cultural attitudes research – cultural
dimensions,” http://www.boydassociates.net/Stonehill/Global/hofstede-plus.pdf, accessed March
23, 2012.
15Where possible we use indicator variables to make it easier to compare absolute effects.
Results including a continuous distance measure are described in the robustness checks in the
Appendix.
16The number in parenthesis is the absolute value of the z-statistic of the corresponding
point estimate. A z-statistic larger than 2, approximately, indicates that the average effect is
statistically significant.
17The single instance where the relative magnitudes differ is statistically insignificant.
18It does reduce the sample size as we need to exclude the first observation for each supplier-
client pair.
19Coefficient estimates from a conditional logit are identical to a logit model with contract
fixed-effects, only the implied marginal effects will differ slightly (see Appendix).
20The increase in the point estimates of the PROX 10KM and the SAME NATIONALITY
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variables in column (4) is a mechanical result of the reduction in the estimated importance of
relational proximity.
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Chapter 3
Governing supply relationships
3.1 Introduction
Several studies test one particular theory of the firm by explaining the make-
or-buy decision based on a single crucial explanatory factor. There are, broadly
speaking, two main issues with this approach. First, the variables used to predict
the make-or-buy decision are often complementary, not just in their interpretation
but also from a theoretical point of view. Second, such an approach overlooks
the fact that many sourcing relationships cannot be easily classified as either
“make” or “buy”. In many situations, a particular theory will only be decisive
where often implicit necessary conditions are satisfied.
There is, in contrast, an applied literature that treats such complementarities
more explicitly and focuses on more complex forms of firm-to-firm relationships.
Such relationships are sometimes called networks or hybrid forms of organization,
and they have been frequently identified in case studies of industry. Can we
explain observable features of networks using those same theories of the firm?
That is, can we use the same explanatory variables that predict make-or-buy
decisions to distinguish between different forms of buying?
The economics literature has developed several theories to explain firm bound-
aries. We will focus on two prominent theories, transaction costs (TCE) and
property rights (PRT), and we will explicitly consider their implicit assumption
of incomplete contracts. If activities can be redefined to make them describ-
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able by complete contracts they can more easily be outsourced ([28] Maskin and
Tirole, 1999; [2] Aghion and Holden, 2011). If contracts are fundamentally in-
complete, transaction costs and the risk of hold-up are likely to differ depending
on whether an activity is organized within a firm or transacted over markets ([9]
Coase, 1937; [43] Williamson, 1979). If non-contractible investments of two par-
ties in a transaction have a very different impact on the joint surplus, it might
be optimal to give one side more control and organize the transaction within one
firm and put that side in charge ([14] Grossman and Hart, 1986).
These theories predict why some activities are organized in-house while others
are outsourced. Each has independently been tested and found some support in
the data. For example, [24] Levin and Tadelis (2010) find that city services
that are subject to high transactions costs of contracting are less likely to be
privatized. [30] Monteverde and Teece (1982) find that parts requiring a lot of
engineering effort in their design are more likely to be produced in-house. [45]
Woodruff (2002) finds that Mexican shoe retailers are less likely to be vertically
integrated with the shoe manufacturer in segments with high fashion turnover.
Specific investments are high for these products, but they are borne by the retailer
who should thus not be controlled by the manufacturer in an integrated firm. [26]
Lafontaine and Slade (2009) summarizes a broad range of the empirical literature.
To make progress integrating the distinct literatures, [13] Gibbons (2005)
describes several theories in a uniform framework and proposes a single unify-
ing model that nests different explanations. We take a different approach and
start from outsourcing relationships that are observed in our automotive data.
We draw inspiration from two highly influential studies outside of economics to
condense the information into distinct governance types. [29] Powell (1990) has
argued that a variety of sourcing configurations are possible in between the ex-
treme cases of make or buy. The global value chains (GVC) theory of [12] Gereffi,
Humphrey, and Sturgeon (2005) uses three explanatory variables to generate a
classification of four types of buying relationships.
To structure our empirical analysis, we provide an integrated framework to
nest a topology of governance types into the three different strands in the eco-
nomic theory of the firm. Rather than exhaustively partitioning all observed re-
lationships in a few groups, we associate each governance type with a monotonic
mapping to an observable continuous variable. For example, in a so-called cap-
tive relationship the buyer provides the supplier with technological support and
guarantees it sufficient sales to operate without losses, but in return it demands
exclusivity. The number of clients a supplier works for should vary inversely
with the probability that the relationship is of a captive type. We further argue
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that the three component or buyer characteristics the GVC literature uses to
predict governance types—complexity, codifiability, and capabilities—are closely
related to the explanatory variables that the three economic theories of the firm
have highlighted: ease of contracting, specific assets, and relative importance of
marginal investments.
As mentioned, we test the predictive power of our framework using unique
sourcing information that is usually highly confidential. Our data covers the
automotive industry which is an interesting place to study theories of the firm
as it touches on virtually all sub-sectors of manufacturing. Over the 1993–2012
period, we observe for nearly 10,000 buyer-component pairs which supplier holds
the contract for a particular vehicle model. As we observe repeated contracting
between buyers and suppliers and the type of components that different suppliers
produce, we can construct the different proxies that characterize the nature of
the relationship between the component divisions of suppliers (the supplier),
e.g. Bosch-electronics or Faurecia-interiors, and the different automakers’ design
center (the buyer), e.g. Ford-Europe or Toyota-North America.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the
importance to make conditional statements when considering the predictions of
the classic make-or-buy literature. Section 3.3 introduces the GVC theory as
an organizing framework from which we obtain a set of conditional empirical
relationships to estimate with our data. In the following Section 3.4 we give an
overview of outsourcing relationships in the automotive industry, where we also
introduce our data set. In Section 3.5 starts the core of our empirical analysis.
Subsection 3.5.1 explains how we obtain proxies for different forms of outsourcing
governance, and Subsection 3.5.2 explains the construction of our explanatory
variables. The next two Subsections 3.5.3 and 3.5.4 show and discuss the results
of our tests of the choice of governance, before concluding in Section 4.4. An
appendix includes details about the construction of variables and alternative
specifications.
3.2 Make-or-buy theories: the importance of con-
ditional statements
Two of the most prominent theories in the "theory of the firm" literature are
transaction cost economics (TCE) and the property rights theory (PRT). Models
in the TCE literature focus on ex post transaction frictions and have as main
predictor variable the costs of transacting. A well-studied example of costly
64 Governing supply relationships
transaction frictions is haggling over the division of ex post appropriable rents
([43] Williamson, 1979). It is said to be endogenously determined by three id-
iosyncratic characteristics of transactions: the specificity of assets involved, the
frequency of interactions, and the extent of uncertainty ([44] Williamson, 1985).
In this setup, a transaction is brought inside the firm when the costs of carrying
it out on the market are sufficiently high.
In contrast, models in the PRT literature are largely game theoretical ([10]
Dessein, 2013). Transaction costs are not relevant for the distinction between
in-house production and outsourcing since firms anticipate any cost disparities in
their ex ante decisions. Crucial instead is the productivity of investments under
either integration or separation of upstream and downstream assets, and the
main predictor variable is marginal returns to investments ([14] Grossman and
Hart, 1986). Firms in a vertical bargaining game share unique relational rents
which cannot be allocated by means of a formal contract ([20] Klein, Crawford
and Alchian, 1978). How much is there to be shared depends on how much
firms invest in the relationship, and the amount of investments depends on the
profitability of different ownership structures. In this setup, vertical integration
is chosen if integration of assets makes investments more productive than an
outsourcing relationship.
Despite somewhat different views on how the issue of rent-sharing is resolved
by firms and how it influences their choice of governance, there have been at-
tempts to try to reconciled different predictions of the theory of the firm ([13]
Gibbons, 2005). In order to analyze them under the same definition of a contract
one would need to allow for, on one hand, some degree of bounded rationality
as assumed in the PRT literature—where agents fully anticipate the costs and
benefits of different states of the world—and, on the other hand, for the pos-
sibility of ex post haggling over the emergence of an unanticipated relational
surplus—which would also influence ex-ante decisions as in the TCE literature
([17] Hart and Moore, 1999).
Notice that both TCE and PRT theories assume the existence of non-contractible
relational rents. However, whether a contract is more or less complete influences
the amount of residual control rights available to the firm that owns the pro-
ductive asset, which in turn creates the possibilities for bargaining and haggling
over the division of relational rents seen in the above literatures ([2] Aghion and
Holden, 2011). [28] Maskin and Tirole (1999) discuss describability in a simi-
lar way. The more potential states of the world that are covered by a contract
(the more complete the contract), the higher its describability. Failure to assign
contractual rights to potential states of the world raises the amount of resid-
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ual rights in contracts with low describability. Thus, controlling for degree of
contract completeness is important when looking at the other factors.
To understand the importance of conditioning on contract completeness, con-
sider the role of residual rights in the predictions of TCE and PRT models.
When a firm has a large amount of residual control rights over an asset that
is critical in production, it generates specific rents that an external firm could
try to appropriate. But the process of allocating these rents can create costs
that are not easily transmitted through contracts, making them dependent of
the form of governance. The TCE literature addresses this issue by modeling the
bargaining frictions that generate transaction costs, but it takes the degree of
contract completeness as exogenously given. Residual rights can also affect the
value of property. The different surpluses that a specific asset can achieve often
depend on who has the residual rights of control over it. Typically, the ability
to extract rents from those residual rights creates different incentives to invest,
making ownership dependent of the form of governance. The PRT literature ad-
dresses this issue by modeling returns to investments under different ownership
structures, but it takes the amount of residual rights that ownership can provide
as exogenously given.
Conditional on the amount of contractual and residual rights, the TCE and
PRT theories offer each a conceptually different solution to the make-or-buy
problem. Taken together however, these theories can provide a richer view on
the problem that goes beyond the choice of governance along firm boundaries.
3.3 GVC as an organizing framework: obtaining
testable predictions
The make-or-buy literatures discussed so far only model the choice of governance
at the boundary of the firm. The choice is dichotomous, and so all transactions
that are not carried out within firm boundaries are lumped together as a mar-
ket governance type, as shown in the first column of Table 3.1. Yet evidence
suggests that there are more complex and variegated options for the governance
of outsourcing relationships. A subsequent literature considers transactions in a
hybrid type of governance often called networks (see the second column of table).
In transactions of the network type, (i) contracts are incomplete, (ii) firms typi-
cally do under-invest, and (iii) there are high transaction costs, but outsourcing
occurs nonetheless. Several attempts have been made to explain these apparent
contradictions.
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First, firms that choose to outsource when contracts are incomplete do so
perhaps because their investments are asymmetric in the degree of specificity
([6] Bensaou, 1999). While supplier investments may be quite specific (rendering
a contract less complete and favoring integration), buyer investments may be
much less specific, making outsourcing a viable form of governance. Second,
even though outsourcing typically causes firms to under-invest by encouraging
them to diversify investments towards alternative but less efficient ends, firms
may be able to sustain a relationship over a longer period of time, providing
them better incentives to focus investments towards the first-best, efficient end
([5] Baker, Gibbons and Murphy, 2002). And third, while outsourcing may be
plagued by frictions in contracting, it may be a better solution for firms who seek
to exploit firm-specific resources or unique capabilities. [29] Powell (1990) has
pointed out that one of the principal aspects of those network forms of governance
in the second column is the overall high degree of inter-connectedness between
the outsourcing firms.
Table 3.1: Literature on governance choice
Make-or-buy
literature
Networks
literature
GVC literature
Market Market MARKET
Networks,
hybrid type
MODULAR
RELATIONAL
CAPTIVE
Hierarchy Hierarchy HIERARCHY
Source: adapted from [37] Sturgeon (2008: p. 16)
A more recent strand of literature is largely evidence-driven and makes several
important findings regarding the governance of outsourcing relationships. [11]
Gereffi (1999) finds that lead firms play an important role in the governance of
the apparel supply chain. He describes producer-driven supply chains character-
ized by large manufacturers that dominate upstream suppliers, and buyer-driven
supply chains characterized by large retailers dictating norms and requirements
to their network of captive suppliers. The study by [36] Sturgeon (2002) finds that
in electronics contract manufacturing, turn-key suppliers play an important role
in the production of customized goods with a multi-use interface, which allows
for the use of larger-scale generic manufacturing capacity that limits transaction-
specific investments and shifts some bargaining power to the supplier, in what
he calls a modular type of governance. [4] Asanuma (1989) studies outsourc-
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ing relationships in the Japanese automotive industry, and finds that suppliers
accumulate unique relationship-specific skills through learning and technological
investments that are ultimately borne by both buyers and suppliers, creating a
high degree of relational inter-dependency.
In the theory of value chain governance of [12] Gereffi, Humphrey and Stur-
geon (2005), some of the findings from the above case studies are incorporated
into a framework that breaks governance down to five ideal types. Their typology
replaces the intermediate network type with three distinct categories of gover-
nance, namely modular, relational and captive (see the third column of Table
3.1). Modular governance is characterized by turn-key suppliers of customized
products with a multi-use interface. Relational governance is said to occur in
transactions that involve a number of mutual dependencies, often sustained by
close ties and trust. And captive governance is characterized by the dominating
role of the lead firm. The theory also includes an arm’s length, market governance
type, and a hierarchy type for transactions within firms.
To predict the choice of GVC governance, three explanatory variables are
introduced by [12] Gereffi et al. (2005):
1. the complexity of transactions,
2. the degree of codifiability of transactions,
3. and the capability of the supply base.
Transactions that exhibit rather low degrees of complexity will take place on
standard, spot markets. More complex transactions will instead be carried out
either within an integrated firm (as in the theory of the firm), or in one of the
three distinct categories of outsourcing relationships (replacing networks in the
last column of Table 3.1): that is in either modular, relational or captive rela-
tionships. Next, transactions that are difficult to codify will be better supported
by the relational type of governance, when not by hierarchical governance. Fi-
nally, for transactions where suppliers lack the necessary capabilities, a captive
relationship will be implemented. When the entire supply base does not have the
needed capabilities, the buyer will choose to organize the transaction in-house.
To obtain the prediction of which exact governance form is chosen, the variables
are combined in different configurations of high or low complexity, high or low
codifiability, and high or low supplier capability.
We use the GVC theory as an organizing framework to analyze relationship
governance in view of the PRT and TCE literatures. We discuss how the pre-
dictions regarding complexity, codifiability and supplier capability can be inter-
preted in terms of conditional statements from the theory of the firm. Complex
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transactions can lead to difficulties in the design of an appropriate outsourcing
contract. [4] Bajari and Tadelis (2001) show in their model how contracts can
be endogenously designed as a response to project complexity. Thus, in order to
control for the degree of contract completeness it is important to condition on
complexity. Furthermore, a transaction that is hard to codify does not clearly
specify how residual rights are allocated, which results in potential ex post hag-
gling over the division of relationship surplus, and higher transaction costs. This
tells that in order to control for amount of transaction costs it is important to
condition on codifiability. Moreover, a supplier that is more productive than
the buyer is also relatively more capable in making investments in relationship-
specific assets. This tells us that in order to control for the relative productivity
of firms it is important to condition on supplier capability.1
Table 3.2 combines four conditional statements of the theory of the firm with
four GVC variables. As shown in the table, given high complexity, firms will
choose either modular, relational, captive or hierarchical governance. To predict
which of the four governance types is chosen, we first consider a classic prediction
from the PRT literature. When the supplier is relatively more productive, the
firm will choose to outsource despite this meaning that a potentially high amount
of residual rights is transferred to the supplier. Hence, suppliers with relatively
high marginal returns enter either modular or relational relationships. Notice
that the PRT literature does not make the distinction between the captive and
hierarchy types, as in both cases the less productive supplier loses ownership
of the downstream asset in the ex ante deal. Now conditioning on a statement
from the TCE literature, when transaction costs are low as in modular and
captive relationships, outsourcing is a viable alternative to in-house production.
Notice here again that the TCE literature does not make the distinction between
relational and hierarchy, as in both cases there is too much potential for ex
post haggling over the division of relational rents. Finally, combing all variables
we obtain that hierarchy will be chosen only when the marginal returns of the
potential supplier are low and transaction costs are expected to be high.
Table 3.2: The choice of GVC governance when contracts are incomplete and
transactions are complex
Difficulty to codify
transactions
TCE: Transaction costs
High Low
Capability of the
supply base
PRT: Supplier
marginal returns
Low HIERARCHY CAPTIVE
High RELATIONAL MODULAR
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While Table 3.2 derived four conditional statements assuming that contracts
are incomplete and transactions are complex, relaxing this assumption could
change the predictions. High transaction costs predict in-house production in
the TCE literature, but this invariably depends on the specificity of the assets
involved. Controlling for the degree of contract completeness accounts for this
kind of simultaneity. For instance, when assets are not specific but generic, ex-
cess residual rights can be traded away in the market, in which case contracts
become sufficiently complete for transaction costs to be written down explicitly
and transmitted through prices. Similarly, high marginal returns predict vertical
integration in the PRT literature, but in the absence of residual rights of own-
ership, productive investments in upstream or downstream assets do not create
the types of unique benefits that outweigh the costs of using the market.2 Hence,
when contracts involve investments that are generally quite generic and also in-
volve little uncertainty, trade on markets is always preferred over integration.
To illustrate how conditioning on different levels of supplier marginal returns
and transaction costs can change the choice from make to buy, consider the fol-
lowing Table 3.3. Cases (1) to (4) of Table 3.3 are instances in which specific
investments and uncertainty make contracting difficult, and subtle variations in
the characteristics of transactions lead to different choices of outsourcing gover-
nance.3 Even when investments are specific and highly productive, significantly
low transaction costs imply that the likelihood of haggling is very low and out-
sourcing is viable. This is common of transactions where the use of more direct
control and power prevents shirking and costly re-contracting. A shift from high
to low transaction costs induces this change from make (1) to buy (2). On the
other hand, when marginal returns are very low and the firm cannot make any
productive use of the specific assets required, it is better off relying on an outside
supplier, even if high transaction costs mean engaging in costly interactions. A
shift from make (1) to buy (3) represents this case. Finally, case (4) corresponds
to the situation in which both marginal returns and transaction costs are simul-
taneously low, favoring outsourcing. Similarly as in the make-or-buy cases illus-
trated above, a shift from buy (2) to buy (4) involves reorganizing the outsourcing
relationship to allow the supplier more autonomy in making relationship-specific
investments (since they are more productive), and a shift from buy (3) to buy
(4) means less dependence on costly interactions with the supplier. Although
comparable to a more amr’s length case, case (4) is still unique in that it involves
a significant amount of residual rights allocated to the supplier due to incom-
plete contracting. Because these rights are unique (they are attached to specific
assets), it gives the supplier room for differentiation on the market.
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Table 3.3: Conditional statements from theory and the choice to outsource
PRT: Supplier
marginal
returns
TCE:
Transaction
costs
Make-or-buy
Low High Make (1)
Low Buy (2)
High High Buy (3)
Low Buy (4)
3.4 Sourcing relationships in the automotive in-
dustry and overview of the data
The automotive industry is particularly well suited for the study of governance.
One of the earliest empirical tests of the TCE theory is [30] Monteverde and Teece
(1982), with data on automotive parts manufacturing. They measure the effort
that goes into engineering an automotive component, and find that it strongly
predicts in-house production. In this classic study of the make-or-buy problem,
the variable of interest indicates whether a large share of a component’s produc-
tion takes place in-house, while all external supply relationships are aggregated
as one form of outsourcing governance.
In contrast, more recent studies of the industry focus on the rich heterogene-
ity in supply chain relationships. [21] Humphrey (2004) studies the formation
of global automotive supply networks, and [38] Sturgeon, Van Biesebroeck and
Gereffi (2008) analyze recent trends in the industry, emphasizing the importance
of governance in value chain linkages, with an application of the GVC framework.
Different types of relationship governance are also found in several case studies of
the industry. [4] Asanuma (1989) provides an early account of relational gover-
nance in the Japanese automotive industry, and [25] Kotabe, Parente and Murray
(2007) study modular production strategies in the Brazilian automotive industry.
[18] Helper (1991) shows how relationships in the American automotive industry
have evolved from the traditional arm’s length market type, and [19] Klein (2007)
investigates the failed attempt of General Motors to hold Fisher Body a captive
supplier. The rich diversity in the technologies supplied also contributes to this
heterogeneity. The automotive industry is the most downstream industry in the
study of the upstreamness of U.S. manufacturing by [2] Antras, Chor, Fally and
Hillberry (2012).
To study relationship governance we use transaction-level data on first and
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lower-tier supply contracts. The data comes from SupplierBusiness, a consultant
to the industry, and covers transactions from 1993 through 2012. It includes all
major carmakers and global first-tier suppliers. In addition, the data includes
over a thousand small and medium supplier firms located in Europe and North
America. Table 3.4 summarizes some of the key characteristics of our data. We
observe 64 unique buyers ”b”, defined as an original equipment manufacturer
(OEM) in one of the two regions, Europe or North America. We also observe 213
unique products ”p”, defined using the detailed component categories provided
by SupplierBusiness, 350 different car models ”m” of different OEMs, and 2,205
unique suppliers ”s”, defined as the product division of a supplier firm in one of
the two major geographic regions (more details on the component categories are
given in the Appendix).
Table 3.4: Data on automotive supply relationships
By global supplier By global OEM
Number of Total Mean St.
Dev.
Skew. Mean St.
Dev.
Skew.
Buyers b 64 38.1 18.6 -0.551 1.42 0.49 0.315
Products p 213 38.0 34.2 1.09 193 27.3 -2.43
Models m 350 144 97.4 0.053 12.0 5.88 0.224
Suppliers s 2,205 3.80 1.38 -0.758 378 144 -0.245
Bundles bs a 12,908 84.0 63.6 0.638 427 195 0.229
Relations bsp b 25,563 269 285 1.31 906 455 0.283
Transactions bspm c 43,575 539 593 1.31 1,722 1,013 0.268
Note: The full sample contains 57,354 observations. aBundle is defined as the aggregate
of contracts between a buyer and a supplier. bA relation is a series of transactions
between a buyer and a supplier for a specific product. cA transaction is a unique
combination of a buyer, a supplier, a product and a car model.
Table 3.4 also contains our definitions of bundles, relations and transactions.
We define bundle as a the aggregate of contracts between a buyer and a supplier,
that includes contracts for different car parts and to different car models.4 A
relation is defined as a series of transactions between a buyer and a supplier for
a specific product. And finally, a transaction is defined as a unique combination
of a buyer, a supplier, a product and the car model that it is supplied to. The
following scheme shows how these definitions are made in the data:
• Bundle: a unique combination of a buyer b & a supplier s;
• Relation: a unique combination of a buyer b & a supplier s & a product p;
• Transaction: a unique combination of a buyer b & a supplier s & a product
p & a car model m.
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Because the data set has a time dimension, even our most detailed definition
of a unique transaction will contain a few repeated transactions over time. On
average, about one in every three transactions reoccurs in the data set, which
has a total of 57,354 observations.
In the subsequent columns of Table 3.4, the data is given by global suppliers
and global OEMs. Notice that suppliers are more representative of the charac-
teristics of transactions. In the second row of the table, for instance, the average
number of products supplied is 38, with a high standard deviation and a positive
skewness across suppliers. It means that the majority of suppliers supply less
than 17.8% of the products observed. In contrast, the vast majority of carmakers
use more than 90.6% of all products observed. Since the characteristics of prod-
ucts—as well as modules, relations and the other contract variables—are crucial
in the choice of relationship governance, the variation in supplier characteristics
is also key for the identification of governance types. We use this feature of the
industry to model heterogeneity in governance types below in Section 4.1.
To the data on contracts we add firm-level data collected from Amadeus,
a database with broad European coverage of firms in the automotive industry,
described quite extensively in [30] Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013). This
additional information is used to generate a set of relevant control variables,
below in Section 3.5.2.
3.5 Estimating the choice of relationship gover-
nance
3.5.1 Obtaining proxies for the different types of GVC gov-
ernance
To test the make-or-buy choice it is fairly easy to obtain a variable that indicates
whether a transaction takes place inside a firm or outside on markets. This has
to do with the fact that firm borders are mostly easy to observe. To estimate
outsourcing governance, however, the task of obtaining unambiguous indicator
variables or proxies is much more difficult. Since the different forms of outsourcing
governance all take place between outsourcing firms, we need to look for more
nuanced characteristics of the transactions.
[7] Berry (1994) and [40]Verboven (1996) show how the market share of a
product can inform us about the choices of consumers. While they models more
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specifically consumer demand, the general model can as well be interpreted in
terms of an outsourcing firm’s choice of a supplier (or of a type of supply relation-
ship). We use the GVC literature to obtain the key characteristics of governance
which are most relevant to identify each different governance type, and we use
as proxy variable different measures of market share. A relationship j’s con-
tribution to a market share is calculated using information about the monthly
production volumes of the car models covered by relationship j. We only observe
the projected quantities, but this should be tolerable since they are projected
approximately at the time when the supply contract is signed. Thus, a market
share σj is constructed as follows:
σj =
∑
n∈Nj qn∑
n∈N qn +Q0
,
where qn is the (projected) production of an individual outsourcing contract,
and Nj is the set of outsourcing contracts within a definition of relationship. As
seen in the previous section, we use several definitions for j: the set of contracts
that a specific buyer b holds, or analogously a supplier s, or the bundle bs, etc.
Q0 =M−QN is a crude measure of the outside good obtained by subtracting the
observed production QN =
∑
n∈N qn implied by all of the outsourcing contracts
in our data set from an estimate M of the industry’s total production volume.
For M we use global production volumes for the years 1997-2012, obtained from
the International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (OICA), a think
tank for 35 national trade associations in the automotive industry. We harmonize
these quantities by region (Europe or North America) and time (in months).
As discussed in the previous section, automotive suppliers carry the crucial
characteristics of transactions that we wish to use for identification of the different
types of outsourcing governance. (Since suppliers are often organized in several
product divisions, each maintaining a potentially different type of client relation-
ship, we use the definition of supplier developed in the previous section, i.e. a
supplier is a regional product division of the firm.) When suppliers face strong
competition from a large number of other suppliers in the market for a rather
common product, we identify a transaction that is more market-like. It implies a
low supplier market share σs and a relative large product market size σp. When
suppliers are able to capture a large bundle of contracts (implying high σs) for
the delivery of a turnkey module that can be redeployed over different customers
(implying low σbs), we identify a transaction that is more modular-like. Yet when
suppliers are successful in capturing many contracts because they reoccur (high
σs) in rather unique relationships (low σbsp), we identify a transaction that is
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more of the relational type. Finally, when suppliers with little market influence
(low σs) supply to buyers that exhibit relatively high market power (high σb),
we identify a transaction that is more of the captive type. Below in Table 3.5
we summarize our method to identify governance types, showing the dependent
variable Depvar generated as the logarithm of relative market shares.
Table 3.5: Identifying governance types
Governance type Effect Share of Relative to share of Depvar
MARKET Low Supplier Product − ln(σs/σp)
MODULAR High Supplier Bundle a + ln(σs/σbs)
RELATIONAL High Supplier Relation a + ln(σs/σbsp)
CAPTIVE Low Supplier Buyer − ln(σs/σb)
HIERARCHY Low Transaction a Outside good − ln(σbspm/σ0)
Note: aSee definition in Table 5, footnote.
We can also view Depvar as capturing the observed market position of sup-
pliers given the relevant market for either market, modular, relational, or captive
transactions. High competition for rents with other suppliers, and an unbalanced
power relation between the buyer and the supplier, lead to a weak market position
for suppliers in market and captive transactions, respectively. Controlling for the
size of the product market and the size of the buyer are important to distinguish
each case. High market differentiation from other suppliers, and a strong position
in the division of rents between the buyer and the supplier, lead to relational and
modular transactions, respectively. Controlling for the uniqueness of the rela-
tionship and of the module in question are important to distinguish each case.
For instance, a borderline large supplier might actually represent the market type
if the product it sells takes up a very large chunk of the overall product market.
It might instead represent the captive type, if its client is so large that there are
few alternative outlets on the market, making market rivalry between suppliers
less indicative of its low market share. Yet if it concerns a transaction that is
very unique, then a borderline large supplier has a high Depvar and it represents
continuing success in the relational type, and if it involves a redeployable bundle
of contracts (including different products to different uses), then a high Depvar
means that it captures many contracts of the modular type. Notice that our
definitions of Depvar are intentionally more general than detailed, allowing for
potentially overlapping governance types. Although this comes at the expense
of identifying somewhat weaker average effects, it helps us avoid making more
restrictive assumptions on the types.
To estimate hierarchy governance, we look at the information contained in
3.5 Estimating the choice of relationship governance 75
each transaction. Since this case corresponds to the choice of governance at
the boundary of the firm, the characteristics of both buyers and suppliers are
important, as well as the characteristics of the product being outsourced and its
intended use. A transaction that is underrepresented in the supply market (low
σbspm) is probably more often carried out in-house as the hierarchy type. Also,
transactions that are not observed at all on the market (high σ0) are probably
carried out within firm boundaries.
3.5.2 Construction of the GVC variables and other control
variables
Our main explanatory variables are complexity, codifiability and supplier ca-
pability. We construct them using detailed information on transactions (from
SupplierBusiness), and firms (from Amadeus). To construct the complexity and
codifiability measures, we use three levels of component descriptions from our
transactions data. The variables are based on a conservative binary classifica-
tion: products involve either complex or noncomplex transactions, and either
codifiable or non-codifiable transactions (the full list of product categories and
classifications is given in the Appendix, where we also show a more flexible spec-
ification). Complex are mainly electronics and electrical components and a few
other components that require a good deal of engineering effort in design and
production. These include components in the powertrain and in the chassis areas
of a car. The mean of this variable is 0.581. Codifiable are components that
go primarily in the interior and exterior areas of a car, save airbags, brakes and
a few others. Some sub-components that appear across all areas of the car are
also highly codifiable, as for example fasteners and fixings, and switches and ca-
bles. The mean of this variable is 0.307, and the sample correlation between the
complexity and codifiability variables is strongly negative at -0.728.
Our variable of supplier capability is given as the size of the supplier relative
to its age. A literature on firm capability and learning finds that firms compete
on the basis of internal resources that take time to develop ([31] Penrose, 1959).
Moreover, recent research by [15] Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Miranda (2013) shows
that it is important to control for firm age when looking at the effects of firm
growth. The variable is constructed using company data on suppliers, and is
defined as the supplier’s turnover (operating revenues in 2007) divided by the age
of its branch or headquarters (date of incorporation). For ease of interpretation
we dichotomize it at the mean of the effect of age on turnover. The final variable
takes on the value 1 if the supplier is capable, and 0 if the supplier is not. Its
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mean is 0.453, and the sample correlation between complexity and capability is
0.0211, and between codifiability and capability is -0.0253.
In addition to the three variables from the GVC theory, we also collected
some important control variables from the Amadeus dataset (for the year 2007).
Geographical proximity is known to play an important part in both the decision
to outsource and the choice of outsourcing relationship ([30] Schmitt and Van
Biesebroeck, 2013). For instance, the decision to vertically integrate production
sites is found to depend on proximity to input suppliers ([22] Joskow, 1985). We
therefore include the distance from the supplier plant to the client, in kilometers.
Next, cultural, historic, institutional and family ties are expected to play a role
in the organization of outsourcing relationships. We include a variable of cultural
distance using the survey data of [19] Hostede (1980), measured at the country
level and calculated as the Mahalanobis distance over four dimensions: individ-
ualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. In addition, we
include a dummy variable for the effect of country borders, which is an important
variable in the analysis of foreign direct investment.
Contract length is proxied by the number of months between the start and end
of production of a car model. Longer contracts can be seen as a compensation for
uncertainty in a buyer-supplier relation ([22] Joskow, 1985). Since uncertainty
plays a key role in transactions ([44] Williamson, 1985), it will be important
to control for its influence. We also add a proxy for value added, defined as
operating revenues over total assets. The following Table 3.6 shows the pairwise
correlations of our explanatory variables.
Table 3.6: Sample correlations of the explanatory variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Complexity (1) 1.0000
Codifiability (2) -0.7280 1.0000
Capability (3) 0.0211 -0.0253 1.0000
Km Distance (4) -0.1217 0.0437 -0.2027 1.0000
Hofstede Culture (5) 0.0263 0.0050 0.0503 0.1432 1.0000
Border Effect (6) -0.0876 0.0090 -0.1983 0.4361 -0.2415 1.0000
Months Production (7) 0.0222 -0.0046 -0.0365 -0.2683 -0.0713 -0.0219 1.0000
Proxy Value Added (8) 0.1404 -0.1180 -0.3175 -0.0906 -0.0292 -0.0417 0.0444 1.0000
Note: The sample has 12,343 observations.
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3.5.3 Results of simple regressions: testing each GVC type
separately
In this section we regress our variables of complexity, codifiability and supplier
capability (constructed in Section 3.5.2) on different proxies of governance (con-
structed in Section 3.5.1). Here the approach is to run a separate regression for
each type of GVC governance, to find which variables can best distinguish one
type from the others.
As discussed above, the GVC theory uses different configurations of high and
low for complexity, codifiability and capability to predict the choice of value chain
governance, shown below in Table 3.7. A market form of governance is predicted
when complexity is low, and notice that low complexity is sufficient to predict
market since complexity is higher in the other types to the right (first row of
the table). Low codifiability predicts relational governance and also hierarchy,
but since hierarchy is the in-house form of governance, it is characterized as
having a very small representation (if at all) on the outsourcing market. Thus
we expect to see low codifiability as a good predictor of relational governance.
Finally, low capability predicts captive governance and also hierarchy, but here
again we expect the effect on hierarchy to be comparably very weak. Thus low
supplier capability should be a good predictor of captive governance. Modular
and hierarchy are harder to test, because there are no direct predictions using only
one of the explanatory variables. Nonetheless, when codifiability and capability
are simultaneously high, we should expect to see modular as the chosen form
of governance. Similarly for hierarchy, it can be predicted by codifiability and
capability being simultaneously low.
Table 3.7: Predictions from the GVC theory
MARKET RELATIONAL CAPTIVE MODULAR HIERARCHY
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Complexity Low High High High High
Codifiability High Low High High Low
Capability High High Low High Low
Source: Adapted from [12] Gereffi, Humphrey and Sturgeon (2005: p.87).
Tables 3.8-3.9 show the basic results of our estimation of GVC governance,
where we use simple least squares regressions on the log of market shares. So for
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the market type, the simplest regression takes the following form:
− ln(σs/σp) = β0 + β1 ×Dcomplexn + εn,
where Dcomplexn is a dummy variable indicating high complexity in observation
n, and εn is the least squares residual. Note that estimation of the remaining
types is done in the same way. In the tables, we show three different regressions
for each of the five different types of governance. The first two columns of each
type report the simplest specifications of GVC variables needed to identify a
governance type. The first column always shows the effect of the single GVC
variable that should sufficiently predict a type. The second column adds all
three GVC variables, and the sample is kept the same in the first two columns.
In the third column of each type we add a set of relevant control variables, which
impacts the estimation sample somewhat as these variables come from another
data source.
We obtain results that largely support the GVC theory, that is, the three
GVC variables are found to be in general good predictors of our proxies of the
governance types. In column (1) of Table 3.8, low complexity has an especially
strong effect in predicting a supplier with a small share in a product market
(recall the definition of dependent variables in Table 3.5). It decreases the share
of the supplier relative to the share of the product market, by -0.602%, and this
negative effect is also found in column (2) where all three variables are included.
In addition, the partial effect of codifiability is positive for the market type,
which is very plausible given that market products tend to be more standardized
than products in the other types of contracts. In column (4), low codifiability
strongly predicts relational governance, even when we control for the effect of
the other variables. It tells that when codifiability is low, a supplier has a high
market share compared to the share of the particular buyer-supplier-component
relationship that the supplier belongs to. The partial effects of complexity and
supplier capability are strong and positive in column (5). In column (7), low
supplier capability predicts a small supplier market share relative to the market
share of his buyer, in a captive type of relationship. This holds even when
controlling for the other GVC variables in column (8), where the negative effect
of complexity means that captive relationships are less complex than the average
of the other outsourcing types.
Modular governance can be tested with a variable that indicates that both
codifiability and capability are high. This is the case in only 11.2% of the obser-
vations and even though the effect is positive, in column (10) of Table 3.9, it can
not strongly predict modular governance, also not when all three GVC variables
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Table 3.9: Continued from Table 3.8
MODULAR HIERARCHY
(10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Codifiable and capable 0.0391
(0.0370)
Codifiable or capable -0.0957***
(0.0214)
Complexity 0.0819** 0.127*** 0.0606* -0.00400
(0.0378) (0.0398) (0.0342) (0.0364)
Codifiability -0.0272 0.00802 -0.156*** -0.192***
(0.0407) (0.0424) (0.0368) (0.0388)
Capability 0.0169 0.163*** -0.0223 0.112***
(0.0233) (0.0261) (0.0211) (0.0239)
Km Distance -0.0104 -0.00605
(0.00798) (0.00730)
Hofstede Distance -0.579*** 0.00699
(0.0252) (0.0230)
Border Effect 0.124*** 0.112***
(0.0293) (0.0268)
Months Production 0.00713*** 0.0159***
(0.000639) (0.000584)
Proxy Value Added 0.0175*** 0.0173***
(0.00209) (0.00191)
Constant 2.788*** 2.737*** 2.217*** 11.07*** 11.03*** 9.636***
(0.0123) (0.0374) (0.0696) (0.0166) (0.0338) (0.0636)
Observations 14,061 14,061 12,060 14,061 14,061 12,060
R-squared 0.000 0.001 0.073 0.001 0.005 0.078
Note: Simple least squares regressions. The dependent variables for the different governance
types are defined in Table 3.5. Standard errors in parentheses; * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
are added in column (11). Lastly, transactions that are weakly represented on
the outsourcing market relative to the alternative of in-house production are used
as a proxy for the hierarchy form of governance. We construct a variable that is
1 if either codifiability or capability are high, and 0 if they are both low. This
variable can strongly predict the hierarchy type in column (13). The next column
(14) adds all three GVC variables, where the prediction holds that complexity
should be high, codifiability low and capability low in hierarchy.
In columns (3), (6), (9), (12) and (15), we add control variables for alterna-
tive explanations of governance choice that are used in the literature. In these
estimations, the effects of the GVC variables remain largely the same and in line
with predictions, with the exception of capability in column (15). The effects of
some of the control variables are also meaningful. The distance effect is in most
cases negative, especially for captive since these relationships often see the cap-
tive suppliers co-located with their clients. But the effect of distance is positive
for market relationships, which is to be expected as market products are often
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traded internationally and shipped from greater distances. The effect of cultural
distance is negative in most cases, particularly in relationships where close col-
laboration is important, such as in relational governance. But it is positive for
captive relationships, hinting at the need to maintain stronger control over the
supplier. From the estimates for the variable Months of Production we see that
relational and modular governance are correlated with the longest lasting pro-
duction lines, while market relationships appear to be on average much shorter.
The proxy of value added exhibits the same pattern.
3.5.4 Additional pairwise comparisons: testing one GVC
type against another
In Table 3.10 we compare the choice of governance pairwise, that is, we estimate
the effects of the variables specified in the previous table but look instead at the
choice between two different governance types. Here we compare only between
the network types of governance, but we also include hierarchy for completeness.
In the top part of the table, the approach is to regress on the log difference of
the market shares of two different governance types Y and X, using again simple
least squares. So for the first regression of the relational type versus the modular
type, we estimate:
ln(σs/σbsp)− ln(σs/σbs) = β0 + β1 ×Dcomplexn + ...+ εn.
In the bottom part of the table, the approach is to regress on a dichotomous
variable that takes on the value 1 if the transaction is of a certain type of gov-
ernance Y and not of another type X, and 0 otherwise. For this we categorize
the different governance types using the observations that fall above the median
of the distribution of our governance proxies, and we estimate this using probit
regressions. That is, for the comparison of the relational type versus the modular
type in the first regression:
Pr
[
ln(σs/σbsp) > p50% & ln(σs/σbs) < p50%
]
= Φ
(
β0 + β1 ×Dcomplexn + ...
)
,
where Φ is the cumulative normal distribution and p50% is the 50% percentile
(median) of the sample distribution of each Depvar.
In columns (1)-(6), the interpretation of coefficients is as odds ratio. In the
first column, low codifiability increases the odds of relational governance relative
to modular by 0.128%, or conversely, high codifiability makes modular 3.47%
more likely than relational. In terms of market shares, it implies that low cod-
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Table 3.10: Pairwise comparisons of governance types, two estimation methods
Y : RELATION CAPTIVE HIERARCH RELATION CAPTIVE RELATION
X : MODULAR MODULAR MODULAR HIERARCH HIERARCH CAPTIVE
ln (Y )− ln (X) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Complexity 0.288*** -0.642*** -0.131*** 0.419*** -0.511*** 0.930***
(0.0302) (0.0833) (0.0389) (0.0400) (0.0682) (0.0889)
Codifiability -0.128*** -0.110 -0.200*** 0.0722* 0.0904 -0.0182
(0.0321) (0.0888) (0.0415) (0.0426) (0.0728) (0.0948)
Capability 0.236*** -0.458*** -0.0510** 0.287*** -0.406*** 0.693***
(0.0198) (0.0547) (0.0255) (0.0262) (0.0448) (0.0584)
Km Distance 0.00720 -0.0111 0.00438 0.00282 -0.0155 0.0183
(0.00605) (0.0167) (0.00780) (0.00802) (0.0137) (0.0178)
Hofstede Culture 0.321*** 0.964*** 0.586*** -0.266*** 0.378*** -0.644***
(0.0191) (0.0527) (0.0246) (0.0253) (0.0432) (0.0563)
Border Effect -0.120*** -0.157** -0.0112 -0.109*** -0.145*** 0.0361
(0.0222) (0.0614) (0.0287) (0.0295) (0.0503) (0.0655)
Months Production 0.00576*** -0.0103*** 0.00874*** -0.00298*** -0.0190*** 0.0160***
(0.000484) (0.00134) (0.000624) (0.000642) (0.00110) (0.00143)
Proxy Value Added 0.0300*** -0.0533*** -0.000172 0.0302*** -0.0531*** 0.0833***
(0.00158) (0.00437) (0.00204) (0.00210) (0.00358) (0.00467)
Constant 0.192*** 0.414*** 7.419*** -7.227*** -7.005*** -0.222
(0.0527) (0.146) (0.0680) (0.0699) (0.119) (0.155)
R-squared 0.108 0.062 0.060 0.054 0.072 0.079
Y : RELATION CAPTIVE HIERARCH RELATION CAPTIVE RELATION
X : MODULAR MODULAR MODULAR HIERARCH HIERARCH CAPTIVE
Y = 1 &X = 0 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Complexity 0.242*** -0.223*** -0.144** 0.316*** -0.27*** 0.325***
(0.085) (0.043) (0.072) (0.070) (0.048) (0.042)
Codifiability -0.387*** 0.028 -0.189** -0.094 0.116** -0.136***
(0.089) (0.046) (0.075) (0.075) (0.052) (0.046)
Capability 0.162*** -0.295*** -0.089** 0.266*** -0.337*** 0.371***
(0.053) (0.028) (0.045) (0.046) (0.032) (0.029)
Km Distance -0.020 -0.032*** 0.000 0.011 -0.033*** 0.031***
(0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.009)
Hofstede Culture 0.549*** 0.538*** 0.795*** -0.382*** 0.277*** -0.368***
(0.051) (0.027) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031) (0.028)
Border Effect -0.146** -0.035 0.025 -0.119** -0.038 -0.013
(0.062) (0.032) (0.051) (0.053) (0.036) (0.032)
Months Production 0.007*** -0.004*** 0.016*** -0.011*** -0.012*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Proxy Value Added 0.034*** -0.03*** -0.011*** 0.034*** -0.035*** 0.04***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant -0.994*** 0.514*** -1.465*** 0.628*** 1.243*** -0.866***
(0.149) (0.076) (0.133) (0.137) (0.084) (0.076)
Observations 2,856 9,656 3,962 3,701 7,577 9,632
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.07
Note: Simple least squares estimation of the log difference of governance proxies, in columns (1)-(6);
and probit estimation using mutually exclusive governance categories (see p. 81 for more details),
in columns (7)-(12). The number of observations is 12,060 for columns (1)-(6). Standard errors in
parentheses; * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
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ifiability increases the share of a buyer-supplier-component relation relative to
the share of a bundle of buyer-supplier transactions by 0.288%. We highlight
the estimates that should come out with a clear change in sign according to
the predictions of Table 3.7. A clear distinction between relational and modular
governance is that codifiability is expected to be lower in relational governance.
Similarly, a key difference between captive and modular is that in captive re-
lationships, the supplier is less capable. We first compare relational, captive
and hierarchy against modular in columns (1)-(3), where the signs of the GVC
variables are all in line with prediction. Next in columns (4)-(5) we compare
relational and captive to hierarchy. When a supplier becomes more capable, our
test in column (4) suggests that firms would switch from vertical integration to
relational outsourcing, and when the transaction becomes more codifiable, they
would switch from vertical integration to a captive outsourcing relationship ac-
cording to column (5). The last column (6) compares relational to captive, where
the expected changes in sign do occur, but interestingly, there is a strong effect
for complexity.
Interesting are also the effects of some of the control variables that are in-
cluded throughout in the estimations. Hierarchy appears to exhibit the longest
contracts in terms of the variable Months of Production, followed by relational.
The type of relationship that adds most value appears to be relational outsourc-
ing, and the least value-adding is a captive relationship. The importance of
distance, border and culture is much more ambiguous in these pairwise compar-
isons, but there are a few interesting exceptions. Cultural proximity is surpris-
ingly important in modular relationships, while geographical proximity is most
important in captive relationships, and country borders are most impeding for
relational outsourcing.
In columns (7)-(12) we observe basically the same effects as above, although
the sample size changes quite considerably across regressions, which is due to the
dependent variable being mutually exclusive in the types. Overall, the theoret-
ical predictions in Table 3.7 are largely sustained, also in more nuanced test of
governance choice.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper has shown how the theory of the firm can be interpreted in terms
of conditional statements that have a relevant application in the global value
chain (GVC) literature. We have used the theory of [12] Gereffi et al. (2005)
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as an organizing framework to obtain a set of empirical predictions, which we
then tested using detailed transactions data from the automotive industry. Our
empirical method has shown how to obtain proxy variables for five different forms
of governance obtained from the GVC literature: market, modular, relational,
captive and hierarchy. Furthermore, we have estimated the predictive power of
the three key explanatory variables in [12] Gereffi et al. (2005)—namely complex-
ity, transaction codifiability and supplier capability—in the choice of value chain
governance. We find largely favorable results that are also robust to different
estimation methods.
Appendix
Construction of variables
Component categories are constructed using three levels of detail. The upper
most level gives the general area of the car where the component is built in,
which we also use for the identification of supplier divisions. The intermediary
level indicates the functionality of the component. The lower level category gives
a generic description of the component, irrespective of functionality and use. At
the intersection of these three levels of detail we define a unique components,
which is then classified as complex/noncomplex and codifiable/not codifiable, as
show below.
Table 3.11: Conservative definitions of complexity and codifiability
Complexity Codifiability
Chassis/Underbody Axles 1
Brakes 1
Chassis Components a
Heat Shielding 1
Pressed/Stamped and Metal
Parts
Seals 1
Steering System 1
Suspension System 1 a
Tires 1
Wheels a
Electrical/Electronic ABS/ESC 1
Airbags 1
Alarm/Immobilizer 1
Axles 1
Battery & Components 1
Doors/Tailgate 1
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Driver Assistance System 1
Electronic Distribution System 1
Engine 1
Exhaust System 1
Fuel System 1
Fuse/Relay/Junction Box 1
Horns 1
Ignition 1
Infotainment System 1
Instrument Cluster 1
Lighting 1 1
Motors 1
Pedal Assembly 1
Seating 1
Steering System 1
Switches 1
Thermal System 1
Exterior Body Parts
Bonding/Adhesives 1
Bumper & Components 1
Coatings 1
Doors/Tailgate 1
Glass 1
Lighting 1
Mirrors 1
Noise vibration and harshness 1 1
Pillars 1
Pressed/Stamped and Metal
Parts
Seals 1
Washer/Wiper Systems 1
Interior Airbags 1
Center Console/Dashboard
Doors/Tailgate 1
Floor
Instrument Panel 1
Interior Trim
Lighting 1
Mirrors 1
Noise vibration and harshness 1
Pedal Assembly
Pillars 1
Seating 1
Steering System
Thermal System 1
Miscellaneous Bonding/Adhesives
Powertrain Axles 1a a
Engine 1
Exhaust System 1
Filters/Fillers 1
Fuel System 1
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Heat Shielding 1
Noise vibration and harshness 1
Seals 1 1
Thermal System 1
Transmission 1a a
Note: a Classifications differ in the generic definition (rounded using sample average).
Instead of using the more detailed but perhaps too conservative classification
of component categories, we can regress the governance types directly on indi-
cators of the component categories. Below in Table 3 are the results of a more
flexible specification using upper level category dummies, and we see that the di-
rection and even the magnitude of the effects are as expected. Electronics, which
are generally complex in cars, are a good predictor for market governance (with
a negative sign) as well as relational governance (with a positive sign). Power-
train components are good predictors of modular governance, and miscellaneous
components predict captive and hierarchy governance. Interior and exterior com-
ponents are most often found across market and captive relationships, and chassis
and underbodies in captive or hierarchy relationships.
Table 3.12: Regressions on upper level component categories
MARKET MODULAR RELATION CAPTIVE HIERARCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Chassis/ Underbody .144*** -.172*** -.305*** .543*** .145***
Electrical/ Electronics -.526*** -.0264* .125*** .0107 .113***
Exterior .708*** -.162*** -.59*** .357*** -.159***
Interior .502*** -.234*** -.486*** .518*** -.0892***
Miscellaneous .408*** -.255** -1.36*** 1.54*** .356**
Constant .717*** 2.9*** 4.01*** 2.02*** 10.6***
Observations 57,354 57,354 57,354 57,354 37,516
Adj. R-squared .0567 .00638 .0331 .0193 .00751
Note: The reference category is Powertrain. * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
The supplier capability variable is constructed using data collected on sup-
plier firms, at the headquarters and branch levels. There are many potential
candidates to use as proxy, such as R&D investments, age of the firm, size of the
firm, profits of the firm, value added in the firm, and many more. We choose to
work with a dichotomous firm size divided by firm age variable as explained in
Section 4.2. Below we show the results for using alternative proxies of supplier
capability, all continuous variables. We see that our capability variable is in fact
weaker than the others.
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Table 3.13: Adjusted R-squared of regressions using alternative measures of sup-
plier capability
MARKET MODULAR RELATION CAPTIVE HIERARCH
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
R&D .0186 .0018 .0078 .0080 .0124
Profits .0295 .0181 .0145 .0422 .0306
Age .0600 .0017 .0180 .0182 .0004
Capability a .0008 .0018 .0046 .0014 .0013
Note:a Dichotomous size-by-age variable as used above.
Notes
1Supplier capability is meant in overall relative terms, i.e. relative to the buyer and to the
other potential outcomes of the governance choice process.
2In particular, for sufficiently complete contracts, we say that suppliers are equally capable
of carrying out the investments, and market transactions are preferred because they spread the
risks of random shocks to productivity.
3Because we are interested in variations in the governance of outsourcing relationships,
low is assumed to be sufficiently low to induce buy even when the other variables are high.
Combinations of high and low that cause make are theoretically possible and would predict
alternative forms of in-house governance, but their analysis is not intended in this paper.
4For the purposes of our analysis, we do not use the definition of a module in the technological
sense of the word, as we wish to capture the challenges that modular production represents in
the contracting dimension.
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Chapter 4
Innovation and relational contracts
4.1 Introduction
Technology is understood to be one of the main drivers of economic progress,
playing a crucial role in many economic theories of industry, trade and growth.
Differences in the rate of technological innovation are found to explain produc-
tivity differences across firms ([22] Klette and Kortum, 2004), income differences
across countries ([8] Caselli, 2005), and differences in the growth paths of entire
regions ([13] Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The mechanisms that govern invest-
ments in innovation are, however, less understood. This paper investigates how a
relational incentive contract between two outsourcing firms can foster innovation.
Most of the economic literature treats innovation as a black-box ([2]Aghion
and Tirole (1994) are one of the earliest departures from this view). Productive
resources go in and technology comes out according to some unknown production
function that is usually assumed to be parametric (where the parameters are typ-
ically interpreted as technology themselves). This approach largely neglects the
mode of interaction between firms and how it affects the incentives to innovate.
When investments are uncertain—and particularly in the case of investments
in innovation—when contractual safeguards cannot be made to accommodate
unforeseen outcomes, incentives crucially depend on how firms share the costs
and benefits of innovation. The standard prediction from the incomplete con-
tracting literature is that firms will under-invest ([14] Hart and Moore, 1999).
To improve upon the under-investment problem, firms can recourse to relational
I would like to thank Jo Van Biesebroeck, Wouter Dessein, Jens Südekum, Liza Archan-
skaia, Frank Verboven, Sho Miyamoto and seminar participants at the Center of Excellence
meetings in Leuven for comments and suggestions for improvement. Financial support from
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contracting, which, by working out the range of agreements that can be made
mutually self-enforceable, becomes a viable alternative rent-sharing mechanism.
I write a model of relational contracting in the spirit of [5] Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (2002), but I focus on the case of non-integrated asset ownership
and the choice between relational outsourcing and arm’s length trade (spot out-
sourcing). My theoretical contribution is to reformulate the under-investment
problem in terms of outsourcing firms’ investments in innovation. For that I use
the modeling approach of [1] Acemoglu, Antràs and Helpman (2007), to obtain
a testable equilibrium relationship that micro-founds the costs and benefits of
innovation, and to provide me with observable variables for innovation and re-
lational contracts. That is, I write a model of relational contracting to deliver
a testable empirical relationship in terms of observable variables. My empirical
contribution is to then test this relationship using a rich and novel data set of
outsourcing contracts from the car industry.
This paper builds upon a literature that investigates the under-investment
problem from a variety motivating questions. The effect of governance on in-
vestments has been given a fair amount of attention in the study of incomplete
contracts. [20] Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) look at how the division of
non-contractible profits affects the governance of relationships, and the seminal
work of [12] Grossman and Hart (1986) shows how this influences the incentives
to invest, creating an optimal condition for the choice of governance. Yet the
relationship between investments and governance is not always one-way, as re-
cent evidence in [27] Mol (2005) suggests. Outsourcing relationships sometimes
involve large amounts of specialized R&D investments, whereas the standard
prediction from this literature rules out that such investments will take place
between outsourcing firms. To reconcile this fact, recent studies have proposed
that firms can make use of alternative governance mechanisms to support their
outsourcing contracts. There are broadly two such types of mechanisms.
On one hand, some contracts are just better supported by the role of ex-
ternal institutions, which facilitate the governance of outsourcing relationships
where otherwise difficult. Following this view, there is a well-established litera-
ture in international trade that focuses on the aggregate effects of contractibility.
For example, [1] Acemoglu et al. (2007) write a model where the degree of
contractibility is an exogenous variable to study its impact on technological in-
novation. Empirically, the works of [23] Levchenko (2007) and [28] Nunn (2007)
support this view by looking at the effects of contract enforcement and other
institutions on trade between firms and countries.
On the other hand, some contracts are just be better supported by informal
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relational agreements. [24] Levin (2003) studies the internal conditions of in-
formal agreements, such as self-enforceability, which help overcome the issue of
contractibility endogenously. The empirical findings in [17] Johnson, McMillan
and Woodruff (2002) and [30] Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013) contrast the
two views of institutions and relational agreements, by considering the effects of
external facilities such as courts or culture separately from the internal benefits
of long-term, informal relationships.
I follow the latter strand of literature and include an explicit role for re-
lational agreements as a mechanism of governance that can improve upon an
incomplete contract. In particular, I follow the view that ability to design rela-
tional agreements is a strategic instrument available to firms. This is in fact the
main theme in the "relational view" of the firm, a well-establish concept in the
business literature. The key insight is that there are gains from investments that
can span firm boundaries and be embedded in the relationships themselves ([11]
Dyer and Singh, 1998). Following the tradition of the "theory of the firm" litera-
ture, [5] Baker et al. (2002) view the under-investment problem in a similar way.
They investigate how relational agreements can serve as an important incentive
mechanism to overcome under-investment in different ownership structures. ([25]
Malcomson (2013) summarizes further contributions in this strand of literature.)
This paper shows how relational agreements can help incentivize investments
in innovation, thus becoming a simultaneous endogenous choice for outsourcing
firms. I obtain two main results. First, when investments can be characterized as
non-contractible and relationship-specific (that is, when the benefits outside of a
relationship are low compared to the internal benefits), firms choose a long-term
relational outsourcing contract to accomplish higher innovation, which is only
feasible if they are sufficiently forward-looking. Second, both the efficiency and
feasibility of a relational outsourcing contract depend on the value of alternative
market agreements. When these are comparatively high, a short-term arm’s
length relationship is chosen to accomplish higher innovation. From a perspective
of theory, these results are not surprisingly new.
By micro-founding investments in a long-term outsourcing relationship my
model relates to the early work of [21] Klein and Leffler (1981), which looks more
specifically at the implications of a premium on price for investments in quality
(and quality and innovation are to some degree interlinked). I find, however,
that the mapping from the tradable characteristic of (say) quality to innovation
is non-linear and highly convoluted. Also because I model a relational contract
with implicit bonus payments, my mechanism relates to [26] MacLeod (2007),
but rather than exploring the potential gains and costs of different outsourcing
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modes, I look at the equilibrium relationship between two endogenous choice
variables. It also relates to [7] Board (2011), who investigates the advantages
of a long-term relationship over the statics gains of switching trading partners.
While he focuses more on the conditions that make this kind of loyalty pay off,
my model is interested in the choice variables of firms and their interpretation
(as innovation).
An important assumption behind my results is that of decreasing returns
to innovation. In particular, the relationship between the amount of marginal
returns inside versus outside of a relationship establishes the key trade-off in
firms’ incentives to innovate. In my model, relational governance is chosen to
allocate innovation towards its most productive use, that is, where innovation
produces the greatest marginal returns. This relates to the more general result
found in the property rights theory, that ownership rights should be allocated
to the firm with the highest marginal returns ([31] Whinston, 2003). I find that
relational contracts can serve as a means to transfer control to the supplier in a
similar way, but without the need to integrate the often firm-specific assets.
With respect to my empirical contribution, this paper derives an equilibrium
relationship that can be directly verified with my data from the car industry. I
use a rich and novel data set of transactions between carmakers and their sup-
pliers of car parts. It includes several relevant characteristics of the outsourcing
relationships, such as the car models supplied and the years of production, in ad-
dition to detailed descriptions about the car parts. From my theoretical model I
obtain a variable for relational contracts which can be estimated as the likelihood
of contract renewal. I find that a high likelihood of contract renewal is positively
related to the supply of more innovative car parts, measured using information
about the technology provided by the suppliers themselves. Using a second data
source from international trade, I condition my estimation on the value of equiv-
alent products imported into the US. It results in the expected reversal of the
original empirical relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces
the basic concepts and modeling assumptions and derives the main model pre-
dictions. Subsection 4.2.1 introduces the bargaining environment. Subsection
4.2.2 lays out the structural form of investments, and subsection 4.2.3 solves the
model in the deterministic case, followed by a simulation of the results under
a specific class of demand curves, in subsection 4.2.4. Next in subsection 4.2.5,
the model is extended to a stochastic case, where a set of testable predictions is
obtained. Section 4.3.1 presents the industry and the data for empirical analysis,
and section 4.3.2 shows the results of regressions. Section 4.4 concludes. Proofs
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and mathematical derivations are given in the Appendix.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Game setup
In this section I introduce a simple bargaining environment for the interactions
between two outsourcing firms. I closely follow the incomplete contracting setup
of [5] Baker et al. (2002), but deviate from it in order to define a somewhat
narrower schedule of transfers, which I need in order to micro-found investment
choices.
Consider a downstream buyer b who outsources the production of a new
technology to an upstream supplier s. The downstream value of this technology
is given by Qb, which is observable to both b and s but not verifiable by any
other third party, such as a court of law. Qb is thus non-contractible in the
classic sense. An example of a non-contractible technology is a product with a
very specific or a new use, whose market value can at best be derived from its
second-best use. Further, let Ps determine the resale value of the technology
in a second-best upstream market, and note that Qb > Ps for the outsourcing
game to be worthwhile. A hold-up problem arises in such case, in that neither b
nor s are able to credibly commit to trade this technology at Qb. For instance,
the supplier may deliver a technology valued Ps against upfront payment of Qb,
relying on a court’s inability to verify its true value, or equivalently, the buyer
may renege on the promised payment of Qb for an already delivered product,
alleging a lower value Ps. The difference Qb − Ps is then a relationship-specific
surplus that cannot be implemented by means of a legally binding contract.
The amount of relationship-specific surplus depends on some inputs Xs pro-
vided by the supplier, which are observed internally by b and s, but which are
not externally verifiable. Inputs Xs contribute to the downstream value of the
technology in a monotonically increasing way, that is ∂Q (Xs)b /∂Xs > 0, and
to produce them, the supplier takes two types of costly actions: he invests a
quantity x (n)s in each production task n ∈ [1, N ], and he selects the particular
set N of complementary tasks that go into production. Crucially, while some
of the tasks n may be more or less contractible, the set N includes tasks that
are innovative and which are non-contractible, rendering the aggregate of trad-
able inputs X (N, x (n)s)s as non-contractible. Finally, the total costs incurred
in production are given by the function C (N, x (n)s)s.
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Depending on how b and s agree (or disagree) to share the relationship-specific
surplus, both sides may have a strategic interest in the supply of Xs. As Q (Xs)b
enters the profit function of the supplier, he may have an incentive to increase
Xs in order to achieve a higher downstream value for the technology. And as the
downstream value goes up, the buyer may be more willing to share additional
downstream surplus in the form of some transfers contingent on Q (Xs)b. Note
that none of these effects is independent of functional assumptions. For now I
focus on the structure of the bargain and rent sharing, but below in Section 4.2.2
I elaborate further on the production and demand structures.
I consider two forms of rent sharing:1
1. arm’s length trade,
2. and relational outsourcing.
In a benchmark case, firms share the relationship-specific surplus non-cooperatively
by engaging in a Nash bargain with exogenously given bargaining power. This
corresponds to an arm’s length type of transaction, and follows the timing de-
picted in Figure 4.1 below. This and the following figure are based on the more
general representation of [25] Malcomson (2013), but they are adapted to the fit
with the empirical motivation of this paper. The state of the world is revealed in
time t0, when the identities b and s are assigned to the buyer and the supplier,
and the production parameters in Qb (·), Xs (·) and Cs (·) as well as the demand
function Ps (·) are revealed. In t1, b and s meet to organize their outsourcing
transaction. They learn about their relative bargaining strength β ∈ [0, 1], and
calculate the optimal quantities to trade, marked with a ⋆ symbol henceforth. At
this point, they engage in a form of cheap talk to determine the conditions of their
transaction, including price P ⋆s and quantity X⋆s . In t2, the supplier produces
X⋆s at cost C⋆s . I shall consider a random event in t3 when linking the model
predictions to data, below in Section 4.2.4. For now I consider a deterministic
scenario in which the supplier delivers X⋆s in t4, and at the same time, the buyer
pays him the resale price P ⋆s plus a share β (Q⋆b − P ⋆s ) of the relationship-specific
surplus. In the following round in t+0 , a new set of game parameters is revealed
and firms restart the game with (new) randomly matched outsourcing partners.
This corresponds to the bottom decision path in the figure.
To summarize, profits in arm’s length trade can be expressed in the following
functional form, which is preserved in every new round that firms play the deter-
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Figure 4.1: Timing of the outsourcing game: arm’s length case
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ministic game (the stochastic version of profits is introduced in Section 4.2.4),
π⋆b = (1− β) (Q⋆b − P ⋆s )
π⋆s = P ⋆s + β (Q⋆b − P ⋆s )− C⋆s .
The total revenues of the supplier are P ⋆s + β (Q⋆b − P ⋆s ) and his costs are C⋆s ,
while the buyer earns Q⋆b minus the payments to the supplier. Joint profits
are then simply π⋆b + π⋆s = Q⋆b − C⋆s . Since bilateral transfers do not enter the
joint profit function, the incentives provided by P ⋆s might deviate the supplier
from the actions that are optimal within a relationship. Thus here it becomes
already apparent that the particular choice of rent-sharing mechanism influences
how much the supplier invests in the downstream and upstream value of the
technology. In the case of arm’s length trade, a supplier with higher β has
incentives to supply more of X⋆s and contribute to a higher Q⋆b , and if this is
greater than the increase in costs C⋆s , then joint profits are also higher. In this
scenario however, the bargaining parameter β is taken as given by firms who
maximize their individual profits from one round to the next. Past interactions
do not confer any additional benefits, and there is no cooperation in the long
run.
The strategic alternative is for firms to engage in long-term relational bar-
gaining. In this case, firms share the relationship-specific surplus conditional on
a mutual commitment to maintain a long-term relationship that is profitable to
either side. This is accomplished by setting up a scheme of recurring transfers
Tbs which are made viable by the accumulation of surplus in the relationship,
and which are self-enforceable between b and s. The mechanism that sustains
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this form of rent-sharing is self-reinforcing: as transfers Tbs raise the prospects of
a higher stream of profits in the long run, the profitability of a long-term com-
mitment might also go up, allowing for even higher Tbs. Firms can find different
ways to transfer Tbs, such as using non-money gifts and other benefits to reward
the relationship, but I assume that they all can be accurately observed by both b
and s. In addition, the following properties apply: (i) transfers Tbs are bilateral
and assumed to be constant over time, i.e. Ts = −Tb ∀t, (ii) transfers are written
as a function of Q (Xs)b, which makes them non-contractible, (iii) the extent of
transfers depends, on one hand, on the relative bargaining power in the short
run, captured by the Nash parameter β, (iv) and, one the other hand, on the
long-run value of the relationship, discounted with a common factor δ ∈ [0, 1], (v)
and lastly, b and s need to find mutual agreement on the exact size of the trans-
fers, which crucially depends on each side’s incentive compatibility constraints,
derived in detail below.
Below in Figure 4.2 the timing of the relational bargaining game is depicted.
As in the previous case, the state of the world is revealed in t0. In t1, b and s
meet and agree (cheap talk) on the terms of relational outsourcing, marked with
a ∼ symbol henceforth. These include the price P˜s and quantity X˜s to trade, and
a commitment to pay an additional compensation T˜s to the supplier, contingent
on the downstream value Q˜
(
X˜s
)
b
. Notice that in some relational bargaining
games, such terms of trade are interpreted as a take-or-leave offer made by one
of the sides of the bargain. As this could create a conflict in the interpretation
of β, I assume that in t1 b and s engage in a more complex although informal
negotiation that includes a role for β but which I do not explicitly model. T˜s is
then disbursed according to the following transfer schedule,Ts = T˜
(
Q˜
(
X˜s
)
b
)
s
if Xs = X˜s
Ts = 0 if Xs < X˜s.
(4.1)
I shall use the notation Ts =
{
T˜s, 0
}
to denote such a schedule. While T˜s is not
legally binding, dishonoring it triggers an immediate and irreversible break down
of the long-term relationship (corresponding to a grim-trigger type of strategy,
which is adopted by both sides). Next in t2, the supplier produces X˜s at cost
C˜s. In a deterministic scenario, there are no random events affecting the decision
to remain in the relationship in t3, and so in t4, the buyer makes the transfer of
P˜s + T˜s to stay in the relationship and the contract is renewed with the same
supplier and under the same conditions in the next round, starting in t+1 .
To summarize, in every new round in a deterministic scenario, profits in
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Figure 4.2: Timing of the outsourcing game: relational case
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relational outsourcing can be written as follows,
π˜b = Q˜b − P˜s − T˜s
π˜s = P˜s + T˜s − C˜s.
The actual size of relational transfers T˜s depends on how much of the discounted
stream of relationship-specific surplus b is willing to share and s is willing to
accept. The main trade-off for firms is between sticking to the relationship and
repeatedly extracting a high portion of Q˜b − P˜s, versus quitting the relationship
and searching on the market for alternative trading partners, who perhaps pay a
better P ⋆s or exhibit a more favorable β/ (1− β) ratio. Hence, T˜s needs to suffice
each firm’s individual conditions of long-term participation in the relationship.
The condition for buyer b is that his net present value of profits from hon-
oring T˜s in the long run is at least weakly greater than his net present value of
profits from reneging on T˜s today, with profits discounted by a constant factor δ.
Looking at Figure 4.2, b either pays the promised T˜s in t4 and renews the con-
tract afterwards (and in a deterministic scenario he will do repeatedly so), or he
pays the non-cooperative share β
(
Q˜b − P˜s
)
and switches to arm’s length trade
afterwards (in which case he gets paired with another random supplier). The
left-hand side of inequality (4.2) below shows b’s payoff from following the upper
decision branch in the figure, whereas the right-hand side shows his alternative
option in the lower decision branch,
−T˜s +
∞∑
t+=2
δt
+
π˜
(
T˜s
)
b
≥ −β (Q˜b − P˜s)+ ∞∑
t+=2
δt
+
π⋆b . (4.2)
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The discounting parameter δ captures more generally how much buyer b values
future trade in the relationship with s. Note that although the standard repre-
sentation of net present value is for the discounted value of activities in future
points in time t+, the interpretation of the above summation terms can be more
flexible. A stream of relational profits could also refer to a multitude of activities
that are related in a point in time, such as a number of different tasks t+. By
re-writing inequality (4.2) above I obtain a condition on the maximum amount
that b is willing to transfer,
−T˜maxb = (β + δ (1− β))
(
Q˜b − P˜s
)− δπ⋆b .
Analogously, the condition for supplier s requires that the net present value
of the long-term relationship with T˜s is at least weakly greater than the value of
switching to arm’s length trade, given discounting δ,
T˜s +
∞∑
t+=2
δt
+
π˜
(
T˜s
)
s
≥ β (Q˜b − P˜s)+ ∞∑
t+=2
δt
+
π⋆s . (4.3)
Here as well, this creates a condition on the minimum amount that s is willing
to accept,
T˜mins = (1− δ)β
(
Q˜b − P˜s
)
+ δ
(
C˜s − P˜s
)
+ δπ⋆s .
With both sides agreeing on the amount of self-enforceable transfers, T˜mins ≤
−T˜maxb becomes a necessary as well as sufficient condition for the relational
outsourcing game.2 It determines the range of transfers that are self-enforceable
by b and s simultaneously. Given the game parameters β and δ and the quantities
traded, firms choose relational outsourcing whenever this necessary and sufficient
condition is fulfilled, otherwise they revert to the benchmark case of arm’s length
trade. In addition, the implicit condition T˜mins > 0 implies that for quantities
of supplier inputs below the agreed-upon X˜s, the relational contract is always
violated as Ts = 0 in schedule (4.1) does not fall within the necessary range.
4.2.2 Structure of investments
In the previous section I showed how the choice of relationship governance de-
pends on Qb, Xs, Cs and Ps. To obtain the equilibrium version of that condition,
I derive in this section the optimal upstream and downstream quantities based
on the profit maximizing behavior of firms. This modeling step allows me to
establish an equilibrium relationship between the choice of governance and the
choice of investments in innovation, which is the observable variable in the em-
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pirical analysis. I start by laying out the production and cost structures of the
buyer and the supplier.
The buyer achieves Qb by mixing his unique assets y¯b with supplier inputs
Xs according to a constant returns to scale production function,
Qb = Xγs y¯
1−γ
b , (4.4)
where the parameter γ ∈ (0, 1) gives the degree of specificity of Xs. Buyer in-
puts are available at a fixed quantity y¯b, and their allocation is taken as optimal,
which implies that b makes positive profits equivalent to the costs of ownership
of y¯b. This makes the buyer’s problem more of an accounting one, as he does not
have control over any variable inputs. Nonetheless, the modeling of Qb (Xs) has
two important reasons. First, it allows for the introduction of the parameter γ,
which has not only a valuable economical meaning, but it also allows to gener-
ate the curvature necessary for concavity of the problem. Second, it makes the
outsourcing model consistent in that it creates a role for separated ownership of
assets (although this assumption could be relaxed in an extension of the model).
For intuition, buyer inputs can be understood as some form of non-transferable
qualities such as his entrepreneurial skills, or a valuable brand. Without com-
promising the generality of my main result, I normalize the size of buyer inputs
to y¯b ≡ 1 henceforth.
The supplier producesXs following a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)
production function of the following form,
Xs =
(∫ N
x (n)1/αs dn
)α
, (4.5)
where x (n)s is the amount of investments in task n, N is the total number
of task varieties, and α ∈ (1,∞) is a parameter that regulates the degree of
task complementarity. In this stylized model, x (n)s and N are endogenously
chosen by the supplier, where higher innovation is captured by the choice of a
particular set N consisting of highly innovative tasks.3 Here it already becomes
clear that even though investments could be expressed entirely in terms of the
tradable quantity Xs as in previous studies, for empirical purposes it is important
to derive investments in terms of N , as the relationship between Xs and N is
non-linear.
The CES production function is thus the modeling tool that I use to study
intensive as well as extensive investments in new technology. I make this choice
of model partially for analytic convenience, but also because of a long tradition
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in the literature that already includes the modeling of technology adoption ([1]
Acemoglu et al., 2007). It makes sense to interpret this as a model of innovation.
First, truly innovative investments are arguably non-contractible by nature, as is
assumed here. Second, for investments to qualify as innovative it is important to
distinguish between the sheer size of investments and the types of investments,
as is done in this type of Dixit-Stiglitz equilibrium with optimal choice of variety.
And third, by modeling the degree of product differentiation the CES model
is able to quantify innovation, although this requires an additional assumption,
discussed in below in Section 4.2.3.
To make such investments, the supplier incurs costs Cs which exhibit the
following structure,
Cs =
∫ N
(c (n)N + c (n)x x (n)s) dn.
It includes the variable costs of investment c (n)x, and the total costs of innova-
tion,
∫ N
c (n)N dn. Notice that Cs is decreasing in average investment levels but
increasing in technology variety. Hence, the equilibrium choice of investments
features a trade-off between quantity and variety. For the supplier, it is cost-
efficient to increase the amount of investments x (n)s at the expense of adopting
fewer technologies N , but since α > 1 (cf. equation 4.5), it is at the same time
more productive to employ a higher number of technology varieties for each given
level of investments.
Finally, the resale price or the value in a second-best upstream market is
derived from Ps = P (Xs)Xs, where the demand function P (Xs) is assumed to
be sufficiently elastic with ϵ ≤ −1 so that the marginal resale price is positive,
P ′Xs = P (Xs)
(
1 + ϵ
ϵ
)
≥ 0. (4.6)
Together, P ′Xs and Q
′
Xs
establish the relationship between the amount of returns
to investment on the upstream and downstream market. In particular, equation
(4.4) implies decreasing returns to scale in the efficient use of the technology,
since I assume γ < 1. Then, whether the technology is traded at stronger or
weaker decreasing returns on the resale market is key for the results of my model.
I consider a case where Q′′Xs < P
′′
Xs
, and there are at least three important
arguments for this. First, the resale market can be seen as an approximation
of the long-run value of the technology, and in the long run, demand elasticities
are generally higher (in absolute value). Second, the fixed costs associated with
the introduction of a new technology tend to dissipate to zero in the long run,
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making it easier to scale production (i.e. Ps converges to constant returns to
scale). And third, there is usually a limit to the amount of unique surplus that
a relationship can generate. As the technology matures on the market, initially
non-tradable resources (e.g. y¯b is a patent) are freed up to competition.
4.2.3 Equilibrium behavior
Equipped with the above functional assumptions, I can now turn to the profit
maximizing choices of firms. My model is constructed as long-run outsourc-
ing game, but since payoffs are the same in every round for given equilibrium
choices of firms, it falls in a category of stationary games ([24] Levin, 2002).
This is very helpful as it allows me to represent the choices of firms in just two
possible outcomes of the outsourcing game—arm’s length trade and relational
outsourcing—which I then compare for inference. I shall consider a symmetric
scenario in which
x (n)s ≡ x ∀n, and c (n)k ≡ ck ∀n, k ∈ {N, x} .
This symmetry assumption has the following interpretation. Suppose that tasks
x (n)s, n ∈ [1, N ] are ordered by their degree of innovativeness, that is, n = 1 is
the least innovative and n = N is the most innovative task. Then the assump-
tion that all x are the same removes x (n)s of their characteristic of increasing
innovativeness, which is now entirely captured by an increase in the variable N .
This assumption also strongly simplifies my functional forms: the supplier’s pro-
duction function becomes Xs = Nαx and his cost function Cs = N (cN + cxx).
The first-best result is given by optimization of the joint profits of the rela-
tionship, πb + πs = Qb − Cs. To achieve the quantities
{
NFB , xFB
}
, b and s
jointly choose the average size of investments x and the degree of innovation N
that maximize the following problem,
πFBb + πFBs = max
N,x
(Nαx)γ −N (cN + cxx)
with an additional functional restriction, αγ < 1, required for concavity.4 From
the first-order conditions of this problem, I obtain that first-best levels of in-
novation are given as a function of the cost structure c ≡ c1−γN cγx (negative re-
lationship) and of the production parameters α (positive relationship) and γ
104 Innovation and relational contracts
(bell-shaped relationship) as shown below,
NFB =
(γ
c
(α− 1)1−γ
) 1
1−αγ
xFB = cN
cx
(
1
α− 1
)
.
Clearly, the bargaining positions of b and s do not matter in this case as both
their interests are perfectly aligned. When such a relationship is not possible,
however, the particular choice of bargaining mechanism matters, and the above
first-best result cannot be achieved because the supplier has also incentives to
invest towards alternative markets.
In the arm’s length case, trade is governed by the Nash bargaining rules,
and so buyer profits π⋆b are simply determined by the quantities delivered by the
supplier. The supplier chooses both the degree N⋆ of technological innovation
and the average size x⋆ of investments by maximizing profits
π⋆s = max
N,x
P (N, x)s + β ((N
αx)γ − P (N, x)s)−N (cN + cxx) ,
From the first-order conditions, the optimal pair {N⋆, x⋆} is given as the fixed
point solution of the following equations,
N⋆ 1−αγ = (1− β) P
′
X⋆
cx
(N⋆ α)1−γ + β γ
cx
(1/x⋆)1−γ (4.7)
x⋆ = cN
cx
(
1
α− 1
)
.
The extent of innovation N⋆ is shown as a function of two terms. The first term
on the right-hand side of equation (4.7) corresponds to the market reward to
greater innovation. The magnitude of this term varies with the particular demand
conditions on the resale market, since the marginal resale price also depends on
the equilibrium quantities, P ′ (N⋆, x⋆) (below in Section 4.2.4 I consider a specific
class of demand curves to run some simulations). The second term is proportional
to the amount of relational incentives β, and depends on the substitution with
x⋆. Thus, if β is high, N⋆ goes up with higher supplier specificity γ, whereas if
β is low, N⋆ goes up with the resale price P ′. This nicely illustrates the trade-
off in supplier incentives, which depend on his share of the relationship-specific
surplus. Furthermore, notice that the supplier makes sort of unitary investments
in x⋆, for given cost and α parameters. A higher ratio of fixed to variable costs
increases the average size of investments, at the expense of lower innovation. More
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complementarity between technology varieties favors innovation, but decreases
x⋆.5
In relational outsourcing, trade depends on both buyer and supplier honoring
their commitments to pay out relational benefits, which take the form of transfers
T˜s contingent on Q˜
(
X˜s
)
b
. After an informal agreement is reached in t1, the
supplier chooses in t2 the pair
{
N˜ , x˜
}
that minimizes his costs, given the quantity
X˜s required for disbursement of T˜s (see Figure 4.2). That is,
C˜s = min
N,x
N (cN + cxx) s.t. f (N, x) = X˜s.
From the first-order conditions of this optimization problem I obtain
N˜ =
(
cx
η
) 1
α−1
(4.8)
x˜ = cN
cx
(
1
α− 1
)
,
where η is the shadow value of X˜s (technically, it is the Lagrange multiplier).
Some important conclusions can already be drawn from this result. First, since
N˜ is a function of η, equation (4.8) shows how the optimal level of innovation
changes whenever relaxing the requirement on X˜s leads to a readjustment in
costs (and thus supplier profits). Because of the property of increasing returns
to scale, a marginal increase in X˜s makes the supplier invest more in innovation
N˜ as unit costs go down and η decreases. Second, since x˜ = x⋆, the average size
of investments does not depend on governance, although this is mostly due to
the stylized aspect of the model.
There are several possible equilibria for this relational outsourcing game.
Given a common discount factor δ, I show above in Section 4.2.1 that for a
transfer T˜s to be mutually self-enforceable it needs to fall within the range[
T˜mins ,−T˜maxb
]
, implying that several different transfer schedules (4.1) are, in
theory, implementable. The exact transfer schedule that is agreed upon depends
on a more complex underlying bargaining structure that also nests the bargain-
ing parameter β, as both buyer and supplier may have interest in designing the
division of the relationship-specific surplus.6 However, since I do not model this
structure, I derive next only the range of innovation levels that can be achieved
within the context of a relational bargain.
Suppose that, after the demand and production parameters are revealed in
t0, b and s set out to negotiate the highest possible X˜s in t1.7 Since X˜s is
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monotonically increasing in N˜ , the problem of finding the highest possible N˜ is
to calculate the optimal reaction from increasing the production requirement to
X˜maxs . First, a small increase in X˜s induces the supplier to adopt a higher N˜ , by a
factor proportional to 1/η (see equation 4.8). But then with a higher N˜ , the buyer
is able to offer an even better deal and ask for higher X˜s, as it creates additional
slackness in his participation constraint (see equation 4.2). This process can be
iterated until the highest N˜ is reached, at the point where the reaction curve of
the buyer becomes binding, that is
(
∂T˜s/∂X˜s
)∣∣ T˜s = −T˜maxb , and the shadow
value for the supplier reaches η = ∂
(
P˜s − T˜maxb
)
/∂X˜s.8 Plugging this into (4.8)
I obtain η = (1− τ)P ′
X˜
+ τγX˜γ−1s and
N˜1−αγ = (1− τ) P
′
X˜
cx
(
N˜α
)1−γ + τ γ
cx
(1/x˜)1−γ . (4.9)
Notice that this result is symmetric to the result in the arm’s length case,
only with τ replacing the Nash bargaining parameter in (4.7). It is given by
τ = β + (1− β) δ, β ≤ τ ≤ 1.
As τ ≥ β, relational outsourcing provides here weaker incentives from outside
markets (cf. first term on the right-hand side of equation 4.9) but proportionally
stronger incentives from within relationships (cf. second term). This result par-
allels an important prediction from the property rights theory, that it is optimal
to allocate assets towards the most productive firm in the relationship. While
the property rights literature focuses on the costs and benefits of trading own-
ership rights, my model looks at how firms use relational contracts to find the
right incentives within a fixed ownership structure (namely outsourcing). There
are costs as well as benefits from engaging in relational bargaining. A relational
contract allows the supplier to have more control over the relationship-specific
rents (a high τ is equivalent to a strong bargaining position β), which induces
him to invest more towards the (efficient) downstream value of the technology.
But this creates costs to the buyer as he has to forgo additional revenue.
To find the lowest possible N˜ , I can solve similarly for the reaction curve
of the buyer at the binding constraint of the supplier
(
∂T˜s/∂X˜s
)∣∣ T˜s = T˜mins .
It makes the supplier choose the same N⋆ as in the arm’s length case, since
π˜s
(
T˜mins
)
= (1− δ)π⋆s . Now, with this pair of results I can at last compute the
necessary (although not sufficient) condition for a feasible transfer scheme,9
Q˜b − P˜s ≥ Q⋆b − P ⋆s . (4.10)
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A benefits scheme that is sustainable under the relational scenario needs to gen-
erate higher relationship-specific surplus than a comparable arm’s length trans-
action. There are at least two important conclusions from this result. First, it
shows that because the prospect of future profits always generates stronger in-
centives in relationships, the necessary condition is that the relationship-specific
gains are at least weakly greater. Second, it crucially shows that market condi-
tions are equally important in determining the sustainability of a relationship.
Given (4.10), T˜s is jointly determined by b and s according to their broader
bargaining relationship, and profits are π˜{b,s}
(
T˜s
∣∣ Q˜b − P˜s ≥ Q⋆b − P ⋆s ).
Together, equations (4.7), (4.9) and (4.10) establish the equilibrium relation-
ship that I use for analysis. Because the equations that solve for N are non-linear,
I approximate them numerically in the following section.
4.2.4 Variation in prices
In this section I look at a specific class of demand curves for the resale market, and
I solve the model numerically by simulating a certain transfer schedule. When
products are very unique, as is often the case with new technologies, second-best
markets provide only a weak approximation of what would be demand for their
intended primary use. As a consequence, the alternative-use demand for such
new technologies can be very elastic, and the resale price can be comparatively
very low. I simulate a case where the demand curve in the second-best market
exhibits the following property: P ′Xs ≡ p, where p is a given demand parameter
for the marginal resale price. This corresponds to assuming perfect elasticity
of demand or constant returns to investments in the alternative use, and it is
representative of the more general cases where Q′′Xs < P
′′
Xs
≤ 0, as discussed
above in section 4.2.2. Now inequality (4.10) can be rewritten as
p ≤ P (N⋆, N˜)
s
=
(
1
γ
c1−αγx x
⋆1−γ
) α−1
1−αγ
, (4.11)
for some threshold price level P s given as a function of the optimal N⋆ and N˜ .
The relational contract is mutually self-enforceable and thus firms are able to
choose relational governance whenever the parameter p is below the threshold
P s. This threshold increases in the average size of investments x⋆ (which do
not depend on governance), making it easier to sustain the relational contract at
higher p. Put differently, transactions that involve generally smaller investments
are better carried out on markets, as the benefits of a long-term relationship in
terms of discounted profits are not high enough to contain the reneging tempta-
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tion. Interestingly, P s is independent of the discount factor δ. While for given
p the reneging temptation clearly decreases in δ, an increase in the value of the
outside option p increases the reneging temptation regardless of δ, i.e. of how
patient b and s are.
To make things more concrete, let me start by computing the extreme case
where p is zero, which corresponds to a technology that has no valuable use
outside of the relationship. The following equations are obtained by plugging
p = 0 into (4.7) and (4.9),
N⋆|p=0 =
(
β
γ
c
(α− 1)1−γ
) 1
1−αγ
N˜ |p=0 =
(
(β + (1− β) δ) γ
c
(α− 1)1−γ
) 1
1−αγ
.
In this case it is easy to see that N˜ |p=0 ≥ N⋆|p=0, and in fact this relationship
holds for all values p ∈ [0, P s], as derived in the Appendix. N˜ |p=0 is the highest
level of innovation that can be obtained when T˜s = −T˜maxb (p = 0), because
this particular T˜s belongs to a transfer schedule that is always mutually self-
enforceable between b and s. In contrast, the arm’s length quantity N⋆|p=0 is
chosen whenever b and s cannot reach agreement over a certain transfer schedule,
which results in the supplier getting Ts = 0. This occurs when their discount
factor δ is too low and their temptation to renege on the long-term commitment
and extract static gains on the market is too high. It holds for all δ that are
below some threshold discount factor δ, given as the smallest δ that makes at
least one of the conditions (4.2)-(4.3) of the buyer and supplier become violated,
for given Ts. That is,
δ = min
[
T˜min−1s (Ts) ,−T˜max−1b (Ts)
]
where T−1 (·) = δ is an inverse function.
Below in Figure 4.3 I simulate how the optimal N changes with δ when p = 0,
but note that a similar figure can be obtained for alternative p ∈ [0, P s]. With
some loss of generality, I select now a certain transfer schedule Ts to be able to
plot the relationship between N and δ in two-dimensional space. I shall consider
Ts =
{
−T˜ (βℓ)max
b
, 0
}
, (4.12)
where βℓ < β corresponds to rewarding the supplier with a smaller share of sur-
plus than he is able to extract in arm’s length bargaining. Only when he becomes
patient enough will the long-term relationship pay off, that is, −T˜ (βℓ)max
b
≥
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T˜ (β)mins . A threshold transfer level can then be obtained at the point where the
supplier is indifferent between arm’s length and relational bargaining T˜ (δ)s =
T˜ (β)mins , and at this point he is able to achieve N˜ (δ). To simulate the result
obtained with this transfer schedule, I use the following parameter constellation:
(i) for simplicity I set fixed and variable costs equal, cN = cx = 1, (ii) and
bargaining power to symmetry, β = 1/2; (iii) in addition, I set α = 1 2/3 and
γ = 1/3, all of which fit within the range of parameters that satisfy the conditions
for concavity derived in the Appendix.
When δ < δ, a constant lower level of innovation N⋆ is achieved because the
supplier trades off fixed gains p from markets against gains from the relationship
that are fixed by β. When δ ≥ δ, transfers T˜s can be made to the supplier, who is
then able to extract additional gains from the relationship at an increasing rate.
It incentivizes him to increase investments in innovation N˜ even further. When
δ = 1, the first-best level of innovation NFB can be implemented, illustrating how
a feasible transfer schedule can overcome the under-investment problem within
a relational outsourcing contract. My model is not able to predict, however,
whether such a transfer schedule is in fact chosen by the outsourcing firms.
Figure 4.3: Innovation and the threshold discount factor δ for given p > P s
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Note: On the horizontal axis is the discount factor δ. The transfer
schedule (4.12) is used for this illustration, while the remaining
parameters are set to β = 1/2, α = 1 2/3, γ = 1/3, and cN =
cx = 1.
Next I introduce variation in prices. As seen above, the full range of p is
constrained by the condition that the relationship has to produce a positive
surplus, that is, Qb − Ps > 0. This creates the following maximum condition
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on prices, p < Pmaxs . As already seen, a viable transfer schedule can be set
up when p ∈ [0, P s]. For all remaining values p ∈ (P s, Pmaxs ), the relational
contract cannot be sustained and so firms always trade the technology at N⋆
using anonymous, arm’s length relationships.
Below in Figure 4.4 I depict the different levels of innovation achieved with
different δ against variation in p (and I use again the parameters and transfer
schedule simulated above). First of all, the figure shows how the N -curves in-
crease with p, implying that the additional incentives provided by an increase in
the resale price exert an overall positive effect on investments in innovation.10,11
The top curve NFB represents the first-best level of innovation, which is constant
for values of p ≤ P s. After that point when the long-term relationship ceases the
exist, arm’s length trade produces a higher level of innovation N⋆. The curve
N˜ (δ) shows the optimal N˜ achieved when δ = δ and p < P s. When δ ≥ δ, firms
choose relational governance (shaded area in the figure), where innovation is also
accordingly higher. When δ < δ, firms fall back to the outside option of arm’s
length trade (bottom curve in the figure), achieving only N⋆. Thus, here again it
is possible to see that the first-best result can be implemented with a relational
contract where b and s are entirely patient or trustful, with δ = 1. First-best
levels of innovation can also be achieved if the supplier has full control, that is
β = 1.
Figure 4.4: Innovation and prices: the choice of governance in relation to δ
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Note: On the horizontal axis is the price parameter p. The transfer
schedule (4.12) is used for this illustration, with varying δ and the
same parameters as in Figure 4.3.
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Finally, Figure 4.5 shows the full range of optimal N˜ that can be achieved
within a long-term relationship, for given δ ≥ δ. It is obtained by computing
the best and worse feasible transfers T˜s in Ts =
{
T˜s, 0
}
, as already discussed in
Section 4.2.3. It is possible to see how an increase in the outside value p, which
makes the range of feasible transfers narrower, also shrinks the range of optimal
N˜ . More crucially, when all conditions for the feasibility of relational contract-
ing are met—δ is high enough, p is small enough, and transfers are workable,
T˜s ∈
[
T˜mins ,−T˜maxb
]
—N˜ is always greater than N⋆. This figure generalizes the
result somewhat, in that it shows all possible endogenous choices of innovation
whenever a relational contract is, in theory, implementable. Of course this result
depends on several restrictive assumptions made throughout the model, such as
the use of a grim-trigger strategy without the possibility of negative transfers,
and the continuous and monotonic relationship between Ts and N . Nonetheless,
the model allows me to micro-found an equilibrium relationship between inno-
vation and relational governance, with which I can derive a testable empirical
relationship in terms of observable variables, in the following section.
Figure 4.5: Innovation and prices: the range of implementable N˜ |T˜s for given
δ > δ
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Note: On the horizontal axis is the price parameter p. Different
transfer schedules are used for this illustration, and they are as-
sumed to be mutually self-enforceable with fixed δ ∈ (δ, 1). All
remaining parameters are the same as in Figure 4.3.
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4.2.5 Stochastic implementation
In this section I allow firms to be exposed to random shocks in the bargaining
process. In Figures 4.1 and 4.2 above, a stochastic term ε disturbs the profit
function of the buyer in t4 in every new bargaining round. I assume that shocks
ε are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), conditionally mean zero,
and sunk, which has several practical implications. First, as shocks are i.i.d.
it avoids the need to add another layer of dynamics to the model. Second, as
shocks are ex-ante mean zero they do not alter the choices of firms in the periods
ahead of t4.12 And third, as shocks are sunk the buyer bears them only until the
end of the round. While these assumptions have clear practical benefits, they
are not entirely unrealistic. ε can be seen as some unexpected costs of switching
suppliers, incurred while searching for new suppliers or dismissing old ones. Note
that even though I model this stochastic term at the buyer side, it may affect
the entire equilibrium choice of b and s to remain or quit the relationship after
t4, so it can be interpreted more generally in terms of a shock that is pertinent
to both sides.
The expected profits of firms are now given as
E
[
π{b,s}|N
]
= π{b,s} + E [ε|N ] ,
where π{b,s} are the deterministic functions of Section 4.2.1, and shocks follow
the assumption E [ε|N ] = 0. The optimal quantities are the same as in equa-
tions (4.7) and (4.9), what crucially changes is condition (4.10) for the choice of
governance. Given that this choice occurs in t5, it will depend on the particular
realization of ε and the distribution that it is drawn from. It begins by changing
the participation condition (4.2) of the buyer, and by changing his maximum tol-
erance for relational transfers to T˜maxb + ε. This in turn influences the necessary
condition for relational contracting as it restricts the range of feasible transfers.
I assume that ε is drawn from a logistic distribution, which gives the following
probability that (4.10) is fulfilled and the relational contract is honored,
Pr [ε < ∆(Qb − Ps)] = Pr [D = 1] , (4.13)
where ∆(Qb − Ps) =
(
Q˜b − P˜s
) − (Q⋆b − P ⋆s ), and D is a dichotomous variable
registering the fact that the outsourcing relationship was not discontinued (upper
decision path in Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
In the last Figure 4.6 below I illustrate the stochastic case. For given dis-
count parameter δ and a feasible transfer schedule Ts =
{
T˜s, 0
}
, it shows the
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levels of innovation that are associated with different forms of governance. Since
the choice of governance is now entirely stochastic, there are, for each parameter
constellation, two possible outcomes of governance, ∼ and ⋆. While in the deter-
ministic scenario N˜ is the level of innovation under relational outsourcing and N⋆
is the level of innovation under arm’s length trade, now the form of governance
that produces a certain N is given by the stochastic condition (4.13). It means
that for given p, any point in either curves is theoretically possible, but only up
to a certain probability. The odds ratio of observing a high N˜ and a low N⋆
near p = 0 is very high, whereas at p = P s it is 50%/50%. In comparison to a
deterministic case in which firms would choose relational governance to the left
of P s and arm’s length trade to the right of it (given the appropriate δ), any
deviations from this choice can now be attributed to a certain randomness ε. For
instance, firms that engage in relational outsourcing when p > P s do so perhaps
because their costs of switching suppliers are so high (that is, so unlikely high)
that their N⋆ curve shifts downwards until it crosses the N˜ curve. It corresponds
to negative realizations of ε, where the odds that a relational contract is renewed
are positive but lower than the odds that the relationship is discontinued.
Figure 4.6: Innovation and prices: stochastic choice of governance for given δ
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Note: On the horizontal axis is the price parameter p. The curve
N˜ is for a feasible transfer T˜s, computed with the same param-
eters as in Figure 4.3. Because here the choice of governance is
stochastic, a N˜ lower than N⋆ when p > P s is possible although
highly unlikely (see p. 113 for an example).
Now, since the condition for the choice of relationship governance is a function
of the optimal choice of technology, I can get a logit estimator for the main
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equilibrium relationship of the model,
λ = ∂ Pr [D = 1]
∂N
.
As shown in the simulation above and derived analytically in the Appendix, I
can get the following testable prediction from the model, for given Ts and δ,λˆ > 0 for low pλˆ < 0 for high p.
There are reasons to believe that many of the transactions included in my data
set are located on the left part of the graph where p is low, given the nature of
relationships in the automotive industry. In the next section I give some classic
examples of outsourcing contracts in this industry, followed by a description of
the data and the regression analysis.
4.3 Evidence
4.3.1 Industry and data
The automotive industry provides rich cases to study. Outsourcing relationships
are often long-term in this industry, and innovation is key to the competitive
advantage of suppliers. In the transaction cost economics (TCE) literature, two
classic examples of relational outsourcing come from the automotive industry:
the Fisher Body–General Motors (GM) relationship in the period 1919-1926,
first cited in [20] Klein et al. (1978) and revisited several times by [19] Klein
(2007), and the relationships between Japanese carmakers and their suppliers in
the 1980s, studied by [4] Asanuma (1989). A third relevant case-study focuses on
European firms. [16] Johnson (2009) studies the development of the Anti-Lock
Braking System (ABS) in the 1960s-70s, and how it was tied to the successful
relationship between Bosch and Daimler-Benz.
[18] Klein (2000) describes how Fisher Body and GM entered a long-term
relational contract for the supply of full car bodies. The contract included an
enforceable 10-year exclusive dealing clause and a cost-plus formula. At the time
of the signing, the main objective was to provide the right guarantees so that
Fisher Body would make the required non-contractible quality investments in
GM-specific bodies. As put in [20] Klein et al. (1978, p. 308): “In order to en-
courage Fisher Body to make the required specific investment, this contract had
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an exclusive dealing clause [...]. This exclusive dealing arrangement significantly
reduced the possibility of General Motors acting opportunistically [...]”. Provid-
ing a long period for amortization of the costs of investment meant that there
would be implicit relational transfers from GM to Fisher Body. In fact, if initial
investments were high compared to the running costs specified in the cost-plus
formula, these implicit transfers would be increasing over time. The agreement
worked for some time, but rapidly changing market conditions affected the sus-
tainability of the relational terms of the contract, which led Fisher Body to refuse
to make further investments, and GM to eventually take over its supplier.
[4] Asanuma (1989) makes an analysis of relational outsourcing in the Japanese
car industry. Carmakers typically offer to their suppliers a basic contract that
runs for one year, but that is foreseen with the conditions for renewal. The basic
contract specifies the general obligations, and the frequency at which delivery
schedules and prices are to be renegotiated. Suppliers who are successful in re-
peated interactions with the buyer can expect to be given increasing responsibility
as they move up in a unique rating system of firms. Buyers differentiate suppliers
into "common subcontractors" who have the design of components supplied by
the carmaker, and "excellent subcontractors" who produce components to their
own design that has been approved by the carmaker. To join the exclusive group
of excellent subcontractors, suppliers are required to make non-contractible in-
vestments in relationship-specific skills and technology. Firms who then belong
to this group typically enjoy the long-run benefits of Japanese inter-firm linkages
(keiretsu), which work as a rent-sharing mechanism.
[16] Johnson (2009) analyzes the many aspects of reputation and firm rela-
tionships that played an important role in the early development of the ABS
brakes. Several suppliers in the US and Europe had made attempts to develop
functional anti-skid brake systems for use in cars. Following the little success
of the first systems in the 1960s, many uncertainties that plagued their design
remained unresolved, and so there was a general skepticism amongst carmakers
and also consumers regarding the use of electronics in car safety systems. It
was finally in 1978 that the German firm Bosch produced the most reliable de-
sign, which became the benchmark for future generations of this technology. [16]
Johnson (2009) points to the successful efforts of Bosch in pursuing a reputa-
tion strategy based on quality and communication, and the role of the long-term
commitment of Daimler-Benz to sponsor these efforts.
To test the main equilibrium relationship of my model about the correlation
between innovation and relational governance, I use theWho-supplies-whom data
set of automotive supply transactions. The data comes from SupplierBusiness, a
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consultant to the industry who systematically surveys suppliers. When a supplier
is surveyed, it will typically provide as complete of a list as possible about the
components and car models it supplies, but it will not provide details about the
contracts with their clients. SupplierBusiness then completes the data set with
information about the carmakers and car models supplied. I observe in total
73,979 transactions covering vehicles produced between 1984 and 2024. There
are 805 uniquely defined car models assembled by 108 carmakers (regional OEMs
of different parent companies). These are supplied by 1,616 suppliers, small and
large, who manufacture and/or pre-assemble a total of 1,127 distinct types of
components. A more detailed description of the data is provided in [30] Schmitt
and Van Biesebroeck (2013).
I obtain two indicator variables for D (see the discussion after equation 4.13)
by looking across all observed transactions of each distinct buyer-supplier pair, to
see whether certain types of transactions reoccur between them. A transaction
is characterized as a supplier and its component on one side, and the buyer and
its car model on the other. Below in Table 4.1 is an illustration of the data. The
carmaker Porsche outsources the production of engine shafts in several of its car
models, which are supplied by ThyssenKrupp and Mahle in this example. While
some of the Porsche models that outsource engine shafts might not be included
in the data, I observe, up to the most recent point in time in the data, virtually
all the Porsche models that ThyssenKrupp and Mahle supply with engine shafts.
From 1996 to 2009, ThyssenKrupp kept a long outsourcing relationship with
Porsche, supplying three Boxster models and a 911. It did not supply, however,
the 2008 Cayenne model, which was outsourced to Mahle. I use this variation
in the data to learn something about the strength of the relationship. Although
Porsche did outsource engine shafts in the 2008 Cayenne, ThyssenKrupp did
not supply them when it conceivably could have (either by winning the entire
contract, or in a dual sourcing contract with Mahle).13
Table 4.1: Suppliers to Porsche: Engine shafts
Carmaker Part Model Year Supplier
Porsche Engine shafts Boxster 1996 ThyssenKrupp
2004 ThyssenKrupp
2009 ThyssenKrupp
911 2004 ThyssenKrupp + Mahle
Cayenne 2008 Mahle
There are several possible explanations for this break in the Porsche–ThyssenKrupp
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relationship: maybe something special about the 2008 Porsche Cayenne, or some-
thing unique about the strategy of firms. The empirical models of the following
section absorb many of these effects with the appropriate use of fixed effects
and conditioning methods. I focus instead on the technology, engine shafts in
this case. The theoretical model of previous sections established an equilibrium
relationship between the degree of technological innovation and the form of rela-
tionship governance. In particular, a relationship that can be sustained over time
is associated with the production of more innovative technologies by the supplier
when there are high rents to be extracted. Below in Table 4.2 are examples of how
often are different technologies repeatedly outsourced in Porsche–ThyssenKrupp
relationship. Engine shafts reoccur more often in this relationship than gearboxes
or wheels.
Table 4.2: Porsche–Thyssenkrupp relationship (i)
Model Year Engine shafts Gearbox Wheels
Boxster 1996 √ √ √
2004 √
2009 √ √
911 2004 √ √
Cayenne 2008 √
To construct the dependent variables I rearrange the information of the pre-
vious table and obtain the long form shown in Table 4.3. The data set has now
292,843 observations, and I use two definitions of dependent variable: Depvar1 is
simply a 0/1 coding of the instances in which a candidate supplier actually sup-
plies the component. A supplier is a candidate in every transaction that involves
a component it has supplied elsewhere to the same buyer. This dichotomous
variable has a sample mean of 0.408, that is, in roughly two out of five cases
a buyer-supplier relationship was not discontinued. Depvar2 is an alternative
definition requiring that an observed candidate supplier appears in at least two
consecutive periods, and it excludes initial observations. Depvar2 has a sample
mean of 0.329. The last column of Table 4.3 is a preview of the location of
explanatory variable String, defined at the level of components.
To construct my main explanatory variable I use detailed component descrip-
tions provided by the suppliers themselves in the survey of SupplierBusiness.
Below in Table 4.4 is an illustration of the level of detail of this data. In the
first column, Category gives the generic type of the component. This is part of
a classification system developed by the surveyor, which I use for control in the
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Table 4.3: Porsche–Thyssenkrupp relationship (ii)
Model Year Part Supply Depvar1 Depvar2 String, etc.
Boxster 1996 Engine shafts √ 1 ...
Gearbox √ 1 ...
Wheels √ 1 ...
2004 Engine shafts √ 1 1 ...
Gearbox 0 0 ...
Wheels 0 0 ...
2009 Engine shafts √ 1 ...
Gearbox √ 1 1 ...
Wheels 0 ...
911 2004 Engine shafts √ 1 1 ...
Gearbox 0 0 ...
Wheels √ 1 1 ...
Cayenne 2008 Engine shafts 0 0 ...
Gearbox √ 1 ...
Wheels 0 0 ...
analysis. There are in total three levels of component category: by a component’s
generic name (289 unique names), by the area in the car (6 unique areas), and
by its functionality (88 unique categories). In the second column is the detailed
description of the component, which I use to measure its degree of technological
innovativeness. There is a lot of variation in this variable, with as many as 26,946
unique entries in the data. One proxy variable that I use is the length of the
string, shown in the third column. It has a mean of 18 characters, a standard
deviation of 14.6, and it is highly skewed to the right with a max of 243 (I ex-
clude observations that have the maximum truncated string size), whereas the
log of this variable is approximately normally distributed. In the example below,
engine shafts can be described simply as “Camshafts”, with 9 characters, or as
“Fully machined balance shaft modules (2.4L)”, with 43 characters.
Table 4.4: Examples of component description
Category Detailed component description String
Engine shafts Camshafts 9
Fully machined balance shaft modules (2.4L) 43
Ductile iron camshaft castings (3.5L V6 and 2.4L
4 cylinder engines)
68
Wheels Wheels 6
Steel and aluminum wheels 25
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I use two alternative proxy variables for the degree of technological inno-
vativeness, obtained after merging the detailed component descriptions in the
original data to US trade data. The new data come from the Center for Interna-
tional Data,14 and contain internationally traded goods classified in 10-digit HS
codes, with descriptions of the goods in each code. I use the information in the
product descriptions of each data set to merge them word-by-word. Since the
matchings are not always perfect, the new variables are averaged across the all
the best matches, which I get from searching both forwards and backwards for
words between data sets.15 The two proxy variables give the trade content of a
component. The first variable measures the average GDP per capita of countries
that export a component to the US, weighted by trade volumes. Its sample mean
is 19,693 US Dollars, for the years 2002-2013. The second variable measures the
share of a component’s US imports that come from Germany, and it has a sample
mean of 0.079.
4.3.2 Results of regressions
To test the main equilibrium relationship of my model, I regress different prox-
ies of the degree of technological innovativeness on the probability of contract
renewal. As seen in Section 4.2.4, firms that engage in relational bargaining are
more likely to adopt more innovative technologies, given low market prices. To
proxy technology by some measurable characteristic in the data, I use the length
of a supplier’s own component description. That is, more innovative technologies
are said to require longer descriptions.
Below in Table 4.5 are the results of a series of logistic regressions using
Depvar1 as dependent variable. I use Depvar1 as a measure of D on the left-
hand side of the logit regression first and foremost because this variable lends
itself easily from the construction of the data set. Depvar1 is a binary variable
that has a meaningful interpretation as logit probability, but because I only test
an equilibrium relationship, I could conceivably invert the right and left-hand
sides of the regression line. However, as I do not impose causality, my model
does not need to defend any particular order of estimation. In the simplest
specification in column (1), the log of string length has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the probability of contract renewal. The number 0.145 is to
be interpreted as follows: the odds of contract renewal are on average 0.145%
higher for a component that has a 1% longer description.
Columns (2)-(4) report the effects of log (String) interacted with six mutu-
ally exclusive component categories. Now the magnitude and even direction of
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Table 4.5: Odds of contract renewal: the effect of component description
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log (String) 0.145***
(0.00659)
× Chassis/Underbody 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.0522***
(0.00728) (0.00924) (0.0127)
× Electrical/Electronic 0.234*** 0.191*** 0.127***
(0.00732) (0.00933) (0.0128)
× Exterior 0.127*** 0.0940*** 0.0192
(0.00730) (0.00932) (0.0129)
× Interior 0.110*** 0.126*** 0.0468***
(0.00724) (0.00927) (0.0128)
× Miscellaneous 0.0325*** 0.0623*** -0.0371**
(0.00841) (0.0108) (0.0148)
× Powertrain 0.122*** 0.117*** 0.0538***
(0.00679) (0.00851) (0.0118)
Constant -0.799*** -0.761***
(0.0198) (0.0199)
Buyer-supplier f.e. (cond.) yes yes
× Model f.e. (cond.) yes
Observations 292,843 292,843 271,055 141,972
Note: Reported are odds-ratios in excess of 1, and standard errors in parenthesis.
Significance testing relative to 0, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
the effects change depending on the category of the product, which helps un-
derstand the importance of conditioning on p. For instance, for components
that fall under the category Electrical/Electronic the effect is strong across the
board. Intuitively, because electronics are complex products which typically re-
quire client-specific design, they generate high relational rents but have a low
resale value. They are probably located on the left part of the graph in Figure
4.6, where the relative odds of contract renewal are high for an increase in a
measure of technology. Column (3) runs a regression with conditioning on each
buyer-supplier pair. There are in total 13,536 unique pairs, which absorb the in-
fluence of unique relationship characteristics and are equivalent to the inclusion
of fixed effects. At this more disaggregated level, I only measure variation within
buyer-supplier pairs, but the results remain largely unchanged. Column (4) goes
further by conditioning additionally on the different car models in the data, to
an equivalent of 81,761 fixed effects and at a cost of eliminating more than 40%
of the observations. As discussed in the previous section, this conditioning helps
abstract from explanations that would rather reflect a car model’s inherent de-
gree of technological innovativeness. Here the results change more considerably,
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becoming overall weaker across categories, and even negative inMiscellaneous. It
first tells that model characteristics are important but that they do not invalidate
the results, and second that certain components which are sourced on markets
are more high-tech as in Miscellaneous, although they are likely to come from
other industries.
Using a second data source (see Section 4.3.1), I regress now a measure of
product sophistication on the likelihood of contract renewal (using Depvar1 as
before). The new variable is based on [15] Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik (2007),
and it measures the (weighted) average GDP per capita of the countries that trade
a certain component. Two additional control variables are constructed in a similar
way: I measure the distance content of a component as the average distance
from the US to the other trading countries (in 1,000 km), and also I measure the
average volume of US import trade for the component (in US Dollars). Below
in column (5) of Table 4.6, log (GDP ) exhibits a strong effect on the likelihood
of contract renewal: the odds of contract renewal are on average 0.139% higher
for a component that is imported from a country with a 1% higher GDP per
capita. Here again, this large positive effect reflects the fact that many of the
components in the data are likely to be located on the left of the distribution of
p. The effect of distance is negative as expected, and it helps control for the cost
components of trade.
The next column (6) adds the variable log (Trade), given in percentage in-
creases of the US Dollar value of trade, to control for the ambiguous influence
of prices p. An increase in log (Trade) leads to a lower probability of contract
renewal, as expected from the model (see Figure 4.6). Including this variable
decreases the effect of log (GDP ) considerably, because it separates the influence
of an implicit low p across transactions. To understand the relationship between
technology and prices more clearly, I split the distribution of the log (Trade) vari-
able into separate percentile bins, and then interact it with log (GDP ). According
to the predictions of the model, innovation has a positive effect on contract re-
newal when p is low, but a negative effect when p is high. I find this relationship
also empirically, in columns (7)-(9).16 The effect of a higher degree of product
sophistication on the odds of contract renewal decreases seemingly monotonically
over the distribution of market prices, even when different interaction variables
are added. Column (8) adds fixed effects for the component categories, to control
for potential measurement issues in the trade data. Here the positive effect of
technology becomes negative somewhere between the 5th and 10th percentiles of
the price distribution. In Section 4.2.4 I derive the existence of such a switching
point at P s, but I cannot estimate it explicitly because both technology and
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Table 4.6: Odds of contract renewal: the effect of product sophistication
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
log (GDP ) 0.139*** 0.103***
(0.0261) (0.0270)
× 1-%ile log (Trade) 0.261*** 0.0803** 0.0398
(0.0329) (0.0348) (0.0617)
× 5-%ile log (Trade) 0.189*** 0.0117 -0.0250
(0.0306) (0.0325) (0.0537)
× 10-%ile log (Trade) 0.158*** -0.0141 -0.0658
(0.0302) (0.0321) (0.0532)
× 25-%ile log (Trade) 0.153*** -0.0181 -0.0597
(0.0300) (0.0320) (0.0530)
× 50-%ile log (Trade) 0.138*** -0.0269 -0.0681
(0.0299) (0.0319) (0.0529)
× 75-%ile log (Trade) 0.130*** -0.0358 -0.0762
(0.0298) (0.0318) (0.0527)
× 90-%ile log (Trade) 0.126*** -0.0386 -0.0840
(0.0297) (0.0317) (0.0525)
× 95-%ile log (Trade) 0.117*** -0.0446 -0.0808
(0.0297) (0.0316) (0.0524)
× 99-%ile log (Trade) 0.105*** -0.0554* -0.0984*
(0.0295) (0.0314) (0.0521)
× >99-%ile log (Trade) 0.0930*** -0.0727** -0.113**
(0.0300) (0.0321) (0.0532)
Distance content -0.0920*** -0.0906*** -0.0798*** -0.0608*** -0.0438***
(0.00324) (0.00326) (0.00345) (0.00382) (0.00658)
Constant -3.653*** -2.454*** -7.657*** -2.212**
(0.723) (0.761) (0.906) (0.958)
log (Trade) -0.00612*** yes yes yes
(0.00127)
× Category f.e. yes yes
Buyer-supplier-model f.e. (cond.) yes
Observations 183,389 181,766 181,766 181,766 82,402
Note: Reported are odds-ratios in excess of 1, and standard errors in parenthesis. Significance
testing relative to 0, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
prices are proxy variables in my regressions. The last column (9) uses condition-
ing to control for buyer-supplier fixed effects. More than half of the observations
are dropped in this strict specification, but the results remain largely the same.
Finally, in Table 4.7 I regress an alternative explanatory variable from the
second data source on my two definitions of dependent variable, for further check
of robustness. In column (10), components that have a higher German content
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are associated with a higher likelihood of contract renewal (using Depvar1 as
before). The effect is very large at a 0.541% increase in the odds of contract
renewal for a 1 percentage point increase in the share of a component’s imports
from Germany. While the previous measure of product sophistication included
all countries that trade with the US, this variable considers the effect of products
that only one particular rich and high-tech country such as Germany exports.
Note that the regression uses the most detailed specification of controls and fixed
effects used above. The last column (11) runs the same regression but on an
alternative definition of the dependent variable, Depvar2. Because this variable
excludes initial observations, the sample size is strongly impacted, keeping only
one fifth of original observations and making it a very strict check of robustness.
Both the effects of technology and distance preserve their signs.
Table 4.7: Odds of contract renewal: alternative specifications
(10) (11)
Depvar2
% German content 0.541*** 0.860***
(0.0888) (0.140)
Distance content -0.0610*** -0.0617***
(0.00436) (0.00682)
log (Trade) × Category f.e. yes yes
Buyer-supplier-model f.e. (cond.) yes yes
Observations 82,416 31,855
Note: Reported are odds-ratios in excess of 1, and standard
errors in parenthesis. Significance testing relative to 0, ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Depvar2 requires observing at
least two consecutive transactions to code a contract as re-
newed, and it excludes initial observations.
4.4 Conclusion
This paper develops a simple model to understand the importance of relational
governance in technological innovation. Firms have the strategic option to design
sustainable long-term relationships supported by informal agreements and rela-
tional transfers. It helps firms achieve higher innovation in situations where the
contracting environment is incomplete and characterized by contractual hurdles
that are typical of investments in new technology. The model also demonstrates
that conditions on an outside resale market are equally important to determine
the feasibility of relational governance. I also derive a necessary condition for mu-
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tual self-enforceability of relational agreements, which involves the total amount
of relationship-specific rents. As the potential for specific rents dwindles and
the technologies become more valued on alternative markets, the main predic-
tion of my model is reversed, that is, arm’s length trade starts to produce better
incentives to innovate.
In the empirical part I use transactions data from the car industry to show
that relationships are not all randomly assigned between carmakers and parts
suppliers, but depend on their technological content. With observable variables
for relational contracting and innovation as derived in the model, I test the hy-
pothesis that a carmaker–supplier relationship is more likely to be renewed when
the part in the transaction is positively related to different proxies of techno-
logical innovativeness. By interacting it with the value of US imports, I further
test whether the direction of the effect changes as predicted by the model. The
general findings also hold under more nuanced specifications, and they are robust
to alternative variable definitions and different regression methods.
Appendix
Permissible range
The problem is only well defined when Qb − Ps > 0, which creates a maximum
condition on prices. Using the optimality result and all the assumptions made in
Section 4.2 about demand and cost parameters, I obtain, for any values of δ,
p < Pmaxs = (α− 1)1−γ
(
1
c
(1− β (1− γ)) (α− 1)1−γ
)−α(1−γ)1−αγ
.
Sufficiency for concavity
The second-order conditions require the Hessian in the supplier optimization
problem to be negative definite. That is, the diagonal elements need to be nega-
tive and the determinant positive. For f = π˜s and given a linear demand curve,
P ′′ = 0, I get[
f ′′NN f
′′
Nx
f ′′Nx f
′′
xx
]
=
[
−ταγ(1−αγ)(α−1)γ(1/N˜)2−αγ −c+ταγ2(α−1)1−γ(1/N˜)1−αγ
−c+ταγ2(α−1)1−γ(1/N˜)1−αγ −τγ(1−γ)(α−1)2−γN˜αγ
]
.
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Note that the arm’s length case is obtained analogously with τ = β, and first-best
with τ = 1. The first diagonal element is negative if and only if αγ < 1 while
the second γ < 1. The determinant is positive if and only if f ′′Nx2 < f ′′NNf ′′xx.
Using condition p < Pmaxs , it is sufficient (although not necessary) to show that
αγ < 1/2 and αγ < 1 − γ simultaneously. Because γ ∈ (0, 1) as defined above
in the text, these more restrictive conditions contain the remaining necessary
conditions, and hence below is a sufficient and necessary condition for concavity,
αγ < 1− γ < 1 and αγ < 12 .
Proof of result (4.11)
(i) N (p) is monotonically increasing in p
Using the implicit function theorem, I show that N˜ is monotonically increasing
in the parameter p, that is,
∂N˜
∂p
= −∂f
∂p
/
∂f
∂N˜
> 0,
where f = −cN˜1−αγ + (1− τ) p (N˜α)1−γ + τγ (α− 1)1−γ . The proof is given in
two parts. The first part is to show that the nominator is positive,
∂f
∂p
= (1− τ) 1
c
(
N˜α
)1−γ
> 0.
The second part is to show that the denominator is negative,
∂f
∂N˜
= − (1− αγ) N˜−αγ + (α− αγ) (1− τ) p
c
N˜α−αγ−1,
which will be negative if and only if N˜ is smaller than
N˜ < N˜max =
(
1− αγ
(α− αγ) (1− τ) pc
) 1
α−1
.
Now by using the result for the optimal N˜ on the left, I obtain the above in-
equality in terms of p,
p <
1− αγ
(α− αγ) (1− τ) 1c
(
(α− αγ) 1c τγ (α− 1)−γ
) α−1
1−αγ
.
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Next I check whether this range of prices falls within p < P s, which after
some algebra simplifies to
1
(1− τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈[1,∞)
> ((1− γ) τγ)α(1−γ)1−αγ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈(0,1)
,
hence showing that ∂f/∂N˜ < 0 and that ∂N˜/∂p > 0 together with the first part.
Note that the arm’s length case is obtained analogously with δ = 0.
(ii) N˜ (p) and N⋆ (p) cross only once
I set N˜ = N⋆ ≡ N to show that there is only one unique solution for p at P s (N),
P s =
N1−αγc− βγ (α− 1)1−γ
(1− β) (Nα)1−γ =
N1−αγc− τγ (α− 1)1−γ
(1− τ) (Nα)1−γ ,
from which I get
N =
(γ
c
(α− 1)1−γ
) 1
1−αγ
P s = c
(
N−1
)α−1 = c(γ
c
(α− 1)1−γ
)− α−11−αγ
< Pmaxs .
(iii) N˜ (p) > N⋆ (p) below a certain threshold P s (N)
In Section 4.2.4 I already show that N˜|p=0 > N⋆|p=0, at p = 0. Here I show that
this relationship applies for all p < P s. Say N˜ = Nκ and N⋆ = N , then at the
point where p
(
N˜ = Nκ
)
= p (N⋆ = N) the parameter κ is either less, greater,
or equal to 1, indicating the relationship between N˜ and N⋆,
p = N
1−αγc− βγ (α− 1)1−γ
(1− β) (Nα)1−γ =
Nκ1−αγc− τγ (α− 1)1−γ
(1− τ) (Nκα)1−γ .
Here I can solve for some N
N =
(γ
c
(α− 1)1−γ Ω
) 1
1−αγ
,
where
Ω = τ (1− β)− β (1− τ)κ
α−αγ
(1− β)κ1−αγ − (1− τ)κα−αγ .
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Now, plugging this back into the above and since P s = p|κ=1, I get the following
relationship between p and κ,
p = P s
(
Ω− β
1− β
)(
1
Ω
)α−αγ
1−αγ
,
and note that Ω|κ=1 = 1. To see in which direction p changes when κ increases
I use the Envelope Theorem at κ = 1,
∂p
∂κ |κ=1
= −P s
(α− 1)
(1− αγ)
1
(τ − β)Φ,
where Φ = α (1− τ (1− γ)) − 1. If the above is is negative, N˜ > N⋆ is true
because, starting from the unique point where the curves cross, and since N is a
monotonic function of p, a decrease in p leads to an increase in the gap between
N˜ and N⋆, that is, κ goes up. Finally, substituting Φ into the necessary condition
for concavity αγ < 1 gives Φ > 0, which concludes the proof.
(iv) Proof of the relationship T˜mins ≤ −T˜maxb ⇒ N˜ > N⋆
I start with the result from before that T˜mins ≤ −T˜maxb implies Q˜b−P˜s ≥ Q⋆b−P ⋆s .
Next I show that Qb−Ps is increasing in N only when p < P s. Since ∂Xs/∂N >
0, it is sufficient to show that
∂
∂Xs
(Qb − Ps) = γXγ−1s − p > 0⇔ p <
γ (α− 1)1−γ
Nα−αγ
.
Using the optimality result for N I obtain, for any value of δ,
p <
γ (α− 1)1−γ
Nα−αγ
= P s.
Hence, given that N˜ > N⋆ when p < P s, the initial relationship is proven.
Comparative statics for δ
To show that N (δ) is increasing in δ for given T˜ , I can use the above result
from the implicit function theorem for ∂N˜/∂δ > 0, with f = −cN˜1−αγ +
(1− τ) p (N˜α)1−γ + τγ (α− 1)1−γ . Since it is already shown that ∂f/∂N˜ < 0, I
only need to derive that ∂f/∂δ > 0, as follows
∂f/∂δ = τ
(
γ (α− 1)1−γ − p (N˜α)1−γ) > 0,
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which is true if and only if
p <
γ
N˜α−αγ
(α− 1)1−γ = P s.
Notes
1While the particular game-theoretical assumptions that I make regarding the structure
of bargain are first and foremost to facilitate modeling and exposition, there are conceivably
several alternative games that would fit to my research question. The two forms of rent sharing
used in this paper provide not only the best contrast between arm’s length trade and relational
outsourcing, but they also convey the message in a consistent but succinct way.
2The intuition behind sufficiency is that for any T˜mins and −T˜maxb , a fixed payment between
b and s can always be made so that both (4.2) and (4.3) are satisfied.
3Even further, N could be interpreted as the number of different ideas that are combined
into an output, while x (n)s is the amount of variable investments in each idea, such as the
number of hours worked.
4The full second-order conditions are derived in the Appendix.
5In particular, comparative statics of α and γ on N⋆ produce a bell-shaped relationship:
increased complementarity and specificity initially increase the optimal amount of innovation
as additional productivity gains are extracted from trade between b and s, but they eventually
decrease in N⋆ as incentives become increasingly distorted towards production on alternative
markets.
6In fact, β only changes the size of the range of self-enforceable transfers. When β is larger,
for example, the supplier has more bargaining strength relative to the buyer and is able to
require a higher T˜mins . But it does not tell which T˜s the parties choose.
7Alternatively, suppose that the supplier has full knowledge of the constraints of the buyer.
This is consistent with the model assumptions because the supplier observes Qb as well as β
and δ.
8Because the supplier is reacting to the demand of the buyer optimally, he sets marginal
costs equal to marginal revenue.
9The sufficient and necessary condition is simultaneous fulfillment of (4.2) and (4.3), as
discussed in Section 4.2.1. Since here I solve for the range of endogenous
{
N˜, x˜
}
, condition
(4.10) is, however, only necessary. It is nonetheless very informative, because it is given as a
function of exogenous parameters.
10Similarly, a reduction in costs c leads to an increase in both N˜ and N⋆ equivalent to the
effect shown Figure 4.5, but because costs impact profits both under arm’s length trade and
relational outsourcing, the effect on technology is somewhat stronger than that of p (that is,
all curves are steeper in 1/c). It might therefore be useful to think of the results shown in the
figure above as varying over a measure of the price-cost ratio of innovation in the horizontal
axis.
11This resembles the result in [1] Acemoglu et al. (2007) for the effect of an increase in
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contractibility, if one is willing to interpret P/Q as the more contractible part of the transaction.
12At least not in terms of the expectations of firms. I do not consider more complicated
cases in which higher moments of the distribution of ε affect the decisions of firms. Arguably,
uncertainty about shocks could be taken into account by modeling of the variance of ε, with
further implications for the discount factor δ.
13Dual or parallel sourcing is fairly common in this industry. While this type of sourcing
strategy constitutes a research topic on its own (see for instance Richardson, J. (1993). Parallel
sourcing and supplier performance in the Japanese automobile industry. Strategic Management
Journal, 14(5): 339-350), I do not explicitly model it as a separate outsourcing choice.
14Feenstra, R. (2013) United States Import and Export Data. Center For International Data,
University of California Davis. http://cid.econ.ucdavis.edu/usix.html
15That is, I first search for words from data set A in B (forward search), and then from B in
A (backward search). Final matches are only the results that score best in both searches.
16Since I measure trade volumes and not directly prices in the variable log (Trade), this
negative effect may be capturing an increasingly crowded market, where product differentiation
is lower and so also innovation.
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